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To me, this looks like just a little dressed-up claim that higher cost of 
living = more attractive city.  Surely I'll admit that there's some 
correlation there -- but it isn't perfect.  Much of Houston's cheap housing 
comes from very few geographical impediments to growth (flat, flat, 
flat), its lack of zoning laws, etc.  But of course some of it, I'll admit, 
does come because there ain't no Pacific Ocean view out the back 
window. 
 
Eric Ruhlin, after reviewing Kahn (1995), on April 
21, 2005 
 
I think you should put that as a quote at the front of your thesis.  Maybe a 
“dedication” even.  Some of your classmates will undoubtedly be 
quoting Keynes, Friedman, Greenspan, Adam Smith, etc.  I think you 
could confound and amaze them all by quoting an obscure source like 
myself.  
Eric Ruhlin on July 31, 2007
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ABSTRACT 
AMENITY EFFECT OR SUPPLY EFFECT? 
METROPOLITAN AMENITIES AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH HOUSING SUPPLY 
 
BY 
 
KWAME DONALDSON 
MAY 2009 
 
Committee Chair:  Dr. Geoffrey K. Turnbull 
Major Department:  Economics 
 
Standard models in urban economics assume that the boundary of an urban area will expand as 
long as the present value of land for urban uses is greater than the present value of land for rural 
uses.  Under this assumption, the boundary of the urban area is endogenously determined by the 
rent paid to rural landowners.  But this assumption is not realistic.  The physical expansion of 
many major urban areas in the United States is impeded by an exogenous boundary.  For 
example, geographic growth of the three most populated metropolitan areas in the country is 
limited by an ocean or a Great Lake.  In this thesis, we argue that such exogenous boundaries 
affect land prices throughout the urban area because inter-city migration is costly and these 
boundaries effectively constrain the supply of land.  Specifically, we develop a theoretical model 
in support of this conclusion and show that prices are highest in cities with the most restrictive 
exogenous boundaries, ceteris paribus.  This argument implies that researchers who do not 
control for exogenous boundaries could be introducing a systematic bias in their findings if they 
use land prices or rents to measure the value of public amenities in urban areas or the relative 
desirability of different cities. 
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Introduction 
The Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX MSA and the Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 
MSA have a lot in common.  Both metropolitan statistical areas rank among the ten most 
populated urban areas in the United States which suggests that each city enjoys the full 
complement of major metropolis amenities.  Both are in Texas which means that each is subject 
to the same state income tax rate (zero percent), state sales tax rate (6.25%), and state 
expenditure policies.  And the two cities are only 240 miles apart which indicates that they share 
similar climate, topography and access to regional amenities.   
Table 1: Growth in Population, Income and Home Prices in Dallas and Houston, 1996-2006 
 Population1 Real (2006) Per Capita Income2 Real (2006) Med. Home Price3 
MSA 1996 2006 Annual Growth 1996 2006
Annual 
Growth 1996 2006
Annual 
Growth
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
MSA 4,497,225 6,003,967 2.93% $33,829 $39,187 1.48% $132,987 $149,500 1.18%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, 
TX MSA 4,268,132 5,539,949 2.64% $33,483 $41,429 2.15% $108,831 $149,100 3.20%
 
In Table 1, we see that the similarities do not end there.  Between 1996 and 2006, these 
two MSAs were among only seven metro areas in the United States to add more than one million 
residents, and the increase in real per capita annual income for both MSAs over this ten year 
period ($5,358 in Dallas and $7,946 in Houston) ranks among the top 20% of all metro areas in 
the country.  But notice that one significant difference over the last ten years is the increase in 
the median sales price of an existing single-family home.  Houston’s increase in existing home 
prices ($40,269) closely matched the national average (near the 50th percentile of all MSAs), 
while Dallas’ increase in home prices ($16,513) lagged far behind (in the bottom quartile), just 
1.2% more than the U.S. inflation rate. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division estimates 
2 Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.  Wages 
and incomes are in real 2006 dollars.  All nominal-to-real adjustments in this study are computed using U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics’ CPI-U annual average index. 
3 National Association of Realtors Median Home Price Report 
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There are at least three reasons for the difference in the increase in home prices between 
Houston and Dallas from 1996 to 2006.  The first explanation is the theory advanced by standard 
Quality of Life (QOL) models in urban economics.  According to this view, there is an attractive 
local amenity that has been more abundant in Houston (relative to Dallas) over the last ten years 
and the hedonic price of this amenity is being captured by the land market than the labor market.  
Previous research has found that a coastline is an example of an amenity whose value is more 
capitalized in local rents compared to wages,4 which might lead us to conclude that Houston’s 
location close to the Gulf of Mexico is responsible for the observed difference in home price 
growth.  But Houston’s nearby Galveston Island is one of the oldest incorporated places in 
Texas.  Why would the amenity value of this beach (or any age-old, time-invariant feature) still 
be causing land price growth in the MSA almost 200 years after it was originally settled by 
Europeans?5 
A second explanation might hold that Houston’s land market in 1996 was not in 
equilibrium, and the growth in land prices that we have witnessed over the last ten years 
represents an equilibrium adjustment.  A version of this hypothesis was advanced in Greenwood, 
et al. (1991), and is supported by the data in Table 1.  While existing home prices were much 
lower in Houston than in Dallas in 1996, home prices in the two MSAs are roughly equal today.  
Given all of the other previously noted similarities between the two cities in terms of amenities 
and income, it is hardly a surprise that land prices in the two cities are now similar as well.  
However, the Greenwood argument is contradicted by the finding that the rate of population 
                                                 
4 See Blomquist, et al. (1988) or Gyourko and Tracy (1991) 
5 One legitimate answer to this question is that the coastline is a normal good, and that the demand and price for 
access to the coast is increasing with rising incomes.  However, housing prices in Houston have increased faster than 
incomes.  If Houston’s home price increase is only due to its proximity to the Gulf, this implies that access to this 
coast is a luxury good (if all households constantly consume one unit of housing) whose net present value has 
increased by $23,756 (=$40,269-$16,513) over the last decade. 
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growth in Houston is slightly outpaced by Dallas’ population growth rate.  Migrants have not 
been comparing the previously low home prices in Houston to the relatively more expensive 
houses in Dallas and choosing more often to move to Houston, en masse.6 
A third explanation is advanced in this thesis.  We argue that home prices may be rising 
faster in the Houston area because the supply of land in the Houston MSA is exogenously 
constrained by the Gulf of Mexico, whereas there are no comparable constraints on land supply 
in the Dallas MSA.  As the rising population in metro Houston consumes more of the area’s 
scarce developable land, home prices are rising faster because the marginal cost of acquiring this 
important input is increasing.  This argument best explains the relatively small increase in home 
prices in the Dallas region because this MSA is by far the most populous metro area with no 
significant exogenous constraints on the supply of land (Atlanta, GA, the second most-populated 
MSA with no such boundaries, has nearly one million fewer residents).  If this argument is 
correct, then we should continue to see home prices increase at faster rates in Houston than in 
Dallas as long as the population of the two cities continues to grow at roughly the same rate. 
However, we recognize that even this argument raises an important question: since land 
prices have been rising faster in supply-constrained Houston, why haven’t residents there chosen 
to relocate to Dallas, or some other quality-equivalent city with slower growing rents?  Such 
migration is the mechanism through which utility (and ultimately prices) is held constant in 
standard open city models in the QOL literature.  Our answer to this question is that migration is 
costly, contrary to a standard assumption in QOL models.  If the cost of migration exceeds the 
benefit of lower rent in potential destinations, then some residents will choose to stay even as 
land and housing prices increase in their present location.  In this thesis, we will attempt to show 
                                                 
6 This argument also does not identify why the two cities were not in equilibrium ten years ago and what has 
recently changed.  Also if this explanation is correct and equilibrium has finally been reached, then we should 
observe roughly identical rates of growth in home prices in Houston and Dallas from now on. 
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that in the presence of varying migration costs, a difference in the supply of land in two cities 
can lead to long-run differences in land prices. 
The three explanations are not mutually exclusive and each probably contributes to the 
observed difference in the increase in home prices between Dallas and Houston.  Importantly, 
our view makes no assumptions about changes in the quantity of urban amenities in either city 
over the last ten years.  In other words, the stock of each city’s local amenities and its relative 
worth to the marginal migrant can remain unchanged in Houston and Dallas, and we would still 
observe greater increases in home prices (given equal population growth) in Houston if the 
supply of developable land is a factor in the price of homes and if land supply is less constrained 
in Dallas.  If differences in the supply of land can lead to changes in home prices even as the set 
of local amenities remains constant, then this implies that home prices cannot be used to measure 
the value of these amenities unless we take these land supply differences into account.  
Many papers in urban economics use rents and wages to calculate hedonic price estimates 
for amenities and then rank different cities based on quality of life indices derived from these 
estimates.  But none of these inter-city studies control for inherent differences in the supply of 
land and housing due to natural geography, topography or regulations.  In the presence of 
migration costs, we show that researchers who fail to control for these differences could be 
introducing a systematic bias in their findings. 
The rest of this dissertation proceeds as follows.  The next section presents the basic 
intuition behind our argument using the supply-and-demand model, and Section III reviews the 
literature on QOL.  Section IV develops a theoretical model, and an empirical model is presented 
in Section V.  In Section VI, we describe the data used in this thesis, and present empirical 
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results in Section VII.  Section VIII concludes and summarizes proposed extensions of this 
thesis. 
Basic Intuition 
In this section, we present the basic intuition behind the argument that constraints on land 
supply can influence prices in an urban area.  Throughout the remainder of this thesis, we will 
make reference to the conclusions drawn from the simple models introduced in this section of the 
paper.  Specifically, in the literature review, we will discuss how standard assumptions in 
Quality of Life (QOL) models depart from the intuition presented in this section; in the theory 
section, we will formalize the intuition presented here; and we will connect this intuition to an 
estimation strategy in the empirical section.  
The basic intuition can be illustrated using supply and demand diagrams.  Markets for a 
city’s homes are depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 under various conditions.7  In all 
three drawings, the upward-sloping supply curve indicates that at higher prices producers are 
willing and able to supply more housing on a given amount of land.  For example, this might 
mean that at sufficiently high rents, developers are willing to replace single-story residences with 
high-rise apartment buildings or that homeowners are willing let out a spare bedroom.  In the 
first two illustrations, an outward shift in the city’s supply of housing is assumed to result from 
an expansion of the city’s border (i.e., b2 > b1 implies S(b2) > S(b1)). 
                                                 
7 In Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, we am assuming for simplicity that a home is a standardized commodity that is 
the same for all households (within and across cities), and that household income is also identical for everyone.  we 
relax these assumptions in Section IV.  
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In Figure 1, the city illustrated is “partially open” (a concept that we formally introduce 
in Chapter 0), and features a demand curve that is negatively sloped.  Some consumers are 
willing to pay for housing in the city at high prices (p1), and even more people will demand 
housing in the city at lower prices (p2).8  Under this assumption, an expansion of the border and 
the consequent increase in the supply of homes will result in a price decrease even if the factors 
that shift demand do not change.   
On the other hand, in Figure 2 we see that in standard open cities, changes in the supply 
of homes have no effect on prices because the demand for housing is perfectly elastic.  In this 
model, costless migration to identical cities gives every resident a free alternative to paying 
higher prices, and therefore no one pays a price different from p2.  If the boundary contracts and 
causes home prices to rise while leaving the area’s quality of life unchanged, then marginal 
migrants will costlessly vacate the city until rents are lowered to previous levels.  If the boundary 
expands and causes home prices to fall, then marginal migrants will flow freely into the city and 
                                                 
8 The two cities illustrated in these figures can either be thought of as the same metropolitan area with large 
differences in the supply of housing at different times (e.g., metro New Orleans before and after Hurricane Katrina) 
or two amenity-equivalent urban areas with differences in the supply of housing in the same year (e.g., the Dallas 
metro area and the Houston metro area in 2006). 
Figure 1: Market for Homes in a 
Partially Open City with Supply Shifts 
 
Figure 2: Market for Homes in an Open 
City with Supply Shifts 
Figure 3: Market for Homes in an Open 
City with Prices Changes 
2112 ppbb >→>  2112 ppbb =→>  2121 AApp >↔>  
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force rents back up.  Section IV formally connects the perfectly elastic demand curve for homes 
in Figure 2 to the assumptions of standard open city models in urban and regional economics.   
Note that if we assume that the demand for homes is perfectly elastic and we also observe 
that p1 is greater p2 as in Figure 3, then this must mean that the demand curve associated with p1 
lies above the demand curve associated with p2.  The higher demand curve suggests that at every 
quantity, migrants value the set of amenities in City 1 (A1) more than City 2’s amenities (A2).  
This further indicates that the quality of life available from higher priced city must exceed the 
QOL available in the lower priced city.  Under this assumption, the price differential completely 
compensates for the variation in quality.  Thus, assuming a perfectly elastic demand curve is 
sufficient to conclude that higher prices for homes in open cities are a direct consequence of 
greater demand or willingness-to-pay for these cities (either between cities or across time within 
the same city).   
But is such an assumption realistic?  Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest an intuitive empirical 
test that we can use to answer this question.   If it can be shown that the price of housing is 
negatively correlated with exogenous constraints on supply (after controlling for the factors that 
shift demand), then this is evidence that Figure 1 is a more accurate depiction of a city’s housing 
market.  However, if there is no statistically significant correlation between prices and land 
supply, then this could indicate that Figure 2 is the more correct model of the market for housing 
in cities. 
Literature Review 
This paper essentially tests a standard implication of the Rosen/Roback model.  This 
model, which is the foundation of the Quality of Life (QOL) literature, assumes migrants have no 
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special attachment to any particular city.9  This assumption, which is similar to the 
“homogeneous product” condition underlying perfectly competitive markets, leads to the 
horizontal demand curve for a city’s housing services depicted in Figure 2.  Rosen (1974) spells 
out the assumption in his influential paper.  He writes that “product differentiation implies that a 
wide variety of alternative packages are available” and “competition prevails because single 
agents add zero weight to the market and treat prices as parametric to their decisions (p. 35).”  
However, he acknowledges that this assumption is an “enormous simplification” and “better 
approximated in some markets than others.” 
Roback (1982), who builds on theoretical insights of Rosen to construct wage-and-rent-
encompassing quality of life indices in urban areas, maintains the related assumption that “the 
cost of changing residences is zero.”10  Her pioneering model assumes that workers and firms are 
willing to pay higher rents in nicer places.  Furthermore, workers will accept lower wages in 
places they like, while firms will pay higher wages in their preferred locations.  These higher 
prices can be retrieved from hedonic wage and rent regressions and then used to construct QOL 
indices.   
The costless migration assumption of Rosen and Roback are perfectly reasonable when 
making intra-city quality of life assessments.  In this context, we can easily imagine a continuum 
of marginally different adjacent neighborhoods stretching from the tiny studio apartment high-
rises of the CBD to the vast thirty acre estates in the exurbs.  Also, residents who move from one 
community to another within the metro area will pay little in direct moving expenses or indirect 
                                                 
9 Put differently, Gyourko, et al. (1999) explain that the QOL methodology “hinges on the equilibrium assumption 
that these (marginal) worker/households are indifferent to their choice of location at the current implicit prices.” p. 
1446. 
10 The opportunity cost of migrating from City A to City B is the foregone amenities of City A.  If City A and City B 
have the same set of amenities, then the opportunity cost of switching between them is zero.  In this regard, 
assuming costless migration is related to the assumption that cities are identical.  A large number of such identical 
cities will have no individual market power as in Rosen’s perfectly competitive framework. 
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opportunity costs (e.g., these migrants do not necessarily forfeit their social networks, the city’s 
cultural, climatic, or geographical amenities, or local job prospects).  But when making inter-city 
comparisons, assuming costless migration to an identical community is not as realistic.  Many 
cities in the United States have no close substitutes, residents who switch between them must 
bear substantial direct and indirect costs, and variations in the supply of developable land among 
these urban areas must therefore be taken into account before we can use land prices to make 
meaningful comparisons of the relative desirability of different cities.11 
However, many studies in urban economics use local land and labor prices to make inter-
city comparisons without directly accounting for the differences in the supply of land.  For 
example, Blomquist, et al. (1988) use rents and wages to rank 253 urban counties, and Gyourko 
and Tracy (1991) use an equivalent compensating differentials approach to produce several 
rankings of 130 metro areas.  Kahn (1995) uses wages and rents to conclude that Chicago and 
Houston have a lower quality of life than New York and San Francisco, and Cragg and Kahn 
(1997) rank all U.S. States using land and labor market prices.  To the extent that all of these 
studies use rents or land prices to derive QOL rankings, we argue that there exists a bias which 
favors (i.e., gives higher rankings to) areas with a more limited supply of land. 
Most of these papers also use hedonic regressions to estimate the willingness-to-pay for 
various urban amenities (a coastline, climate attributes, public education, crime rates, etc.).  
Since none of these studies control for factors that affect the supply of land, we believe that the 
derived willingness-to-pay for any amenity that is positively correlated with factors that restrict 
land supply is overestimated, and vice versa.  For example, we argue that the willingness-to-pay 
                                                 
11 Idiosyncratic migration costs give rise to the downward-sloping demand curve for cities in Figure 1.  As 
illustrated, differences in supply will lead to different prices in a market with a negatively sloped demand curve even 
if the factors that shift demand (e.g., amenity attributes) do not change.  Thus, under these conditions, prices cannot 
be used to gauge amenity values unless we also account for shifts in supply. 
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for the “coast” attribute is inflated because coastlines (in addition to being “nice” amenities) 
increase land prices in waterfront cities by restricting the supply of land within a given distance 
of the Central Business District.  Moreover, if coastal cities receive more rainfall, then the pure 
amenity value of the “precipitation” attribute will be overestimated as well.12  In the next section, 
we formally derive these biases using a simple set of assumptions to describe the supply and 
demand for housing in urban areas. 
Although the QOL literature is relatively new to economics, we emphasize that scholars 
have been debating whether prices are a suitable measure of attractiveness since the beginnings 
of modern economics.   In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that “if in the same 
neighborhood, there was any employment evidently more or less advantageous than the rest, so 
many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that 
its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments (p. 111).”  This reasoning 
lies at the foundation of the idea that wages paid to different occupations represent compensating 
differentials because these payments equilibrate the net appeal of every job.  This argument also 
implies that wages alone are a suitable barometer of the relative desirability of various 
occupations – the jobs that pay the highest wages must be the least attractive.  
Seventy years later in Principles of Political Economy John Stuart Mill challenged this 
view. 
It is altogether a false view of the state of facts to present [compensating 
differentials] as the relation which generally exists between agreeable and 
disagreeable employments.  The really exhausting and the really repulsive labors, 
instead of being better paid than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, 
because they are performed by those who have no choice. (pp. 474-475) 
 
                                                 
12 In fact, Gyourko and Tracy find that “precipitation” is possibly a disamenity (i.e., more precipitation lowers 
rents).  Thus, instead of the hedonic amenity value being overestimated, we am actually arguing that this disamenity 
value could be underestimated. 
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In this passage, Mill suggests that the positive and negative attributes of a job are not the only 
factors that determine how much a worker earns.  The wage is also determined by the supply of 
other workers.  Later, Mill points out that “natural and artificial monopolies” separate the labor 
market into non-competing segments, resulting in an oversupply of labor to disagreeable, low-
skilled jobs. 
 The source of the dispute between Smith and Mill lies in the qualifier “if in the same 
neighborhood.”  Smith is describing a labor market where there are no barriers between 
occupations; Mill is characterizing a labor market where the cost of switching between jobs is 
not zero.  When the cost of switching between jobs is considerable, the wage paid to an 
occupation with a relatively limited supply of workers might be much higher than the wage paid 
to an occupation with a relatively abundant supply of workers, even if the job attributes are 
identical in every way.  In this case, compensating differentials cannot be used to compare the 
disagreeable and agreeable attributes of these occupations.  
Mill was not the last scholar to recognize the limitations of the compensating differentials 
argument.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have also argued that Smith’s reasoning may be 
flawed when considering markets where the cost of switching between suppliers is not zero. 
The idea that regional wages might be positively correlated with regional 
unemployment is based ultimately on Adam Smith’s notion of compensating 
differentials.  The ability of workers and firms to migrate is what underpins this 
relationship.  If, however, migration is costly, agents are likely to see it as an 
investment.  They will be inclined, therefore, to calculate the expected or 
“permanent” returns and costs. (p. 22) 
 
Later, the authors conclude that “migration generates heavy short-run costs…therefore, migrants’ 
choices are not likely to respond to transitory movements in economic conditions (p. 93).”  
Notice that by applying these arguments to the regional context, these authors extend Mill’s 
original criticism from the labor market only to both the labor and land markets.  
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Over the last 30 years, the basic logic behind compensating differentials has become an 
important component of the QOL literature in urban economics. We have already noted that 
Kahn (1995) uses the fact that rents are higher in San Francisco than in Houston to conclude that 
the quality of life in San Francisco must be superior to the QOL in Houston.13  Using more 
modern terminology, Kahn bases this conclusion on essentially the same assumptions made by 
Smith, “if migration is costless, people will arbitrage across space to maximize their utility.  This 
process leads to a capitalization of local public goods into local wages and rentals (p. 222).”  
Kahn’s “migration is costless” condition is equivalent to Smith’s requirement that the jobs being 
compared must be “in the same neighborhood.”  Smith’s reasoning that employees will crowd 
into advantageous occupations and desert disagreeable ones is the same as Kahn’s view that 
“people will arbitrage across space.”  And the “capitalization process” that Kahn describes is a 
straight-forward generalization of the equalization of “returns to employment” noted by Smith. 
Given the similarities between Smith’s and Kahn’s reasoning, it is not surprising that 
Mill’s critique is applicable to both arguments.  For instance, in response to Kahn’s conclusion 
that higher rents in San Francisco imply a superior quality of life, Mill might note that this view 
ignores the important role that natural and artificial restrictions on the supply of land and 
dwellings can have on the rents that residents pay.  If the supply of land and housing in San 
Francisco is more limited than the supply in Houston, then we expect residents of San Francisco 
to pay higher rents, even if the QOL attributes of the two cities are identical in every way.  San 
Francisco’s many barriers to new urban development effectively prevent migrants from 
relocating to and away from the Bay Area as inexpensively as they could migrate to and from 
Houston.   
                                                 
13 Like every post-Roback study in the quality of life literature, Kahn’s conclusions are based on rents and wages.  
Kahn’s study ranks a total of five cities (Chicago, Houston, New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco), see Table 
33. 
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Where migration costs are considerable, there is no reason to believe that migration will 
arbitrage away amenity price differentials.  Because of this, we cannot automatically conclude 
that higher prices indicate a more desirable bundle of public amenities unless we control for 
differences in supply.  Gyourko, et al. (2006) alludes to this conclusion. 
Standard compensating differential models attribute differences in prices across 
markets to variation in amenities and other local traits.  By contrast, the superstar 
cities view implies that limited land supply results in a rightward shift in the 
income distribution and rising land prices that are neither due to changes in the 
innate attractiveness of living there nor in local productivity. (pp. 4-5) 
 
A similar argument has also recently been advanced by Glaeser, et al. (2003) who concludes that 
housing prices are high in Manhattan and some other parts of the country because government 
regulations limit the supply of dwellings.  While Gyourko et al. present a theoretical argument 
with simulations, and Glaeser et al. advance an anecdotal case, this thesis aims to systematically 
assess whether these housing supply concerns apply across a broad array of cities. 
Theory 
The Rosen-Roback Model 
Roback (1982) envisions a world where all people and business are the same.  A firm is 
characterized by a cost function, which through profit maximization becomes a profit function 
that depends on local wages, rents and local attributes, or amenities.  Costless migration implies 
that firms will relocate to new cities if they can earn higher profits there.  In equilibrium, then, it 
must be the case that economic profits (profits in the city in question minus profits available 
elsewhere) must equal zero: 
( ), ; 0w r Aπ π− = .  (4.1)  
In equation 1, π represents the profits available to the firm in every other location.  Similarly, 
people in the Roback model have preferences, which after utility maximization generate an 
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indirect utility function which also depends on wages, rents and amenities.  Amenities are 
defined to be goods for people, although the same assumption is not made for firms.  Amenities 
can either be productive (profit enhancing) or unproductive (profit reducing).  Costless migration 
across cities implies that the utility available in any city be identical to the utility available in any 
other location: 
( ), ; 0v r w A v− = ,  (4.2) 
where v is the utility available to a resident in every other location.  As the discussion above 
makes clear 0, 0r wπ π< <  and 0, 0, 0r w Av v v< > >  while πA is indeterminate in sign.  Equations 
4.1 and 4.2 implicitly define Π and V, which are indifference curves for firms and people in rent-
wage-amenity space.  Figure 4 shows the equilibrium condition as usually represented.  For a 
given level of amenities, rents and wages in a city are determined by the condition that firms and 
residents are indifferent between the city and all other cities, and that rents and wages are the 
same for firms and residents. 
 Within this framework, the effect of amenities on rents and wages are derived by taking 
the derivative of the equilibrium price and wages, as implicitly defined by the equality of Π and 
V.  Equations 4.3 and 4.4 show these derivatives and sign them for a productive amenity. 
0w A A w
r w w r
v vr
A v v
π π
π π
−∂ = >∂ − .  (4.3) 
0A r r A
r w w r
v vw
A v v
π π
π π
>
<
−∂ =∂ − .  (4.4) 
The signs of these derivatives are also available from the manipulation of the indifference curves 
in Figure 4, as shown in Figure 5. 
 These results are important, because they provide a theoretical grounding for the use of 
the partial correlation of rents and wages with city characteristics as weights in constructing 
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Quality of Life (QOL) indices, as was done by Roback and many later authors.14  Under the 
model’s assumptions, the regression coefficients that these equations represent are appropriate 
measures of the value of the amenities because they incorporate only the effects on utility and 
profits, and because they incorporate the preferences of both firms and residents.  Combining the 
information from partial correlations of several amenities (indexed with k) with wages and rents 
across several local labor markets (controlling as for differences in housing and worker quality) 
the residents’ revealed willingness to pay for area QOL can be computed and compared across 
cities (indexed by c), as in Equation 4.5. 
c kc
k k k
dr dwQOL A
dA dA
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑   (4.5) 
Rankings of cities based on such indices have been an important part of the amenity literature 
since Roback (1982), and their sensitivity to various changes in specification has been examined 
thoroughly.  More important than the rankings themselves, however, is the underlying view of 
regional equilibrium the rankings represent.  This view allows for the interpretation of inter-city 
differences in rents and wages as compensating differentials.  While the rankings of cities may 
be of little import (in this model, after all, utility is the same in all cities), the view of regional 
price differences as equilibrium compensation for differences in quality of life is more 
fundamental, as it gives inter-city price differentials informational content. 
The Partially Open City Model with Heterogeneous Moving Costs 
While Roback’s model offers powerful insight into the processes that set regional wages 
and housing costs, it is perhaps too persuasive.  There has been little research into the effects on 
the model of firm and worker heterogeneity and moving costs.  Heterogeneity has generally been 
dealt with in a footnote noting that in its presence, the results hold for the marginal migrant.  This 
                                                 
14 See Gyourko et al. (1997) for a review of this literature.   
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marks a major departure from the original hedonic model of Rosen (1974), where the entire point 
is arguably to show the possibility of efficient sorting of buyers and sellers.  The possibility of 
moving costs preventing the equilibrium described above was seen as making small deviations 
from equilibrium values possible, but has not been seen as either theoretically or empirically 
interesting. 
We make one minor modification to the Roback model.  Firms and residents are still 
assumed to be identical in their preference or cost functions, except for an idiosyncratic 
component representing costs of moving away from their current location.  Equations 1 and 2 are 
thus rewritten as equations 5.6 and 5.7: 
( ), ; ~ ( )jw r A Fπ π ψ− ≥ ⋅   (4.6) 
( ), ; ~ ( )iv r w A v Gϕ− ≥ ⋅ .  (4.7) 
F(.) and G(.) represents the CDF of the gains to migration for firms and individuals, respectively.  
This change means that, for any given location (or, equivalently, any given level of amenities), 
firms and residents have identical preferences for wages, rents and amenities in general, but have 
idiosyncratic attachment to the location (moving costs).  Because their preferences for wages, 
rents and amenities are the same, the idea of the reservation profits and utility (π and v) is still 
valid.  This set of assumptions makes it impossible for us to address the sorting aspect of location 
choice as well as Rosen (1974) does.  However, it simplifies the analysis. 
There are two prominent models of cities in urban economics.  The most common 
representation, the open city model, is based on the assumption of costless migration which leads 
us to conclude that utility across an economy’s open cities is fixed.  Costless migration to other 
open cities ensures that population flows will equilibrate the price-adjusted quality of life among 
residences, and this model can be illustrated by assuming that the demand for the city’s homes is 
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perfectly elastic as in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  A second representation, the closed city model, is 
based on the assumption that the city’s population is fixed, which can be equivalently stated as 
the cost of moving for all residents approaches infinity.15  This model can be illustrated by 
assuming that the demand for the city’s homes is perfectly inelastic. 
In this thesis, we introduce a more general model: the partially open city model that 
features heterogeneous moving costs.  we assume that some of the city’s residents have 
vanishingly low or even negative moving costs as in the open city model, other residents have 
prohibitively high moving costs as in the closed city model, and still others have moving costs 
that lie somewhere in between.  This model can be illustrated in a very simplified setting by 
assuming that the demand for the city’s homes has a negative slope as in Figure 1. 
These idiosyncratic attachments to a city could arise for a number of reasons.  For people, 
investments in social ties, location-specific human capital investments (as in Krupka, 2007), a 
sentimental and unreasoning fear of change, uncertainty about other cities or a difficult-to-
replace job in the current city (such as an academic position) could all increase migration costs.  
From the perspective of the firm, large investments in fixed capital, adaptation to local business 
norms or the use of locally concentrated distribution networks, as well as the personal interests of 
the firm’s decision makers would generate similar attachment to the current location.  In both 
cases, a purely idiosyncratic taste for the area could also exist.  These attachments will vary 
across individuals. 16 
Many features that are generally regarded as amenities can also increase the cost of 
moving.  For example, many major cities offer a unique combination of historical and cultural 
amenities that may be of special interest to the area’s current residents (e.g., Atlanta’s status as 
                                                 
15 This simplified summation of the closed city model assumes that the fixed population is completely immobile. 
16 Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) embed such heterogeneity in a core-periphery model and show that the heterogeneity 
is a strong force for dispersion. 
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the cradle of America’s civil rights movement, Miami’s particular mix of Cuban and West Indian 
influences, Salt Lake City’s unique Mormon heritage and history).  Similarly, industry 
agglomerations or an abundant natural resource supply can create singular labor market 
opportunities for workers or firms in many major cities (e.g., financial services in New York 
City, entertainment in Los Angeles, automobile manufacturing in Detroit).  Because these cities 
feature one-of-a-kind amenities, they are more analogous to oligopoly firms with market power 
over brand-loyal customers and negatively sloped demand curves than price-taking firms in 
perfectly competitive markets and horizontal demand curves as envisioned by Rosen/Roback.  
We find these assumptions so descriptively obvious as not to warrant further elaboration. 
Equations 4.6 and 4.7 imply that the indifference curves used in Figure 4 and Figure 5 represent 
the preferences (or profits) of only one person (or firm).  For any given amenity level, rent-wage 
space will be characterized by a field of V and Π curves, each representing a different person or 
firm.  City population of households and firms will be set by the proportion of firms and 
households for which inequalities 4.6 and 4.7 hold, which is determined by plugging the left 
hand side of each inequality into the CDF of the idiosyncratic attachments (F and G, 
respectively).17  In general, for any given amenity level, indifference curves more to the left will 
be consistent with higher populations of firms and residents (because rents are lower for any 
given wage level), while indifference curves to the right will be associated with fewer residents 
willing to live in the city at those rent-wage combinations.  With population modeled as 
continuous, this set of indifferences curves could be thought of as two surfaces in rent-wage-
population space sloping down as one moves away from the wage-axis.   
                                                 
17 In the following, we normalize the utility and profit functions so that reservation utility and profits (v and π) are 
zero. 
19 
 
 
 
While any rent-wage combination will be equilibrium for some assumed combination of 
residential and commercial populations, only a subset of them will satisfy local labor market 
equilibrium, where the quantity of jobs equals the number of workers.  That is, the city’s 
economy will not be in equilibrium without an additional condition: 
( ) ( )( , ; ) ( , ; )G v r w A F r w Aπ= . 
Figure 7: Local Labor Market Equilibrium 
 
 highlights the set of points in rent-wage space where labor market equilibrium is achieved.  This 
set of points could also be thought of as the intersection of the two surfaces described above.  
The imposition of labor market equilibrium line in equation 4.8 does two things.  First, 
G-F=0 implicitly defines wage as a function of rents and amenities, w=w(r; A).  In Figure 4, w(r; 
A) is drawn as a straight line with the mildest of positive slopes.  In general, the slope of w(r; A) 
will be 
r r
r
w w
F G vw
G v F
π
π
′ ′−= ′ ′− , 
                                                 
18 Equation 4.8 requires that the number of jobs be equal to the number of 
workers. 
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which cannot be signed without further assumptions.  As higher rents drive away both firms and 
residents, the effect of higher rents on equilibrium wage will depend on whether these higher 
rents affect firm location more or less than residential location. 
The imposition of labor market equilibrium also defines the population of firms and 
residents in the city for any amenity-rent combination.  We define the population of residents in 
the city as ( ) ( )( )( ); , ; ;r A G v r w r A AΩ = .  A similar formulation is available for the population 
of firms in a city.  Ω(r; A) will be important later when we close the model.  The effect of rents 
on city population is easily derived: ( )r r w rG v v w′Ω = + .  Because wr is ambiguous, the effect of 
rents on population may appear ambiguous, but the derivative can be shown to be 
unambiguously negative: higher rents drive down population, amenities constant.     
It is the presence of Ω(r; A) that begins to set the current model apart from the Roback 
(1982) formulation, which neglected population levels for the most part. While area population is 
dealt with in Roback (1980), Roback (1988) and Blomquist et al. (1988), population is set by 
dividing average housing demand into the exogenously determined land area, which is defined 
either as the land area of a county or the amount of land available with a certain measured level 
of amenity.  None of these models allow for migration in or out of the area based on amenity, 
rent or wage levels.  We consider this addition to be highly desirable, as it certainly says 
something about the attractiveness of a location if more people live in it.  In the Ann Arbor, MI 
MSA, the average annual household income and monthly rent is $56,817 and $834, which is 
comparable to the average income and rent in the Chicago metro area, $57,008 and $830.19  The 
additional information that Chicago has nearly thirty times more people than Ann Arbor, MI 
seems relevant in terms of understanding the nature of the amenities in the two locations. 
                                                 
19 American Community Survey, 2006 
21 
 
 
 
While the effects of rents on wages and population are relatively easy to derive, the 
effects of amenities are somewhat muddled by the typology of amenities.  We classify amenities 
in three categories: productive, nonproductive and unproductive.20  Productive amenities increase 
utility and profits; nonproductive amenities increase utility but do not affect profits, and 
unproductive amenities increase utility but decrease profits.  In general, the effects of these kinds 
of amenities map directly onto the results from the standard Roback model, except that it does 
not yet make sense to talk about the effect of amenities on rents, since we have not yet derived 
equilibrium rents.  Holding rents constant, ( )A A w AG v v w′Ω = + and 
A A
A
w w
F G vw
G v F
π
π
′ ′−= ′ ′− . 
The signs of these partial derivatives will depend on the type of amenity.  Productive amenities 
will increase population but have an ambiguous effect on wages.  Nonproductive amenities will 
have a positive effect on population and a negative effect on wages.  Unproductive amenities will 
have a negative effect on wages and an ambiguous effect on population. 
For the partial effects above, it was necessary to hold rents constant because assuming 
labor market equilibrium in equation 4.8 did not actually close the model.  For any distribution of 
moving costs and any level of amenities, there is a continuum of possible rent-wage-population 
combinations.  To close the model, we must also assume that the local housing market is also in 
equilibrium.  Equation 4.9 defines this condition: 
( ; ) ( ; ) ( , ( ; ))S r C r A D r w r A= Ω .  (4.9) 
In equation 4.9, we introduce the housing supply function, which depends upon rents (positively, 
so that Sr > 0) and other cost factors (so that SC < 0).  The demand for housing depends on Ω, or 
                                                 
20 This 2nd term is new, and we are open to better ones. 
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population, and the per-capita demand for housing, D, which depends on rents and wages.21  
Although wr is ambiguous of sign and Dw is positive, we will assume that  Dr+Dwwr < 0,  so that 
a form of the law of demand holds. 
 Equation 4.9 means that S-ΩD=0 implicitly defines rent as a function of amenities and 
housing cost shifters: r(A, C).  Having equilibrium rents defined allows us to determine 
equilibrium wages, w(r; A).  Together, equilibrium rents and wages allow us to determine 
equilibrium residential (and firm) population, Ω(r; A).  Thus, housing market equilibrium closes 
the model and we are able to derive the effects of any exogenous factor on rents, wages or 
population.  In particular, we derive the effect of a change in amenities on the equilibrium rental 
rate: 
( )A w Ar r r w r
D D wdr
dA S D D D w
Ω +Ω= −Ω −Ω + . (4.10)  
This amenity effect bears little resemblance to the effect as derived in Section A of this Chapter 
reproducing the Roback capitalization result (Equation 4.3), despite the fact that it represents the 
“marginal” migrant.  This underscores just how much the addition of heterogeneous moving 
costs affects the model.  The Roback “open city” result can be reproduced by assuming that 
G F′ ′=  and taking the limit of Equation 4.10 as these quantities approach infinity.22  This 
exercise confirms that the Roback (1982) formalization is a special case of the heterogeneous 
moving costs model, where moving cost heterogeneity is eliminated.  One interesting factor in 
Equation 4.10 is the Sr term in the denominator.  As this term approaches infinity (as housing is 
supplied more elastically) the rent effect of amenities approaches zero.  This is a formalization of 
                                                 
21 D represents the combined demand for land for each resident.  This includes the resident’s living space as well as 
his work space.  If land and labor are strong complements in production, increases in wages will decrease firms’ 
demand for land while increasing residents’ demand for land, making the total effect on demand for land of an 
increase in wage ambiguous.  we will assume that Dw>0, but this assumption is not important for our results.  
22 G’ and F’ enter into equation 4.10 through the ΩA and Ωr terms, which contain wr and wA as well as G’. 
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a result suggested casually in the conclusion of Glaeser et al. (2006), which also stresses the 
importance of housing supply in setting city rents.   
An important result arising from Equation 4.10 is that its sign is actually ambiguous for 
any kind of amenity.  If the amenity in question is productive, the first term in the numerator is 
positive but the second term is ambiguous.  If the amenity is nonproductive, the first term is 
positive while the second term is negative.  Finally, in the case of an unproductive amenity 
(which reduces profits but increases utility), the first term in the numerator is ambiguous while 
the second term is negative.  The denominator is always positive.  While ambiguous results are 
generally not considered as important as ones we can sign a priori, we think the ambiguity of 
Equation 4.10 is an important result in its own right.23  It underscores that in the presence of 
heterogeneous moving costs – which certainly exist in the world which generates our data – we 
know much less about the effects of amenities on rents and wages than the Roback open-city 
formulation suggests. 
Furthermore, the importance of housing market factors both in the setting of equilibrium 
rents (and thus wages), and in equation 4.10 is new.  While Glaeser et al. (2005), Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2005), and Gyourko et al. (2006) have been moving towards this conclusion from 
other directions, the above frames the importance of housing supply directly in a compensating 
differentials model.  What is important about Equation 4.10 is not so much that it is ambiguous 
of sign, but that it includes several non-preference factors, such as housing supply and housing 
demand parameters and the homogeneity of residents and firms (through the ΩA and Ωr terms).  
This is an important difference from the Roback amenity effect, which depends only on 
preference and profit parameters.  This difference raises questions about the interpretability of 
                                                 
23 Blomquist et al. (1988) generate ambiguous effects by assuming that population (set as described above) has an 
ambiguous productivity or congestion effect after Tolley (1974).  Much of the ambiguity in equation 10 can be 
resolved if we assume that firms are not heterogeneous in moving costs. 
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the assumed hedonic prices derived from hedonic regressions.  If these coefficients reflect 
elasticities of housing demand and supply and the distribution of moving costs among firms and 
people as well as the effects of amenities on utility and profits, how appropriate are they as 
weights in a QOL index? 
We can also derive the effects of amenities on wages: 
A r
dw drw w
dA dA
= + . (4.11) 
Because the last term in Equation 4.11 represents the product of two ambiguous terms, this effect 
is also ambiguous in sign for all types of amenity.  Taking the limit of Equation 4.11 as G F′ ′=  
approaches infinity confirms (after much tedious algebra) that the Roback wage effect (Equation 
4.4) is nested inside the heterogeneous moving cost model.  While we think the ambiguity of 
sign is important in Equation 4.11, more important is the composition of the effect, which 
includes influences from the housing market as in Equation 4.10 as well as all the influences of 
firm and resident heterogeneity through G′  and F ′ , which appear in both wr and wA.  More 
realistic assumptions about the labor market would add additional terms to these effects that have 
nothing to do with the taste that firms and residents have for amenities.   
 We believe that the heterogeneous moving costs model is an important extension of the 
Roback (1982) model, and that it offers important insights into the nature of inter-area price 
differences and the setting of regional equilibrium in area-specific prices and population 
distributions.  The results above suggest that it would take a very clever econometrician to 
extract appropriate QOL weights from cross-city hedonic regression coefficients, which would 
reproduce empirical estimates of Equation 4.10 and Equation 4.11.  Because of these new terms, 
we argue that the partial correlation of area amenities with local housing and labor prices cannot 
be accepted as purely compensating, that the interpretation given to cross-city hedonic prices in 
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the QOL literature up to this point are not valid, and that a QOL index based on these hedonic 
prices is uninterpretable. 
 Driving the sign of a partial derivative to ambiguity is not a constructive contribution.  In 
some sense, the simplification of a model is what allows us to get explicit signs in our theoretical 
relationships, and is the entire point of theory.  We believe the empirical investigation of the 
importance of moving costs and amenity capitalization is an important next step in our 
understanding of cities’ interaction and the workings of inter-city labor markets.  The model also 
contains several factors not stressed in the original theory (wA and wr), but which are in principle 
observable, so we do not view this model as purely destructive or critical.  Instead, we see it as 
improving our understanding of regional equilibrium in prices and populations. 
Cost shifters and QOL indices 
The importance of housing supply in Equation 4.10 is one of its contrasts with Equation 
4.3.  The traditional Roback formalization of the effect of amenities on rents did not include 
housing supply factors because with costless migration (at least for the marginal migrant), cities 
with low amenities could not support higher rents driven by local housing supply (cost) 
differences.  To the extent that such differences increased rents, they would cause out-migration, 
thus lowering rents back to the level the local amenities made feasible.  When migration costs 
are heterogeneous, however, cost-related rent increases can increase rents locally.  While this 
will cause some people to move away (those with the lowest moving costs), some people will be 
willing to accept the higher housing costs in order to continue to capitalize on their local 
attachments.  This result is easily shown by taking the derivative of the implicit rent function 
with respect to the cost term: 
( ) 0Cr r r w r
Sdr
dC S D D D w
−= >−Ω −Ω + .  (4.12)  
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Given the above discussion, Equation 4.12 is not too surprising, although it bears emphasis that 
this result was unavailable in the Roback framework.  The Roback result on local housing costs 
can be reproduced here by allowing Ωr to approach negative infinity.  This drives the 
denominator towards positive infinity, and the derivative as a whole to zero.  Thus, with regard 
to the effect of housing costs on rents, the difference between the heterogeneous moving cost 
model and the Roback model arises from a difference in the assumption on the rent-elasticity of 
city population.  Roback implicitly assumes this elasticity is negative infinity, we assume it is 
something larger than that.   
 While Equation 4.12 is not too surprising, a more important result is available if we allow 
for the existence of some amenities that affect the cost of land or of construction.  There are 
many reasons why amenities may cause land to be more costly.  For instance, in the canonical 
model of the monocentric city, high agricultural yields increase the opportunity cost of land city-
wide.  Such high agricultural yields could be the result of favorable climate.  Rough terrain or 
large swaths of undevelopable area (such as water or national parks) could also increase the cost 
of land in a city by making land scarce or forcing longer commutes over or around these 
obstacles.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) show that topography also appears to have a positive direct 
effect on construction costs.  As such features also offer considerable scenic and recreational 
value (are amenities) and could increase profits (through shipping on coasts or mining in 
mountains) these features have two effects on local rents.  First, they may increase them because 
of their value as amenities.  Second, they will increase rents through their effect on land or 
construction costs in the metro area.  Other factors that could have similar effects (through both 
amenity and cost effects) would include the risk of natural disaster or regulations restricting 
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development such as a binding urban growth boundary or reactionary zoning (as in Glaeser et al. 
(2005a)).   
 The effects on rents of such supply-restricting amenities will be different from those that 
do not restrict supply, as shown in Equation 4.13. 
( )C A A w Ar r r w r
S C D D wdr
dA S D D D w
−Ω −Ω= − −Ω −Ω + . (4.13)  
Equation 4.13 differs from Equation 4.10 in that the term -SCCA has been added.  This term 
represents the amenity’s effect on the supply function through the cost term.  What is somewhat 
troubling is that most natural amenities that leap to mind – coasts, mountains, parks – either 
restrict developable land or increase the cost of development.  On the other hand, most cultural 
amenities have no supply effect.  Equation 4.13 tells us that such cultural amenities will appear 
to be less important in the rental equation of a cross-city hedonic model than natural amenities 
that restrict housing supply, even when their effect on utility and profits are identical.  While 
Equation 4.13 is still ambiguous for every kind of amenity, it is unambiguously greater when the 
amenity causes greater supply restrictions. 
 The existence of this change in the effects of amenities on rents (and thus wages) is 
troubling because the QOL literature uses the effects of amenities on rents and wages as weights 
in the construction of all-encompassing QOL indices.  Roback’s beautifully argued theory leads 
us to believe that in estimating such weights, we are estimating Equation 4.3 in the rent equation.  
However, heterogeneous moving costs imply that in fact we are estimating Equation 4.10.  We 
argued above that Equation 4.10 implies that traditional QOL indices are uninterpretable, but the 
situation is actually worse.  For some amenities we are estimating Equation 4.10, while for other, 
supply-restricting amenities, we are estimating Equation 4.13, which will vary depending on the 
amenity’s effect on construction costs, CA.  The net effect of this is that QOL indices will tend to 
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overemphasize the value of supply-restricting amenities relative to supply-neutral amenities, and 
thus rank areas with high levels of supply-restricting amenities higher in quality of life indices 
than areas specializing in more supply-neutral amenities.  To the extent that traditional QOL 
indices are interpretable, they are biased.  Even approaches which avoid the direct estimation of 
equation 13 (as in Kahn (1995) and Cragg and Kahn (1997)) will be affected by this supply-
restricting effect because the lower supply of housing in some areas will be pushing rents up, 
making them look more attractive.  It is unlikely that this bias will be cancelled out by the 
information from the cross-city wage hedonic.  Examining Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.11, we 
conclude that this canceling out of the bias could occur if wr were exactly one.  However, we 
cannot even be sure that wr is positive, let alone equal to one.  If wr < 0, the wage side of the 
QOL index will actually exacerbate the bias introduced in the rent equation.  
 We not the first to suggest that coefficients from the cross-city hedonic might be biased.  
Gyourko et al (1991) make a similar point with regard to local public finance issues.  However, 
the bias we highlight here is perhaps more vexing because, empirically, correcting for this 
tendency will be extremely difficult.  As we do not observe the value people and businesses 
place on certain characteristics, or the level and patterns of development that would have 
occurred in the absence of the supply-restricting features, it will be very difficult to determine 
how much supply has been restricted in a given urban area and how much rents have responded 
to that supply restriction, as opposed to the utility- and/or profit-enhancing aspects of the features 
restricting supply.  However, without making such a distinction, it is hard to imagine how the 
coefficients in a cross-city hedonic would be appropriate in assigning weights to area 
characteristics.  Such coefficients may be reflecting the high average moving costs of an area’s 
population as much as the great value the residents place on their local characteristics.  
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in the Roback Model Figure 5: Effect on Wages and Rents of a Productive Amenity 
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Figure 6: Π and V with Heterogeneous Moving Costs 
 
Figure 7: Local Labor Market Equilibrium 
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Empirical Model 
 Before describing the empirical model that will be used in this thesis, we must first formally introduce 
two related terms: 
Exogenous Area: the non-urbanized portion of the urban area 
and its vicinity that is strictly off limits to urban development 
under ordinary profit and utility maximizing processes.  The 
boundaries of these undevelopable areas are also defined as 
exogenous. 
Endogenous Area: the non-urbanized portion of the urban area 
and its vicinity that will be converted to urban use when the 
present value of urbanization exceeds the property’s non-
urbanized present value.  The boundaries of such areas are also defined as endogenous. 
 The starting point for our estimation strategy is the housing price hedonic regression typically used in 
QOL studies.  In these studies, the local land rental n24 for household i in city j is often modeled as: 
ijijijjiij ZHn ηδννββ +=++= ,ln 21   (5.1)  
Equation 5.1 is the same as Equation 3.5 in Gyourko, et al. (1999).  In the above equation, Hi is a vector of 
individual housing structural traits, Zj is a vector of city amenity/fiscal characteristics, and νij is the composite 
error term. 
 We see that housing prices in Equation 5.1 are modeled only as function of features that influence the 
demand for traits specific to a dwelling (e.g., total square footage, number of bedrooms, year built) or the 
community’s amenities (e.g., climate variables, local tax and expenditure policies, geographic amenities).  But 
the model of partially open cities with heterogeneous moving costs suggests that an argument measuring the 
supply of homes should also be included the housing price hedonic regressions: 
                                                 
24 In the empirical findings presented in section VII, n may represent home prices, rents, income or wages, depending on the context. 
Figure 8: Simplified Representation of Exogenous 
and Endogenous Areas and Boundaries 
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 (5.2)  
In Equation 5.2, bj is a measure of the city j’s exogenous region and cj measures city j’s total territory,25 
therefore jj cb (the exogenous region percentage) is the proportion of city j’s total territory that is not set by 
profit or utility maximizing considerations.  Both bj and cj can be measured in one dimension (the length of a 
boundary) or two dimensions (the area of a region).  As in the previous section, Ωj represents the population of 
city j.  The new error term, ijνˆ , implies that household and city-wide error components have slightly changed 
from Equation 5.2.  we believe that the interaction between the exogenous region percentage and population is a 
suitable proxy for the remaining supply of homes in a city – a populous area with tight constraints on supply 
(e.g., the island of Manhattan) will have less developable land than an unpopulated area with no constraints 
(e.g., the continent of Antarctica).  We call this interaction term the Housing Supply Effect (HSE) on home 
prices.  According to the model of partially open cities, prices should be higher in more populated cities with 
more restrictive boundaries, ceteris paribus, therefore we hypothesize that γ2 in Equation 5.2 will be positive 
and significant. 
One obvious issue that we face when estimating Equation 5.2 is that many of features that impose 
exogenous boundaries are also viewed as attractive city amenities.  These features include coastlines, 
lakeshores, mountain ranges and national parks.   In such cases, there is a self-evident correlation between the bj 
and Zj, and if γ2 is positive and significant (as we predict) then Equation 5.1 suffers from the omitted variable 
bias.  If γ2 cannot be shown to be different from zero, then there is no systematic bias in the findings of 
researchers who fail to control for exogenous boundaries and use Equation 5.1 to estimate the value of public 
amenities or rank the relative desirability of a set of cities. 
In terms of the theory detailed in Section IV, if γ2 is zero then this means that heterogeneous moving 
costs are not a significant determinant of housing costs and that weights in QOL indexes can be constructed 
using Equation 4.10 (or perhaps Equation 4.3, as argued with standard theory).  If γ2 is positive, then neither 
                                                 
25 In this study, we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Urbanized Area to measure the geographic extent of a city and its perimeter. 
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equation is appropriate for constructing QOL indexes, and amenities that constrain housing supply will appear 
to be more valuable than those that do not. 
For instance, using Equation 5.1, Gyourko and Tracy include a dummy variable indicating the presence 
of a coastline in their housing expenditure hedonic equation; they estimate that the annualized value of living in 
a city with a coastline is $654 for the sample average resident who spends $4,524 on housing; and they find this 
estimate to be statistically significant (t-value: 1.94).  we argue that this estimated amenity value of the coastline 
is inflated in their study because this exogenous boundary (in addition to being an amenity) could also increase 
housing prices by reducing the supply of land available as an input for housing in a city.  The authors also 
include a dummy variable indicating the presence of a coastline in their wage hedonic equation, and they find 
that the coastline’s value in the labor market is statistically insignificant (t-value: -1.01).26 
In order to estimate γ2, we will use panel data techniques to separate the amenity value of boundary from 
the Housing Supply Effect.  But first, we present a model that could theoretically be used to estimate the price 
of housing in city j in year t: 
jtjt
j
j
jt
j
j
jjtjtjt uc
b
c
b
aZHn +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅Ω⋅+⋅Ω++++= 2121 lnlnln γγββ  (5.3)  
Equation 5.3 departs from the models in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 in that it no longer indexes across individual 
households and therefore replaces ijn  with jn  and iH  with jH , the average housing price and structural trait 
for dwellings in city j.  This adjustment is made only for ease of exposition -- this thesis includes empirical 
findings using individual household-level data, and the micro-level results are substantially identical to the 
aggregated city-level findings.  Also in Equation 5.3,wehave added aj to explicitly represent city j’s fixed 
effects on home prices.   
We emphasize that two terms are required to model the exogenous region percentage’s effect on home 
prices during any year.  The first (bj/cj: the fixed amenity effect) is the fixed effect of the boundary, and it 
                                                 
26 Using a different econometric specification and dataset, Blomquist, et al. (1988) also find that the presence of a coastline has a 
statistically significant effect in the housing expenditure hedonic equation (t-value: 13.61) and a statistically insignificant effect in the 
wage hedonic equation (t-value: -0.49).  In both studies the (insignificant) effect of a coastline on wages is negative 
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represents a permanent amenity or disamenity of the undeveloped portion of the city’s territory. 27  For example, 
a lakeshore or mountain range is a permanent amenity that we assume will increase the price of land in the city 
by some time-invariant amount, irrespective of the separate effect that the exogenous region will have on the 
supply of housing services.  A large swamp might be an example of a fixed disamenity that creates an 
exogenous region. 
Secondly, the exogenous boundary percentage also influences prices through the Housing Services 
Effect.  If γ2 is positive as predicted then this suggests that if two cities have the same population and they are 
also identical in every other way, then rents should be higher in the city with the most restrictive exogenous 
boundary.  Alternatively, Equation 5.3 implies that if the boundaries of two cities are equally restrictive and 
they are also alike in every other way, then rents should be higher in the city with most people.  In other words, 
the effect of the boundary on prices becomes more noticeable as the city is closer to “filling up.” 
 The population term in Equations 5.3, Ωjt, could be simultaneously determined with housing prices njt.  
For example, some migrants might move to a city because of its low rents, and rents should increase in response 
to in-migration.  Under these assumptions, Ωjt cannot be considered strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with 
the error term, ujt, and thus the OLS estimate for γ2 will be biased.  To address this endogeneity problem, we 
propose a 2SLS approach where the MSA population (MSAΩjt) is taken to represent Ωjt, and this value is 
estimated in the first stage using the population of the MSA’s Census Division (minus the MSA’s population).  
Specifically, 
( )( )∑
=
Ω−Ω⋅⋅=
9
1
lnln
k
jtktkkjt MSADivdDivMSA βπ   (5.4)  
where  
dDivk = 1 if the first (or only) state listed by the Census Bureau in MSAj’s name is in division k, 0 otherwise.  
For example, in the Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN MSA, dDIV3 = 1 because OH is in the East North 
Central division (Division 3) even though KY is in the East South Central division (Division 6).  There 
are nine Census Divisions.  
DivΩkt - MSAΩjt = the population of division k in year t (excluding the population in year t of the MSA for 
which we am instrumenting.) 
                                                 
27 we recognize that no amenity is time-invariant, strictly speaking.  However, this estimation strategy considers changes over a short 
time period (ten years or less), and we assume that most amenities are essentially fixed over short durations.  According to Gyourko, 
et al., “there is likely to be little real variation in most urban attributes over short time periods.” 
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This formulation assumes that the population of the rest of the MSA’s division is an exogenous factor of 
the MSA’s population (e.g., some of an MSA’s population growth may directly result from being located in a 
growing Census Division), but is uncorrelated with average rents in an MSA, except through the endogenous 
population term (e.g., rent in an MSA is determined for reasons specific to that particular locality or state, but is 
not due to the Census Division).  Table 2 presents the results from the first stage fixed-effects and first 
difference panel regressions where the sample is 363 MSAs (using the 2003 OMB definitions and excluding 
micropolitan areas and metropolitan areas in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico) between 1980 and 2006.  All 
beta coefficients are positive and significant, as expected.  
Table 2: Panel Estimates of Equation 5.4 
Dependent Variable:  First Difference Fixed Effects 
Log of MSA population Division Name    Coef.  t-value    Coef.  t-value 
Log of Division 1 population New England 0.6165 3.28*** 1.0503 9.62*** 
Log of Division 2 population Middle Atlantic 0.3647 2.38** 0.8725 7.97*** 
Log of Division 3 population East North Central 0.2448 9.53*** 0.4313 21.16*** 
Log of Division 4 population West North Central 0.7989 4.82*** 1.3708 18.93*** 
Log of Division 5 population South Atlantic 0.6949 21.32*** 0.9088 64.88*** 
Log of Division 6 population East South Central 0.5751 4.36*** 1.1094 19.94*** 
Log of Division 7 population West South Central 0.5630 9.05*** 0.7885 27.59*** 
Log of Division 8 population Mountain 0.6609 17.27*** 0.8922 55.98*** 
Log of Division 9 population Pacific 0.3485 10.69*** 0.9619 57.90*** 
Constant  0.0051 11.23*** -2.5545 -10.71*** 
Number of observations  9438 9801  
Number of MSAs  363 363  
R2 Within  0.5761  
Between  0.0002  
Overall  0.0726 0.0002  
F-statistic  81.98*** 1423.99***  
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
 
We seek to isolate and examine the Housing Services Effect of the exogenous boundary on home prices.  
To accomplish this, Equation 5.3 is transformed into a first-difference estimator, which removes the fixed 
amenity effect of the border, bj/cj. 
jtjt
j
j
jtjtjttjt uAMSc
b
AMSZHdn ∆+⋅Ω∆⋅+⋅Ω∆+∆+∆+=∆ 2121 ˆlnˆlnln γγββδ   (5.5)  
 
In Equation 5.5, dt = 1 if the observation was recorded in year t (0 otherwise), and jtAMS Ωˆ  represents the 
population estimate from Equation 5.5.  In this equation, all of the border’s time-invariant amenity effects 
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cancel out, and what remains is an equation that can be consistently estimated with 2SLS.  If γ1 and γ2 are 
positive, then Equation 5.5 implies that equal increases in population will cause the rents in the urban area to 
rise the fastest in cites with the most restrictive exogenous boundaries, ceteris paribus. 
 Importantly, in this thesis, the exogenous region percentage is based on geographic data measured in 
year T (the earliest year in the dataset) while the non-geographic data (average prices, average housing traits, 
urban amenities) is reported in years T though T+t.  This convention helps to ensure that the exogenous 
boundary percentage will indeed be an exogenous argument in each specification.  In particular, it is hard to 
believe that the boundary measure in the current year will be at all influenced by changes in home prices in 
future years. 
Notice that Equation 5.5 also removes all other fixed effects from the model in Equation 5.3.  
Obviously, this is necessary if we believe that other omitted fixed explanatory variables are correlated with any 
of the observed variables in the model. For example, coastal cities are likely to have been settled earlier than 
inland cities.  We might further assume that these older cities have a more stable and well-established set of 
industries or are more likely to be urbanized, so land values in these cities should be higher.  Thus, “year-of-
incorporation” is an explanatory fixed effect (we can conceive of many others) that is omitted from estimates of 
Equation 5.1 and probably positively correlated with the length of the exogenous boundary.  However, since the 
first-differenced estimator in Equation 5.5 removes all fixed effects, this omitted variable does not bias the 
2SLS estimates in this model. 
 While Equation 5.5 usefully removes the fixed effects of the exogenous boundary, it retains crucial 
assumptions and potential drawbacks.  In particular, we assume that the effect on housing prices of changes in 
the exogenous boundary is time-invariant after controlling for changes in all of the other variables in Equation 
5.5 (specifically, there is no t subscript on γ2).  But if the effect of exogenous boundaries on rent is greater in the 
second period than in the first period (for example) then Equation 5.5 is mis-specified.  This could be the case if 
“length-of-coastline” is a normal good, and residents value this amenity more as the city’s income increases 
over time. 
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While Equation 5.5 is the preferred formulation, other models and specifications are theoretically 
acceptable.  Specifically, the fixed effects panel data model also removes the time-invariant variables that can 
bias our findings in Equation 5.3.28  The results of a fixed effects model will also be reported with all of the 
first-difference model findings. 
Data 
Geographic Data 
We used GIS maps available from the U.S. Census Bureau (primarily) and the Conservation Biology 
Institute (secondarily) to determine the geographic location and shape of urban areas and the exogenous areas 
that constrain them.  The Census Bureau defines an urban area as “core census block groups or blocks that have 
a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile” and “surrounding census blocks that have an 
overall density of at least 500 people per square mile.”  This definition implies that urban areas are comprised of 
a contiguous group of census blocks – densely settled areas that are separated by non-urbanized regions are 
separately classified.  This means that a single metropolitan area can contain multiple urban areas.  But many of 
the control variables that we used in this thesis have been aggregated at the MSA level.  To account for this 
potential inconsistency between the geographic extent of MSAs and urban areas, our definition of the 
metropolitan urban area (MUA) is the union of all urban areas (as defined by the Census Bureau) within a 
metropolitan area. 
In this thesis, exogenous areas consist of all bodies of water, all federal property, any territory beyond 
the borders of the United States, and all of the entries in the Conversation Biology Institute’s Protected Areas 
Database with a GAP Code of three or less. This final category includes state parks and wildlife areas, private 
preservations owned by nonprofit groups, tribal territory reserved for Native Americans, and similar areas.  
                                                 
28 According to Wooldridge (2002), both the first difference (FD) and fixed effects (FE) estimators are unbiased and consistent (with T 
fixed as N → ∞).  But the FE estimator is more efficient when the error terms (uit) are serially uncorrelated while the FD estimator is 
more efficient when uit follows a random walk.  we believe that the uit are serially correlated because home price is the dependent 
variable, but we do not include the interest rate as an explanatory variable.  When interest rates are low, home buyers can qualify for 
bigger mortgages, and home prices and values rise (Harris (1989)).  Further, low interest rates in the first period are correlated with 
low interest rates in the second period.  Thus, omitting this variable from the regression means that there will be serial correlation in 
the error term, and the FE model will not produce the best estimates. When possible, the results of both models will be presented in 
this paper. 
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Taken together, all of these areas comprise portions of the MUA and its vicinity that are strictly off limits to 
urban development under ordinary profit and utility maximizing processes. 
We calculate the length of exogenous boundaries by measuring the sections of the perimeter of MUAs 
that intersect exogenous areas.  This measurement for the San Francisco MUA is represented by the blue line in 
Figure 9.  The endogenous boundary is highlighted with the red line in Figure 9.  The black boundary line in 
Figure 9 indicates a border with an urban area outside of the San Francisco MUA.  The exogenous region 
percentage is length of the exogenous boundary divided by the combined length of the exogenous and 
endogenous boundaries.  In Figure 9, this measurement includes segments along inner boundary of the San 
Francisco MUA’s perimeter (an inner boundary has latitude and longitude points that are in between points on 
other segments of MUA’s perimeter).  This exogenous region percentage is labeled Inner and Outer Bounds in 
Section VII.  In Figure 10, this measure considers outer boundaries only (an outer boundary is a segment of the 
MUA’s perimeter that is not an inner boundary).  This exogenous region percentage is labeled Outer Bounds 
Only in Section VII. 
The difference between inner exogenous boundaries and outer exogenous boundaries will not 
significantly change the regression estimates of Equation 5.5 because the correlation between these two 
measures is quite high (0.96, see Table 1).  However, we argue in this thesis that exogenous boundaries 
constrain the supply of land in urban areas, and this supply constraint leads to higher land prices and rents.  But 
inner exogenous boundaries do not constrain the supply of land as much as outer exogenous boundaries.  
Residents in communities like the San Francisco Bay Area can use bridges, tunnels or ferries to surmount inner 
exogenous boundaries and effectively increase the supply of land in the urban area.  Thus, if the total length of 
the exogenous boundary is the same in two urban areas, we expect prices to be higher in the urban area where 
the interior exogenous boundary constitutes a smaller fraction of the total boundary, ceteris paribus.   
The exogenous region percentages illustrated in Figure 9 and Figure 10 are based on the length of the 
exogenous region’s boundary.  We have also developed measures based on the area of the exogenous region, 
and these estimates and depicted in Figure 11 and Figure 12.  For the area measure in Figure 11, we propose a 
39 
 
 
 
counterfactual in which exogenous regions do not exist (i.e., a featureless plain) or in which the cost of 
urbanizing these regions is not different from the cost of developing elsewhere.  Under this counterfactual, we 
assume that development would extend in concentric circles away from the urban area’s historical center or 
central business district to encompass an area that is the same size as the urbanized area that we observe today.  
This is the urban circle.  This urban circle represents the city’s minimum average commuting distance to the 
CBD, given the observed preference over residential and commercial lot sizes.  To estimate the effect of 
imposing exogenous areas, we remove existing exogenous regions from the urban circle and construct the 
exogenous region percentage from these resulting areas (see Figure 11).  This exogenous region percentage is 
labeled Undeveloped Region Percentage – Area-UA in Section VII.   
The exogenous areas highlighted in Figure 12 are similar to those illustrated in Figure 11, except we 
constrain the area of every developable circle to be π×(25km)2, rather than the observed area of the MUA.  This 
approach follows Saiz (2008).  This exogenous region percentage is labeled Undeveloped Region Percentage – 
Area-25 in Section VII.  Figure 13 illustrates the geographic distribution of the 305 MUAs in the continental 
United States that are constrained by an exogenous feature, and Table 3 lists these cities.  
40 
 
 
 
Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 provide additional details regarding each of these features. 
Non-Geographic Data 
For the annual estimates of the dependent variable, average home prices, we have three 
sources: the mean value of a new homes from the building permits (BP) series that is compiled 
and reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Manufacturing and Construction Division;29 the 
median home value estimate reported in the American Community Survey (ACS),30 and the 
median existing home sale price gathered and published by the National Association of 
Realtors.31  Results using all three explanatory variables will be reported in this thesis, and a 
description of some of the advantages and disadvantages of each dataset are reported in Table 7.  
Table 8 shows the estimated values of home prices from all three data sources for 140 MSAs in 
2006.32 
Much of the non-geographic explanatory data in this report comes from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Annual population estimates for the MSA are reported by the Population Division.33  
Annual estimates for the median number of rooms, the median age of the house, the average 
commute time and the percent of the population that is African-American in the MSA are 
reported in the American Community Survey.  The MSA murder rate (per 100,000) is compiled 
and reported by the FBI in the Uniform Crime Report.34  Descriptive statistics for the non-
geographic data for each of the home price datasets are listed in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. 
 
                                                 
29 Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/const/www/C40/table3.html#annual 
30 Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS 
31 Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.realtor.org/research/research/metroprice 
32 Only MSAs that have 2006 values from all three datasets are reported in Table 6. 
33 Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/ 
34 Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm.  Murder rates for MSAs in Illinois and Cleveland, 
Ohio were compiled from official state crime reports. 
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Figure 9: Outline of the Inner and Outer Boundaries of Urban Areas within the San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA 
Including inner boundaries, 72.35% of the perimeter of the San Francisco MSA 
is an exogenous boundary.  The inner boundary includes most of the bay’s 
coastline as well as the borders of several state and national parks. 
Figure 10: Outline of Only the Outer Boundaries of Urban Areas within the San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA 
Excluding inner boundaries, 69.75% of the perimeter of the San Francisco MSA 
is an exogenous boundary.  These outermost boundaries are located along the 
frontier of urban area. 
 
 Urbanized areas within San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA 
 Exogenous boundary 
 Endogenous boundary 
 Border with urban area outside of San Francisco MSA (the length of this section of the boundary is excluded from the total perimeter’s length) 
 Body of water 
 Federal property or protected area 
 Shaded relief to estimate hillside elevation 
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Figure 11: Developable Regions for Urban Areas in the San Francisco Bay 
Area (Area-UA) 
There are three urban areas in the San Francisco Bay Area.  For the San 
Francisco MSA, the undevelopable area is 63.04% of the size of the city’s 
urban area.  This value is 27.32% for San Jose and 42.55% for Vallejo. 
To calculate the Undevelopable Region 
Percentage (Size of Urban Area), we 
constructed a VBA macro that executed the 
following steps: 
 
1. Identify a point in the central business 
district of the primary city of the urban area 
(point A).  This point is indicated with a 
yellow dot in Figure 3c. 
 
2. Draw a circle around point A that is the 
same area as the urban area (urban circle).  
The urban circle is outlined in white in 
Figure 3c. 
 
3. Subtract regions that we presume to be 
undevelopable from the urban circle.  
Regions that are presumptively 
undevelopable include bodies of water, 
most federal property and other protected 
areas, and any area with an elevation 
gradient greater than 15%.  What remains is 
a large portion of the city’s developable 
region. 
 
4. Add urbanized areas within the circle to the 
large portion of developable region.  
Urbanized areas (which we assume to be 
developable) can sometimes overlap bodies 
of water (e.g., a drained swamp), federal 
property (a national forest), or steep 
hillsides.  This total developable area is 
shaded in red in Figure 3c. 
 
5. The undevelopable region percentage is: 
CircleUrbanofArea
egionRDevelopedofArea−1
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Figure 12: Developable Regions for Urban Areas in the San Francisco Bay 
Area (Area-25) 
There are three urban areas in the San Francisco Bay Area.  For the San 
Francisco MSA, the undevelopable area is 61.47% of the size of the city’s 
urban area.  This value is 50.75% for San Jose and 27.32% for Vallejo. 
To calculate the Undevelopable Region 
Percentage (25km radius), we constructed a 
VBA macro that executed the following steps: 
 
1. Identify a point in the central business 
district of the primary city of the urban 
area (point A).  This point is indicated with 
a yellow dot in Figure 3c. 
 
2. Draw a circle around point A with a radius 
of 25km.  The urban circle with a radius of 
25km is outlined in white in Figure 3c. 
 
3. Subtract regions that we presume to be 
undevelopable from the urban circle.  
Regions that are presumptively 
undevelopable include bodies of water, 
most federal property and other protected 
areas, and any area with an elevation 
gradient greater than 15%.  What remains 
is a large portion of the city’s developable 
region. 
 
4. Add urban areas within the circle to the 
large portion of developable region.  
Urbanized areas (which we assume to be 
developable) can sometimes overlap 
bodies of water (e.g., a drained swamp), 
federal property (a national forest), or 
steep hillsides.  This total developable area 
is shaded in red in Figure 3c. 
 
5. The undevelopable region percentage is: 
CircleUrbanofArea
egionRDevelopedofArea−1  
For all regions, the area of the urban circle 
is π×(25km)2  using this measure. 
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Figure 13: Location of Urbanized Areas in the Continental United States with Exogenous Boundaries 
 
In the continental United States, 305 urban areas have an exogenous boundary.  For the purposes of this thesis, an urban area can be exogenously bound by federal 
property and other protected areas, bodies of water or steep hillsides. 
 
Map Legend 
● Urban areas with at least two years of observations in all three home price datasets: 107. 35 
● Urban areas with at least two years of observations in two of the home price datasets: 144. 
● Urban areas with at least two years of observations in only one of the home price datasets: 2 (Coeur d'Alene, ID and Myrtle Beach, SC). 
 
                                                 
35 At least two years of observations per urban area are required for panel data techniques.  UAs with just one observation are discarded from the first-difference model, and 
singleton observations change only the intercept of the fixed effect models. 
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Table 3: Measures of Land Supply Constraints for Urban Areas in the Continental United States 
MSA Name 
Inner and 
Outer 
Bounds 
Outer 
Bounds 
Only 
Undev. 
Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA
Undev. 
Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 MSA Name 
Inner and 
Outer 
Bounds 
Outer 
Bounds 
Only 
Undev. 
Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA
Undev. 
Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14% Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, 27.12% 46.92% 43.72% 48.11%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22% Greeley, CO  4.91% 6.05% 0.53% 2.07%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI  36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17% Olympia, WA  45.48% 50.53% 12.86% 32.17%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  17.28% 13.73% 2.90% 0.68% Yakima, WA  16.24% 13.00% 20.93% 34.67%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ- 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78% Laredo, TX  24.98% 33.72% 27.14% 35.70%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13% Macon, GA  12.37% 12.09% 0.68% 6.05%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL  66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58% Topeka, KS  12.03% 15.83% 0.34% 0.96%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA- 38.37% 30.18% 9.08% 5.38% Gulfport-Biloxi, MS  44.99% 52.81% 30.10% 86.33%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36% Waco, TX  14.07% 10.61% 5.77% 2.98%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71% Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA  54.64% 41.53% 9.09% 15.41%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH  60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03% Barnstable Town, MA  73.22% 83.10% 60.96% 69.00%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47% Appleton, WI  19.13% 21.52% 7.15% 15.55%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65% Champaign-Urbana, IL    0.43% 0.37%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  27.95% 35.70% 20.67% 16.91% Chico, CA  9.33% 6.09% 1.37% 30.10%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27% Sioux Falls, SD    0.41% 0.29%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33% Prescott, AZ  52.67% 59.17% 7.45% 52.26%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA  56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07% Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI  15.96% 10.93% 9.69% 6.18%
St. Louis, MO-IL  18.15% 19.03% 7.09% 6.54% Springfield, IL  34.62% 21.18% 5.37% 1.79%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  55.56% 56.15% 26.10% 26.76% Burlington-South Burlington, VT  33.28% 33.21% 4.22% 39.81%
Baltimore-Towson, MD  55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74% Longview, TX    0.41% 1.61%
Denver-Aurora, CO  26.92% 27.80% 8.48% 9.50% Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA  99.54% 99.04% 50.82% 83.11%
Pittsburgh, PA  6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19% Florence, SC    0.37% 1.49%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA  32.92% 24.39% 12.13% 12.30% Tuscaloosa, AL  4.54% 5.61% 0.62% 6.47%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49% Elkhart-Goshen, IN  1.89% 3.99% 0.31% 1.09%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52% Medford, OR  24.78% 31.12% 9.58% 60.64%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA  20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42% Racine, WI  26.82% 37.53% 28.55% 51.92%
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL  34.39% 30.89% 4.84% 4.76% Tyler, TX  1.15% 2.40% 0.39% 1.74%
Kansas City, MO-KS  12.61% 7.13% 2.22% 2.24% Las Cruces, NM  34.66% 38.53% 7.55% 46.83%
San Antonio, TX  26.64% 22.75% 6.30% 9.37% Lake Charles, LA  12.46% 5.41% 3.70% 8.42%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  60.94% 60.02% 27.32% 50.75% College Station-Bryan, TX    0.41% 0.12%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  57.70% 63.69% 8.53% 27.78% Johnson City, TN  55.03% 56.75% 15.16% 33.66%
Columbus, OH  12.66% 14.94% 0.72% 1.87% Charlottesville, VA  7.25% 7.94% 3.75% 18.96%
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN  9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87% Yuma, AZ  54.70% 49.01% 6.78% 32.02%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA- 55.23% 60.10% 41.34% 42.44% Fargo, ND-MN    0.39% 0.12%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA  46.77% 48.18% 9.75% 9.64% Bellingham, WA  59.22% 65.24% 20.83% 46.00%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC  12.15% 10.43% 3.50% 3.10% Lafayette, IN  4.42% 3.71% 0.42% 0.13%
Austin-Round Rock, TX  9.16% 9.90% 4.11% 3.51% Athens-Clarke County, GA  10.35% 7.38% 3.63% 1.41%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  17.79% 30.44% 27.69% 28.95% St. Cloud, MN  13.41% 13.05% 1.50% 1.53%
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-- 19.39% 12.99% 3.14% 3.35% Kingston, NY  21.91% 28.52% 18.91% 19.23%
Jacksonville, FL  54.95% 40.10% 12.94% 17.49% Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL  96.18% 97.75% 70.24% 88.24%
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  12.21% 8.31% 4.42% 5.38% Redding, CA  20.56% 23.08% 2.88% 33.18%
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN  18.22% 16.80% 7.65% 7.85% Rochester, MN  10.55% 8.29% 2.07% 1.43%
Richmond, VA  10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44% Bloomington, IN  6.63% 3.39% 1.56% 23.22%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  27.56% 26.57% 3.99% 4.85% Anderson, SC  14.46% 14.66% 0.37% 7.10%
Oklahoma City, OK  5.19% 3.28% 1.68% 2.82% Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI  44.01% 43.17% 19.32% 45.93%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY  27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49% Gainesville, GA  66.05% 50.35% 17.50% 14.13%
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  5.01% 8.61% 0.25% 0.84% Monroe, LA  13.90% 18.22% 0.75% 14.86%
Salt Lake City, UT  31.32% 39.86% 30.31% 41.34% Joplin, MO  5.47% 6.95% 0.41% 0.45%
Rochester, NY  7.77% 17.33% 14.31% 20.20% Terre Haute, IN  2.88% 4.77% 0.44% 0.18%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  63.87% 59.94% 38.83% 60.83% Greenville, NC    0.43% 0.85%
Raleigh-Cary, NC  19.52% 11.87% 5.41% 6.03% Albany, GA  17.42% 9.81% 3.41% 2.06%
Tucson, AZ  38.42% 41.45% 12.32% 28.07% Jackson, MI  9.13% 8.96% 0.37% 3.49%
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  29.65% 35.30% 40.62% 41.78% Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL  75.55% 68.87% 38.82% 56.67%
Tulsa, OK  5.06% 1.90% 0.43% 0.27% Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA  11.51% 7.01% 1.10% 1.41%
Fresno, CA  1.25% 2.09% 0.40% 1.94% Yuba City, CA    0.48% 8.22%
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  12.40% 8.95% 1.40% 4.10% Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV-OH  20.78% 18.97% 1.73% 2.35%
New Haven-Milford, CT  42.72% 58.09% 27.97% 33.39% Niles-Benton Harbor, MI  23.05% 34.09%  0.63%
Dayton, OH  19.01% 19.46% 2.42% 2.47% Bloomington-Normal, IL    0.46% 0.40%
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  16.42% 21.27% 1.73% 5.04% Oshkosh-Neenah, WI  31.65% 33.25% 7.51% 33.71%
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Albuquerque, NM  24.50% 37.19% 9.30% 25.12% El Centro, CA    0.51% 25.04%
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ  10.76% 13.21% 3.32% 6.16% Janesville, WI    0.51% 3.35%
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA  39.83% 52.05% 34.70% 65.37% Abilene, TX  20.22% 19.37% 0.43% 2.00%
Worcester, MA  34.77% 31.61% 4.99% 8.35% Columbia, MO  2.84% 3.54% 0.69% 10.42%
Bakersfield, CA  12.79%  1.30% 6.10% Eau Claire, WI  21.88% 15.75% 1.92% 1.77%
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  10.65% 7.40% 0.28% 0.97% Monroe, MI  25.54% 28.25% 7.81% 35.97%
Baton Rouge, LA  16.72% 24.51% 6.55% 7.20% Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ  17.83% 17.37% 3.50% 14.78%
El Paso, TX  33.36% 42.05% 50.44% 54.87% Pueblo, CO  14.55% 17.55% 0.86% 26.70%
Columbia, SC  27.27% 27.91% 4.17% 7.38% Pascagoula, MS  28.41% 36.54% 26.14% 58.45%
Akron, OH  32.19% 33.64% 8.56% 8.89% Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA  8.94% 10.53% 9.70% 54.61%
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX  11.72% 16.25% 9.22% 23.66% Jacksonville, NC  50.32% 40.97% 14.14% 46.10%
Springfield, MA  34.33% 33.36% 5.47% 8.90% Alexandria, LA    0.39% 30.87%
Greensboro-High Point, NC  5.25% 3.66% 2.43% 1.26% Decatur, AL  31.79% 35.86% 22.13% 12.86%
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL  62.16% 63.05% 36.34% 42.93% Bend, OR  40.63% 48.41% 6.87% 66.34%
Stockton, CA  6.79% 3.70% 2.08% 1.21% Billings, MT  34.31% 35.20% 7.46% 12.74%
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY  20.17% 18.85% 9.32% 11.21% Dover, DE  39.08% 38.91% 4.09% 29.70%
Knoxville, TN  15.73% 6.61% 5.97% 6.59% Wheeling, WV-OH  51.65% 41.57% 19.11% 23.23%
Toledo, OH  30.34% 18.25% 3.48% 8.74% Bangor, ME  37.02% 36.23% 3.13% 17.52%
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR  20.08% 15.90% 7.46% 13.79% Johnstown, PA  37.47% 27.52% 34.35% 30.21%
Syracuse, NY  21.34% 25.28% 5.40% 13.08% Madera, CA    0.51% 0.43%
Charleston-North Charleston, SC  44.91% 43.42% 25.81% 37.92% Rocky Mount, NC    0.46% 0.64%
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC  2.08% 2.19% 2.67% 1.27% Wichita Falls, TX  29.81% 29.86% 3.21% 3.48%
Colorado Springs, CO  47.09% 47.66% 10.68% 33.11% Jefferson City, MO  16.04% 21.35% 8.34% 13.87%
Wichita, KS  1.69% 0.61% 2.12% 0.70% Sioux City, IA-NE-SD  44.45% 33.99% 7.27% 4.56%
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA  9.78% 16.39% 0.46% 1.69% Burlington, NC  1.52% 0.69% 0.36% 0.59%
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL  57.42% 52.37% 30.04% 45.51% Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL  26.49% 27.19% 9.25% 5.30%
Boise City-Nampa, ID  23.75% 35.74% 35.53% 47.88% Santa Fe, NM  18.86% 18.48% 3.91% 42.19%
Lakeland, FL  19.72% 21.68% 8.07% 10.22% Springfield, OH  12.45% 15.00% 1.57% 2.06%
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA  21.87% 23.72% 28.13% 25.74% State College, PA  13.89% 17.30% 1.76% 51.61%
Madison, WI  24.50% 13.81% 16.65% 5.99% Iowa City, IA  5.70% 8.98% 0.46% 5.75%
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL  71.13% 61.26% 29.96% 45.03% Dothan, AL    0.41% 0.12%
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA  16.79% 13.45% 4.02% 6.60% Battle Creek, MI  2.29% 3.90% 0.37% 4.00%
Jackson, MS  6.53% 6.69% 0.25% 2.93% Hattiesburg, MS  5.81% 4.70% 0.45% 4.94%
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA  23.33% 19.73% 21.35% 25.42% Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR    0.37% 8.88%
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC  12.99% 14.45% 2.70% 10.10% Dalton, GA  16.92% 18.61% 18.66% 25.14%
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME  40.93% 46.10% 21.39% 38.68% Grand Junction, CO  50.86% 65.73% 21.46% 61.29%
Modesto, CA    0.31% 3.73% Napa, CA  1.63% 2.04% 0.51% 54.11%
Ogden-Clearfield, UT  44.49% 53.14% 40.66% 53.65% Morristown, TN  18.99% 21.09% 8.53% 28.26%
Chattanooga, TN-GA  48.47% 37.66% 20.19% 25.46% Coeur d'Alene, ID  42.50% 47.79% 43.63% 65.28%
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL  42.12% 46.73% 16.14% 24.00% Pittsfield, MA  44.05% 40.88% 11.52% 50.19%
Lancaster, PA  6.40% 10.92% 0.20% 6.50% Anderson, IN    0.36% 0.12%
Provo-Orem, UT  40.26% 45.23% 42.99% 65.71% Wausau, WI  23.74% 7.04% 8.77% 1.58%
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA  14.75% 15.16% 30.17% 36.09% Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL  65.00% 67.31% 37.83% 47.82%
Durham, NC  21.52% 26.54% 3.03% 14.61% Glens Falls, NY  1.30% 2.99% 0.45% 25.93%
Winston-Salem, NC    0.18% 0.14% La Crosse, WI-MN  57.46% 57.81% 44.24% 51.53%
Lansing-East Lansing, MI  6.28% 4.60% 0.23% 1.51% Warner Robins, GA  17.46% 24.32% 9.81% 11.60%
Spokane, WA  16.49% 21.00% 9.47% 18.15% Odessa, TX    1.08% 0.35%
Flint, MI  3.63% 5.08% 0.18% 1.62% Mansfield, OH  1.52% 1.37% 0.39% 1.88%
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL  59.83% 62.66% 48.16% 52.76% Lebanon, PA  1.09% 1.61% 0.51% 16.62%
Lexington-Fayette, KY  5.48% 6.56% 0.66% 0.92% Altoona, PA  15.74% 18.13% 28.06% 44.68%
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO  2.87% 4.20% 2.17% 10.11% Farmington, NM  54.21% 54.44% 21.39% 29.10%
Visalia-Porterville, CA  2.97% 3.81% 0.39% 2.28% St. George, UT  37.43% 45.94% 13.58% 68.81%
York-Hanover, PA  9.68% 9.42% 2.09% 5.88% Valdosta, GA  9.48% 9.78% 0.48% 4.08%
Corpus Christi, TX  44.24% 40.44% 25.58% 31.61% Auburn-Opelika, AL  1.42% 1.22% 3.19% 3.83%
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA  42.23% 43.07% 42.55% 47.39% Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH  27.97% 30.80% 14.75% 19.28%
Salinas, CA  51.62% 51.21% 5.11% 47.98% Flagstaff, AZ  100.00% 100.00% 48.63% 9.62%
Canton-Massillon, OH  17.43% 13.58% 0.28% 1.45% Midland, TX    0.43% 0.48%
Fort Wayne, IN  13.28% 8.63% 0.34% 0.54% St. Joseph, MO-KS  24.41% 18.10% 8.46% 5.39%
Springfield, MO  5.53% 3.74% 0.31% 1.48% Winchester, VA-WV    0.48% 5.55%
Mobile, AL  16.53% 17.80% 45.08% 31.81% Rapid City, SD  4.22% 3.75% 8.28% 23.70%
Manchester-Nashua, NH  27.57% 31.83% 5.70% 7.84% Sherman-Denison, TX    0.51% 5.73%
Reading, PA  11.11% 9.37% 11.44% 10.50% Salisbury, MD  6.84% 12.35% 0.55% 10.21%
Reno-Sparks, NV  67.57% 70.62% 30.07% 62.42% Williamsport, PA  19.99% 25.85% 28.56% 52.16%
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA  58.37% 60.59% 73.58% 87.20% Idaho Falls, ID  5.57% 8.13% 0.48% 13.34%
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Asheville, NC  36.68% 39.98% 35.17% 48.74% Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA  12.66% 11.22% 5.75% 37.34%
Port St. Lucie, FL  63.92% 50.22% 6.78% 25.99% Morgantown, WV  34.28% 32.74% 11.45% 30.94%
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX  17.32% 25.06% 27.89% 65.34% Muncie, IN    0.43% 1.08%
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA  20.01% 14.21% 4.64% 6.67% Sheboygan, WI  18.67% 28.82% 17.65% 49.86%
Salem, OR  15.77% 10.99% 5.34% 9.77% Victoria, TX    0.41% 0.12%
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  20.31% 28.24% 2.53% 16.23% Goldsboro, NC  2.05% 3.86% 3.42% 0.54%
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL  40.49% 21.55% 5.01% 3.44% Harrisonburg, VA    0.51% 22.87%
Huntsville, AL  24.01% 23.23% 22.92% 20.46% Jonesboro, AR    0.46% 0.22%
Peoria, IL  14.79% 14.59% 8.47% 4.45% Bowling Green, KY    0.48% 0.20%
Trenton-Ewing, NJ  34.96% 32.37% 5.11% 3.33% Anniston-Oxford, AL  25.33% 21.24% 29.18% 45.85%
Montgomery, AL  6.55% 8.16% 0.46% 0.23% Lawrence, KS    0.51% 3.25%
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC  14.25% 10.87% 4.52% 5.88% Owensboro, KY  16.13% 19.12% 7.23% 3.31%
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX  42.45% 36.95% 34.20% 50.56% Jackson, TN    0.46% 1.26%
Evansville, IN-KY  19.04% 19.50% 7.83% 4.40% Logan, UT-ID  19.28% 25.35% 8.58% 54.47%
Rockford, IL  32.41% 37.11% 2.03% 1.87% Michigan City-La Porte, IN  26.69% 33.58% 27.01% 45.60%
Ann Arbor, MI  5.68% 4.88% 0.24% 0.79% Cleveland, TN    0.41% 7.18%
Fayetteville, NC  30.24% 33.31% 8.65% 15.36% Decatur, IL  24.89% 16.17% 7.46% 1.53%
Eugene-Springfield, OR  25.76% 26.55% 13.32% 36.58% Lawton, OK  34.95% 44.90% 2.62% 19.65%
Tallahassee, FL  41.39% 49.85% 7.28% 25.04% Kankakee-Bradley, IL  25.26% 27.21% 0.51% 1.16%
Wilmington, NC  41.81% 41.12% 7.82% 29.40% Bay City, MI  52.55% 48.62% 6.23% 28.20%
Savannah, GA  36.62% 33.49% 11.85% 28.42% Lewiston-Auburn, ME  15.43% 21.51% 2.68% 5.20%
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI  12.81% 18.39% 0.38% 1.60% Danville, VA    0.51% 1.52%
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI  1.37% 2.28% 0.23% 1.17% Wenatchee, WA  66.26% 65.51% 36.69% 81.01%
Ocala, FL  22.70% 23.19% 0.77% 14.86% Lima, OH    0.41% 0.16%
Charleston, WV  48.73% 50.72% 34.73% 48.65% San Angelo, TX  46.76% 40.70% 7.04% 6.95%
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA  12.19% 9.59% 16.83% 31.64% Sumter, SC  14.50% 12.07% 0.43% 7.34%
Green Bay, WI  15.19% 18.34% 22.27% 17.16% Pine Bluff, AR  18.87% 23.95% 7.93% 7.94%
Utica-Rome, NY  2.18% 3.08% 4.19% 6.60% Gadsden, AL  8.07% 7.95% 3.63% 12.01%
Roanoke, VA  46.53% 49.97% 12.57% 40.01% Missoula, MT  40.55% 53.18% 25.48% 76.37%
Columbus, GA-AL  29.52% 35.96% 11.13% 28.54% Bismarck, ND  19.59% 12.55% 2.28% 7.91%
Fort Smith, AR-OK  26.80% 24.65% 9.30% 11.84% Kokomo, IN  3.16% 3.48% 0.46% 1.40%
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH  0.80% 1.77% 1.28% 17.67% Brunswick, GA  50.39% 45.70% 26.10% 43.26%
Lincoln, NE    0.31% 1.76% Ithaca, NY  31.91% 32.21% 17.12% 27.39%
Boulder, CO  12.50% 17.50% 54.09% 57.36% Longview, WA  40.69% 54.34% 17.88% 53.99%
Erie, PA  23.91% 34.07% 40.33% 47.70% Fond du Lac, WI  15.00% 14.44% 11.08% 17.14%
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO  22.60% 21.10% 5.55% 26.28% Ocean City, NJ  71.31% 78.60%  56.40%
Duluth, MN-WI  48.51% 50.56% 22.99% 24.55% Grand Forks, ND-MN  6.56%  0.57% 1.21%
Atlantic City, NJ  55.08% 65.40% 63.69% 67.28% Rome, GA  15.42% 17.42% 9.96% 22.20%
Spartanburg, SC  2.06% 3.64% 3.32% 2.70% Hot Springs, AR  73.83% 57.97% 23.98% 21.16%
Norwich-New London, CT  22.98% 33.73% 2.33% 5.50% Dubuque, IA  39.65% 33.58% 9.35% 8.28%
Lubbock, TX  6.56% 9.89% 0.78% 1.30% Elmira, NY  31.18% 30.28% 25.22% 36.90%
Holland-Grand Haven, MI  31.70% 16.28% 2.59% 24.63% Pocatello, ID  42.86% 51.14% 13.71% 83.82%
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV  13.99% 17.20% 0.32% 11.51% Cheyenne, WY  19.50% 24.94% 1.63% 4.49%
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA  17.81% 18.21% 42.27% 65.88% Danville, IL  12.39% 10.01% 3.81% 3.59%
Lafayette, LA  0.97% 1.45% 0.47% 0.82% Ames, IA  19.11% 15.73% 0.51% 0.47%
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA  54.79% 63.21% 54.80% 81.88% Great Falls, MT  37.11% 35.15% 1.06% 12.50%
Cedar Rapids, IA  4.46%  0.38% 5.99% Corvallis, OR  26.44% 23.86% 5.33% 28.48%
Binghamton, NY  28.23% 37.53% 21.67% 26.66% Sandusky, OH  53.07% 56.13% 36.74% 47.91%
Merced, CA  4.74% 6.38% 0.48% 8.33% Columbus, IN  5.59% 6.60% 0.51% 10.95%
Gainesville, FL  26.12% 30.36% 15.09% 18.50% Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA  33.92% 35.17% 11.93% 36.67%
Amarillo, TX    0.34% 0.79% Casper, WY  21.88% 28.06% 3.32% 41.16%
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA  66.26% 57.14% 22.88% 35.89% Lewiston, ID-WA  28.06% 32.72% 35.24% 43.76%
Clarksville, TN-KY  15.75% 18.49% 0.32% 9.20% Carson City, NV  76.08% 76.84% 32.33% 36.18%
Lynchburg, VA  0.94% 1.15% 3.01% 11.92%  
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Table 4: Correlations Between Land Constraint Measures 
  
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only
Undeveloped Region 
Percentage-Area UA 
Undeveloped Region 
Percentage-Area 25 
Inner and Outer Boundaries 1.0000    
Outer Boundaries Only 0.9564 1.0000   
Undeveloped Region Percentage-Area UA 0.6652 0.7274 1.0000  
Undeveloped Region Percentage-Area 25 0.5947 0.6842 0.7559 1.0000 
 
Table 5: Features that Impose and Rules for Determining Exogenous Boundaries 
Bodies of Water (16250) Federal Lands (6666) 
Bay or Estuary or Ocean (1760) 
Canal (2) 
Glacier (239) 
Lake (10872) 
Lake Dry (135) 
Lake Intermittent (208) 
Reservoir (630) 
Reservoir Intermittent (14) 
Stream or River (607) 
Swamp or Marsh (1783) 
 
Agricultural Research Service ARS (8) 
Air Force DOD (171) 
Army Corps of Engineers DOD (288) 
Army DOD (205) 
Bureau of Prisons DOJ (8) 
Bureau of Reclamation BOR (545) 
Central Intelligence Agency CIA (1) 
Department of Defense DOD (2) 
Department of Energy DOE (16) 
Department of Transportation DOT (1) 
General Services Administration GSA (3) 
Marine Corps DOD (32) 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (2) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA (5) 
National Battlefield NPS (9) 
National Battlefield Park NPS (5) 
National Capital Park NPS (6) 
National Fish Hatchery FWS (5) 
National Forest FS (1548) 
National Game Preserve FWS (2) 
National Grassland FS (44) 
National Historic Landmark District NPS (1) 
National Historic Park NPS (37) 
National Historic Site NPS (22) 
National Lakeshore NPS (38) 
National Mall NPS (1) 
National Memorial NPS (5) 
National Military Park NPS (15) 
National Monument FS (3) 
National Monument NPS (90) 
National Park NPS (223) 
National Parkway NPS (23) 
National Preserve NPS (62) 
National Recreation Area FS (38) 
National Recreation Area NPS (58) 
National Reserve NPS (2) 
National River NPS (11) 
National Scenic Area FS (14) 
National Scenic River NPS (1) 
National Seashore NPS (64) 
National Wild and Scenic River NPS (4) 
National Wildlife Refuge FWS (1358) 
Navy DOD (188) 
Purchase Unit Block FS (44) 
TVA (36) 
U.S. Coast Guard DOT (5) 
United States Department of Agriculture USDA (2) 
Waterfowl Production Area FWS (159) 
Wilderness FS (675) 
Wilderness FWS (287) 
Wilderness NPS (252) 
Wilderness Study Area FS (21) 
Wilderness Study Area FWS (1) 
Wilderness Study Area NPS (8) 
Wildlife Management Area FWS (12) 
Protected Areas 
Using the Conservation Biology Institute’s Protected Areas Database (Version 4, January 2006), we considered all areas with 
a GAP Code of three or less to constitute regions that are presumptively off-limits to urban development. 
GAP CODE DESIGNATIONS 
1 National Park, National Monument, Wilderness Area, Nature Reserve/Preserve, Research Natural Area 
2 State Parks, State Recreation Areas, National Wildlife Refuge, National Recreation Area, Area of Critical 
Environmental Concern, Wilderness Study Area, Conservation Easement, Private Conservation Land, 
National Seashore 
3 BLM Holdings, Military Reservations, National Forests, State Forest, Wildlife Management Areas, Game 
and Fish Preserves, Fish Hatcheries, State Commemorative Area, Access Area, National Grassland, ACOE 
Holding 
  
Hillsides 
To estimate the elevation gradient along a 
segment of the border, we developed a 
VBA macro that executed the following 
steps. 
 
Identify the segment’s midpoint. 
 
Construct a Target Circle around the 
segment’s midpoint with a radius of 0.05 
decimal degrees (approximately 450 
meters, but this distance varies due to the 
curvature of the Earth). 
 
Using USGS SRTM DTED Level 1 Data 
(3-arc sec), determine the maximum and 
minimum elevation (in meters) for all 
points within the Target Circle. 
 
Divide the difference in elevation between 
the maximum and minimum points by the 
diameter (in meters) of the Target Circle.  
This quotient is the elevation gradient for 
the line segment. 
 
If the elevation gradient is greater than 
0.15,36 identify the line segment as an 
exogenous boundary. 
 
Table 6: Geographic Data Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inner and Outer Boundaries 26.97% 19.69% 0.80% Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH  
100.00% 
Flagstaff, AZ  
Outer Boundaries Only 27.82% 20.28% 0.61% Wichita, KS  
100.00% 
Flagstaff, AZ  
Undeveloped Region Percentage-Area UA 11.98% 14.96% 0.18% 73.58% 
                                                 
36 According to a report for the City of Glendora, CA by LSA Associates (a California-based Community and Land Use Planning 
consulting firm) “at about 15 percent, slopes begin to create problems for development”.  This cutoff also follows Saiz (2008). 
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Flint, MI  Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA  
Undeveloped Region Percentage-Area 25 20.59% 21.26% 0.12% Anderson, IN  
88.24% 
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL  
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Table 7: Sources of New and Existing Home Price Estimates by MSA 
Source Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Years 
Available 
Correlations 
BP NAR ACS 
Building Permits series Mean value of newly permitted 
single-unit dwelling (SUDs).  We 
divide the total value of SUDs by 
the number of SUDs. SUDs 
exclude all multi-unit dwellings 
such as duplexes and apartment 
complexes. 
 Values are estimated by builders and 
development professionals 
 Public data 
 Newly permitted construction better 
controls for differences in home values 
due to the age of the MSA’s housing 
stock 
 Most complete set of MSAs and longest 
survey period 
 MSA-level data  
 New construction is more likely to be 
near the endogenous boundary, so this 
measure may not best capture the effect 
of exogenous boundaries 
 Census Bureau warns that “due to the 
nature of the building permit 
application, we suspect that the 
valuations may frequently differ from 
the true cost of construction” 
1980 - 2006 1   
National Association of 
Realtors 
Median sales price of existing 
single-family homes 
 Reports actual sales prices, not survey 
estimates 
 Sales of existing homes are more likely 
to be near the exogenous boundary, so 
this price may be the best measure of 
the effect of exogenous boundaries 
 MSA-level data 
 Proprietary data can be used in this 
thesis but cannot be publicly disclosed 
to any third party (prior to 2004) 
 The value of existing homes can vary 
as a result of the age of an MSAs 
housing stock 
1989 - 2006 0.6861 1  
American Community 
Survey 
Median value for owner occupied 
housing units 
 Public data 
 Other ACS survey data is used in this 
thesis, which reduces the likelihood of 
errors compounded from multiple data 
sources 
 Most observations given that the 
overall dataset is already limited by 
other ACS variables  
 MSA-level data 
 Home values are estimated by random 
survey respondents 
 Least complete set of observations 
2000 - 2006 0.7064 0.9798 1 
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Table 8: Home Price Estimates by MSA for 2006 (Thousands of Dollars) 
MSA BP NAR ACS MSA BP NAR ACS MSA BP NAR ACS MSA BP NAR ACS 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa 246 585 605 Jacksonville, FL 196 193 193 Colorado Springs, CO  172 218 209 Charleston, WV 119 119 93 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN- 222 274 252 Memphis, TN-MS-AR  185 142 126 Wichita, KS  129 115 106 Green Bay, WI  128 151 152 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  194 150 141 Richmond, VA  177 226 203 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, 189 82 100 Lincoln, NE  176 138 143 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 164 230 230 Oklahoma City, OK  159 125 110 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL  207 268 270 Boulder, CO  324 366 347 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  142 149 130 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY  200 98 105 Madison, WI  208 223 218 Erie, PA  126 101 102 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano 203 371 313 Birmingham-Hoover, AL  167 165 131 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 214 212 220 Atlantic City, NJ  135 255 264 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 179 431 454 Salt Lake City, UT  191 203 203 Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA  173 145 144 Spartanburg, SC  104 127 111 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  149 172 187 Rochester, NY  183 115 116 Jackson, MS  149 147 116 Norwich-New London, CT  184 264 253 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  190 152 173 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  174 173 170 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, 176 244 235 Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV  215 223 227 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA- 219 402 404 Raleigh-Cary, NC  204 214 183 Chattanooga, TN-GA  143 136 125 Cedar Rapids, IA  127 134 123 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, 324 737 703 Tucson, AZ  181 245 205 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond 212 206 202 Binghamton, NY  169 97 92 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  188 268 266 Honolulu, HI  277 630 535 Durham, NC  218 173 170 Gainesville, FL  142 213 174 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, 202 400 395 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  459 474 508 Lansing-East Lansing, MI  172 138 156 Amarillo, TX  195 115 96 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  217 361 348 Tulsa, OK  164 132 111 Spokane, WA  145 184 163 Yakima, WA  189 137 137 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 229 232 242 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  219 195 169 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL  162 166 155 Topeka, KS  159 106 108 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, 269 602 572 New Haven-Milford, CT  169 288 266 Lexington-Fayette, KY  162 148 152 Gulfport-Biloxi, MS  114 146 121 
St. Louis, MO-IL  196 148 152 Dayton, OH  205 117 128 Corpus Christi, TX  127 132 92 Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA  209 156 150 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 181 229 202 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  135 138 138 Canton-Massillon, OH  164 109 127 Barnstable Town, MA  310 390 418 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  185 280 301 Albuquerque, NM  170 184 166 Fort Wayne, IN  186 100 112 Appleton, WI  194 129 145 
Denver-Aurora, CO  226 250 245 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA- 155 248 201 Springfield, MO  153 125 117 Champaign-Urbana, IL  158 143 130 
Pittsburgh, PA  191 116 111 Worcester, MA  180 282 299 Mobile, AL  109 137 105 Sioux Falls, SD  136 138 139 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, 220 281 269 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  166 135 146 Reading, PA  185 143 150 Springfield, IL  166 105 113 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  212 134 150 Baton Rouge, LA  127 170 131 Reno-Sparks, NV  191 347 355 Fargo, ND-MN  146 137 139 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  192 143 152 El Paso, TX  121 128 88 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA  160 132 99 Kingston, NY  203 253 239 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL  193 270 243 Columbia, SC  124 142 123 Salem, OR  192 213 189 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA  176 109 112 
Kansas City, MO-KS  190 156 153 Akron, OH  203 115 145 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  145 113 78 Bloomington-Normal, IL  139 152 144 
San Antonio, TX  161 142 106 Springfield, MA  192 210 206 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA- 171 120 111 Dover, DE  147 208 196 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, 321 775 741 Greensboro-High Point, NC  172 149 130 Peoria, IL  206 113 115 Pittsfield, MA  259 213 190 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  127 317 321 Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL  216 334 269 Trenton-Ewing, NJ  122 290 314 Glens Falls, NY  189 162 139 
Columbus, OH  219 148 162 Knoxville, TN  139 151 136 Montgomery, AL  148 144 108 Farmington, NM  174 172 127 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN  190 119 140 Toledo, OH  159 110 132 Rockford, IL  125 119 126 Decatur, IL  148 85 87 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall 179 290 309 Little Rock-North Little Rock- 167 127 116 Eugene-Springfield, OR  199 231 214 Kankakee-Bradley, IL  177 132 139 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC- 165 191 158 Syracuse, NY  165 117 106 Tallahassee, FL  160 178 169 Bismarck, ND  161 135 123 
Austin-Round Rock, TX  145 174 164 Charleston-North Charleston, SC  196 212 180 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI  207 93 118 Cumberland, MD-WV  163 96 98 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, 273 221 197 Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC  123 152 125 Ocala, FL  155 166 154 Elmira, NY  178 87 76 
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Table 9: Non-Geographic Data Descriptive Statistics using the Building Permits Series 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real (2006), mean value of new, 
single unit dwellings (000s) 
166.7 42.2 61.6 
El Paso, TX  
338.2 
Salinas, CA  
Median number of rooms 5.4 0.3 4.4 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL  
6.5 
Provo-Orem, UT  
Median year constructed 1973 9 1945 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA  
1992 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  
MSA population 1,076,986 1,703,566 69,655 
Casper, WY  
12,950,129 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  
Murder rate per 100,000 5.4 3.6 0.3 
Appleton, WI  
25.5 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  
Average commute time in minutes 22.3 3.1 14.0 
Great Falls, MT  
39.6 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ  
African American percentage 12.50% 11.60% 0.1% 
Bend, OR  
49.4% 
Albany, GA  
 
Table 10: Non-Geographic Data Descriptive Statistics using National Association of Realtors Median Home Price Data 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real (2006), median sales price of 
existing single-family homes (000s) 
185.4 107.1 79.6 
Elmira, NY  
775.0 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  
Median number of rooms 5.4 0.3 4.4 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL  
6.2 
Salt Lake City, UT  
Median year constructed 1973 9 1950 
Pittsfield, MA  
1992 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  
MSA population 1,617,855 2,271,609 88,641 
Elmira, NY  
18,818,536 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA  
Murder rate per 100,000 5.9 3.6 0.3 
Appleton, WI  
25.5 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  
Average commute time in minutes 23 3.1 15.6 
Bismarck, ND  
34.2 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA  
African American percentage 13.20% 10.80% 0.1% 
Appleton, WI  
47.2% 
Jackson, MS  
 
Table 11: Non-Geographic Data Descriptive Statistics using American Community Survey Data 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real (2006), median value of owner 
occupied housing units (000s) 
171.2 109.6 53.8 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX  
740.5 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  
Median number of rooms 5.4 0.3 4.4 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL  
6.5 
Provo-Orem, UT  
Median year constructed 1973 9 1945 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA  
1992 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  
MSA population 1,109,466 1,893,811 69,655 
Casper, WY  
18,818,536 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA  
Murder rate per 100,000 5.4 3.6 0.3 
Appleton, WI  
25.5 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  
Average commute time in minutes 22.3 3.1 14.0 
Great Falls, MT  
39.6 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ  
African American percentage 12.40% 11.50% 0.1% 
Bend, OR  
49.4% 
Albany, GA  
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Empirical Results 
Simple Correlations 
One important preliminary finding is the positive correlation between the exogenous 
region percentages developed in this thesis and published Quality of Life (QOL) and Cost of 
Living indexes.  In particular, in Table 12, we see that there is the predicted association between 
nearly all of the measures of constraints on housing supply and QOL rankings or local prices.  
And while some of these correlations are very weak (as low as 0.0031) and others are quite 
strong (as high as -0.9775), the probability of our finding that 67 out of 68 of them have the 
expected sign is negligible (2.3×10-19, assuming that there is a 50/50 chance that the correlation 
might have the expected or unexpected sign).  Section H of the Appendix includes tables of data 
that underlie the correlations summarized in Table 12. 
We see in Row A of Table 12 that there is a positive correlation between all four of 
exogenous region percentages and the quality of life rankings reported in Roback (1980), 
although this correlation is generally weak (only one of the four correlations is statistically 
significant).  These positive correlations are consistent with the central thesis of this study and 
indicate that cities that rank highest in Roback’s study are also more constrained by exogenous 
features.  The weakness of these correlations could be due to inconsistencies in the geographic 
extent of Roback’s cities and the metropolitan areas examined in this thesis or because Roback’s 
rankings are based on wage and rent data that is at least thirty years old.  Also notice that the 
length-based boundary measures are generally more strongly correlated with Roback’s rankings 
than the area-based undeveloped region measures; this pattern will be repeated in nearly all of 
this thesis’ empirical findings. 
Similar QOL rankings have been published since Roback’s original effort.  For example, 
Gyourko and Tracy (1991) also use local rents and wages to devise qualify of life indexes for a 
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broad cross-section of cities.  However, Gyourko and Tracy’s indexes are based on a looser set 
of assumptions and a wider array of econometric models than Roback’s.  In Row B of Table 12, 
we once again see that there is a positive correlation between all of Gyourko and Tracy’s 
rankings (regardless of econometric model) and our exogenous region percentages (regardless of 
geographic orientation).  Notice that Gyourko and Tracy also use the city’s municipal boundary 
rather than its economic boundary in constructing their quality of life indexes.  Perhaps for this 
reason, the positive correlation between their rankings and this thesis’ measures of land supply 
constraints are generally weak.   
Gyourko, et al. (2006) point out that “house price effects occur after the superstar market 
has ‘filled up’.”  This finding suggests that the housing supply effect on prices does not only 
depend on land supply constraints, but also larger populations to fill up the constrained land.  To 
help account for this interaction between population and land supply on home prices, we have 
limited the set of cities in Row C of Table 12 to only those cities whose 2006 metro area 
population is greater than 1 million.  For simplicity, we assume that all such cities were nearing 
their filled-up limit in 1990, and the exogenous region percentage represents the most important 
variable in determining the supply of remaining land (and homes).  In Row C, we see that all of 
the correlations remain positive, and compared to Row B, and the correlations in these “filled 
up” cities has increased in twelve of the sixteen cases. 
Kahn’s (1995) quality-of-life measurements of five cities are also derived from Roback’s 
logic, but do not depend on the assumption that all public amenities are observed and measured.  
In Row D of Table 12, there are sixteen correlations between the four exogenous region 
percentages in this thesis and the four QOL rankings in Kahn’s study, and we see that these 
correlations are negative in every case except one.  Since lower-ranked cities receive higher 
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scores in Kahn’s study, these negative correlations provide more evidence for our thesis.  Many 
of these negative correlations are very strong, with four exceeding 0.9.  Of course, these findings 
also support the canonical view – the features that generally impose exogenous boundaries 
(parks, oceans, mountains, etc.) contribute so much to a city’s quality of life that these rankings 
accurately reflect the marginal migrant’s willingness to pay for these attractive amenities. 
However, notice that this thesis’ exogenous region percentages are generally more 
strongly correlated with Kahn’s 1990 rankings than his 1980 rankings.  Since all five cities 
experienced population growth during the 1980s, the stronger 1990 correlation is consistent with 
the thesis of this dissertation that land prices increase as supply constraints become more binding 
with a growing population.  Standard theory, which ignores the impact that land supply 
restrictions have on prices, can only explain this difference by arguing that the willingness-to-
pay for features that constrain urban development in these cities increased during the 1980s. 
In Row E of Table 12, we report the correlation between this thesis’ four exogenous 
region percentages and the U.S. Government’s 2008 locality pay adjustment schedule.  The 
locality pay adjustment is an automatic wage or salary increase that federal employees receive to 
account for differences in the cost of living among U.S. cities.  For example, because the price in 
Atlanta is higher than the base level, federal employees there earn 17.30% more than the 
unadjusted, standard compensation.  Once again, we see that the correlation between this thesis’ 
four exogenous region percentages and local prices is positive and significant.  Since this 
adjustment is intended to provide equal compensation to employees with similar skills who 
perform similar jobs, it (at least partially) controls for differences in worker quality.  Therefore, 
the positive correlation that we observe between this pay adjustment and land supply constraints 
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cities is not a result of higher quality workers simply bidding up housing and land prices in more 
geographically constrained cities. 
In Row F of Table 12, we report the correlations between this thesis’ four exogenous 
region percentages and the Median Multiple, which is the ratio of local median home prices to 
local median income.  This measure is used by the researchers who compile the annual 
Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey to rank housing costs among major 
cities in various countries.  Home prices in cities with a Median Multiple of three or less are 
considered to be affordable, while cities with a Median Multiple of five or more are viewed as 
having severely unaffordable housing.  In Row F, where we limit the sample to the 50 largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States (MSA population of more than one million) to control for 
the interaction between population and land supply constraints on home prices, we see that the 
correlations between the Median Multiple and the four exogenous region percentages are quite 
high.  In the best case, we find that 49% of the variation in the Median Multiple can be 
“explained” by just one land supply measure. 
In Row G of Table 12, we report the correlation between this thesis’ four exogenous 
region percentages and the ten-year (1996-2006) growth in the local Home Price Index (HPI) 
developed by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).  OFHEO is the 
entity within the U.S. Government’s Department of Housing and Urban Development that is 
charged with ensuring the safety and soundness of the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).  The HPI tracks 
the movement of single-family house prices by measuring average price changes in repeat sales 
or refinancings on the same properties.  In Row G, where we have again restricted the sample to 
the 50 largest MSAs, we see that the correlation between the growth in average home prices and 
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the four exogenous region percentages is again remarkably high.    In the best case, we see that 
50% of the variation in the growth in home prices can be “explained” by just one land supply 
measure.  Since we am considering the ten-year growth in local home prices in Row G, this 
correlation automatically controls for factors that we assume to stable over longer time periods 
such as a general preference for seashores, mountain vistas, and large recreation areas. 
In Row H of Table 12, we report the correlation between this thesis’ four exogenous 
region percentages and the concentration of gay couples reported in Black (2002).  Black argues 
that a large concentration of gay partners signals greater quality of life because these couples, 
who are more likely to be childless, can afford to spend more than heterosexual couples on 
public amenities.  Once again, we see that the simple correlation between Black’s rankings and 
the measures reported in this thesis is positive and significant, as expected.  However, since 
Black’s rankings do not explicitly incorporate land or home price data, these correlations help 
confirm the view that the exogenous features that constrain urban development (e.g., ocean 
fronts, mountain ranges, national and state parks) are also generally attractive amenities.  Of 
course, all of the correlations reported this section are merely suggestive and reinforce the need 
for an estimation strategy that distinguishes the amenity effect of exogenous features on home 
prices from the housing supply effect of these features on prices.
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Table 12: Summary of Correlations Between Quality of Life Indexes or Home Price Measures and Exogenous Region Percentages 
 Source of Quality of Life or 
Cost of Living Index 
Measurement Inner and Outer 
Bounds 
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 
A 
Roback (1982) Corr. w/QOL 3 Rankings 0.4295 0.3574 0.2454 0.0031
t-statistic37 1.8421* 1.4819 0.9805 0.0123
r-squared 0.1845 0.1277 0.0602 0.0000
B 
Gyourko and Tracy (1991) Corr. w/Random Effects 0.0504 0.0749 0.1581 0.1914
Corr. w/Random Effects, Group Effects Included 0.0904 0.1437 0.2450 0.2224
Corr. w/OLS: All Fiscal Variables 0.1597 0.1859 0.2487 0.2492
Corr. w/OLS: No Taxes/No Union 0.0866 0.1221 0.2133 0.2234
C 
Gyourko and Tracy (1991), 
Major MSAs (1 million+) Only 
Corr. w/Random Effects 0.1248 0.1116 0.1579 0.1735
Corr. w/Random Effects, Group Effects Included 0.1974 0.1682 0.1971 0.0784
Corr. w/OLS: All Fiscal Variables 0.2590 0.2588 0.2796 0.2600
Corr. w/OLS: No Taxes/No Union 0.1452 0.1919 0.2747 0.2329
D 
Kahn (1995) Corr. w/1980 Pct Worse Off -0.9156 -0.9775 -0.6235 -0.3030
Corr. w/1980 Median Worse Off -0.5848 -0.7209 -0.2081 0.2222
Corr. w/1990 Pct Worse Off -0.9632 -0.9582 -0.7455 -0.4402
Corr. w/1990 Median Worse Off -0.7768 -0.6949 -0.6164 -0.3142
E 
Federal Govt’s 2008 Locality 
Pay Adjustment 
Corr. w/2008 Pct Pay Adjustment 0.6173 0.5624 0.4751 0.3442
t-statistic 4.2253**** 3.6627**** 2.9071*** 1.9743*
r-squared 0.3810 0.3163 0.2257 0.1185
F Mediaum Multiple = Median Corr. w/2006 Median Multiple 0.6722 0.7002 0.4261 0.5527
  t-statistic 6.2896**** 6.7939**** 3.2628*** 4.5948****
  r-squared 0.4518 0.4902 0.1815 0.3055
G 
OFHEO Local Home Price 
Index 
Corr. w/Growth in Home Price Index 0.7041 0.6844 0.4301 0.3352
t-statistic 6.8689**** 6.5035**** 3.3012*** 2.4653***
r-squared 0.4957 0.4684 0.1850 0.1124
H 
Black (2002) Corr. w/Concentration of Gay Couples 0.4598 0.3931 0.4167 0.3106
t-statistic 3.5118**** 2.8997*** 3.1091*** 2.2160**
r-squared 0.2114 0.1545 0.1737 0.0965
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
                                                 
37 The t-statistic and the r-squared come from the simple regression of the QOL index or home price measure on the exogenous region 
percentage. 
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Aggregated Regression Results 
Regression results on home prices aggregated on the city level are presented in Table 13, 
Table 14 and Table 16.  Take special notice of the pattern of the Housing Supply Effect 
coefficient across these datasets.  The dependent variable in Table 13 is the mean price of 
recently constructed homes reported in the Building Permits series, and we assume that new 
construction is most likely to occur near the urban area’s endogenous regions where undeveloped 
land is being newly converted from non-urban to urban use.  Therefore, we expect the correlation 
between new home prices and the HSE to be relatively weak. 
In Table 14, the dependent variable is the median price of previously owned homes from 
the National Association of Realtors, and we assume that the exogenous boundary represents a 
binding constraint on brand new residential development for most urban areas.  This suggests 
that these previously-owned residences will be concentrated near the exogenous regions.  In this 
case, we predict that the correlation between existing home prices and the HSE will be relatively 
strong. 
In Table 16, the dependent variable is based on answers provided by randomly-selected 
respondents from the American Community Survey who are not systematically more likely to be 
closer to the MSA’s endogenous regions or the exogenous regions.  Thus, we anticipate that the 
correlation between home prices and the HSE will be greater than the correlation reported in 
Table 13 but less than the correlation reported in Table 14.   
All of these expected results are confirmed by the findings in Table 13, Table 14 and 
Table 16 using either the first-difference or fixed effects regression models.  We emphasize that 
the independent variables in these three specifications do not change – every control variable in 
all three datasets is taken from the American Community Survey, except for the murder rate 
which is reported by the FBI.  As we move between datasets in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 16, 
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only the dependent variable and the sample of MSAs surveyed change.  Taken together, these 
results suggest that researchers can avoid the complicating effects of exogenous regions on land 
prices by restricting their investigation to new homes only.  Table 15 shows the estimated 
marginal effect of population growth and the exogenous region percentage on home values for 
various cities (using the fixed effects model and NAR median home price data), and we see that 
these estimated marginal effects are reasonable, especially for cities that fall between the 25th and 
75th percentile. 
The other empirical results in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 16 are generally easy to 
interpret.  Using home price data from the National Association of Realtors and the American 
Community Survey, we find a positive and statistically significant correlation between a city’s 
median home size and its average home prices.  Since the data on median home size comes from 
the American Community Survey (like all of the control variables except for city’s murder rate), 
this effect is most pronounced in Table 16, which also uses average home price data from the 
ACS.  A city’s median home size seems to have no effect on the price of newly built homes in 
Table 13. 
We also see in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 16 that cities with newer homes usually 
have higher average home prices.  This effect is most pronounced with the fixed effects estimator 
in Table 13, which uses the Building Permits series to estimate the value of new homes.  
Generally, if our exogenous region percentage is a positive and statistically significant 
determinant of home prices, then we also find that newer homes are also positively correlated 
with homes prices. 
We also see in Table 13 and Table 14 that homes sell for less in cities with rising murder 
rates.  This effect is most pronounced on the prices of previously owned homes in Table 14, 
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perhaps because these crimes are most likely to occur near the CBD, where the concentration of 
existing homes is highest.  The positive and statistically significant effect of rising murder rates 
on home prices in Table 16 is difficult to explain. 
We find in Table 13 and Table 14 that a larger black population seems to have a positive 
effect on the value of recently built homes (perhaps due to white flight to the suburbs) and 
previously owned homes (perhaps due to a preference among African-Americans to migrate to 
predominately black neighborhoods in the central city).  But the effect in Table 16 is negative 
and statistically significant using average home price data from the American Community 
Survey.  This apparent inconsistency may be because survey respondents erroneously believe 
that a rising black population generally lowers their home value or that a rising white population 
raises it.  This result might also be explained because residents who sell their existing homes and 
home builders who plan new developments may be responding to specific neighborhood effects 
that favor home sales when the city’s proportion of black residents increases, though this effect 
may not generally hold throughout the metropolitan area.  
In Table 13, we find that new homes (which are likely to be constructed on the outskirts 
of the urban area) sell for lower prices in cities with long commutes, but this effect is not 
significant.  In Table 14, we see that existing homes (which we assume are more likely to have 
been constructed near the central city) sell for higher prices in cities with long commutes, and 
this effect is also insignificant.  The overall effect of longer commutes on randomly selected 
homeowners in Table 16 is generally negative and insignificant. 
We also see in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 16 that cities with older and more educated 
populations have higher home values.  This positive and significant effect is evident in nearly 
every home price dataset and estimation model.  This is not surprising: older and more educated 
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residents are likely to have higher incomes, and since housing is a normal good, we expect its 
price to rise with income. 
In Table 17, we report the Housing Supply Effect of exogenous regions on median gross 
rents in the metropolitan urban area.  No matter which of the four exogenous region percentages 
or two estimation models that we use, this effect is always positive.  Predictably, apartment rents 
are higher in cities with tighter constraints on urban development.  However, this result is 
statistically significant in only four of the eight specifications.  In every case, the Housing 
Supply Effect on apartment rents in Table 17 is less than the HSE on the price of existing homes 
in Table 14 or the price of all homes in Table 16.  This pattern will be replicated in other 
empirical findings reported in this study, and is consistent with our thesis.  We can explain this 
difference by noting that cost of moving for apartment renters is lower than the moving costs of 
homeowners.  According to The Wall Street Journal, “for a domestic transfer, it costs a company 
about $62,000 to move a current employee who is a homeowner…; for new hires who own a 
home, the cost is about $55,000.  Renters are less expensive, with relocation costs ranging from 
about $16,000 to $18,000.”38 
In Table 18, we report the Housing Supply Effect of exogenous regions on median 
household income.  Once again, the HSE is positive in every case.  Though this result cannot be 
formally derived from the theoretical model, it is predictable:  we have already shown that cities 
with greater constraints on urban development have higher home prices and apartment rents – as 
a result, higher incomes are necessary to make these higher residential prices affordable.  But 
this effect is statistically significant in only two of the eight specifications.  Not surprisingly, the 
effect of tighter constraints on urban development is more pronounced in the land market than 
the labor market.  And most importantly, the combined effects in these two markets do not 
                                                 
38 For a Job, Look Before Relocating, Ruth Mantell, The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2008. 
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appear to offset each other.  Based on these findings, urban areas with more exogenous regions 
will rank higher in standard, cost-of-living-based QOL studies because the supply of their 
developable areas is more constrained. 
 These findings strongly suggest that moving costs are heterogeneous and that any QOL 
index that ranks cities based on land prices is uninterpretable.  If exogenous features that 
constrain development are amenities (e.g., parks, oceans, mountains) then the value of cities with 
an abundance of these constraints will be overestimated in QOL studies.   If these features are 
disamenities (e.g., noisy military bases, swamps, Mexico) then the value of cities with more of 
these constraints will be underestimated.  Since most of the features that limit opportunities for 
urban development are attractive amenities, urban areas with large and numerous exogenous 
areas will generally outrank cities with small and fewer areas that constrain the supply of land.
64 
 
 
 
Table 13: Regression Results using the Building Permits Series 
 Using First-Difference Estimator Using Fixed Effects Estimator  
Dependent variable: Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Log of real (2006), average value of new, 
single unit dwellings  Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Housing Supply Effect -0.2142 -0.18 -0.0514 -0.04 2.0762 1.15 1.3595 1.09 -0.2700 -0.49 -0.0615 -0.10 1.0247 1.34 0.3607 0.66 
Log of MSA Population 0.6653 0.97 0.7636 1.11 0.4795 0.87 0.2099 0.37 1.0753 4.19**** 1.0693 3.95**** 1.0082 4.60**** 0.9800 4.41**** 
Median number of rooms -0.0159 -0.49 -0.0171 -0.52 -0.0154 -0.48 -0.0114 -0.35 -0.0092 -0.24 -0.0059 -0.15 -0.0132 -0.34 -0.0084 -0.22 
Median year constructed -0.0011 -0.49 -0.0012 -0.54 -0.0017 -0.80 -0.0016 -0.74 0.0077 2.92*** 0.0074 2.75*** 0.0061 2.35** 0.0069 2.68*** 
Murder rate -0.0009 -0.53 -0.0008 -0.48 -0.0006 -0.37 -0.0006 -0.38 -0.0022 -1.10 -0.0019 -0.92 -0.0021 -1.02 -0.0020 -1.01 
African American percentage 0.0761 0.22 0.0790 0.23 0.1010 0.30 0.0988 0.29 0.5663 1.62 0.5218 1.48 0.4143 1.18 0.4894 1.40 
Commute time -0.0038 -1.46 -0.0038 -1.44 -0.0041 -1.61 -0.0039 -1.53 -0.0014 -0.40 -0.0017 -0.48 -0.0020 -0.58 -0.0015 -0.45 
Median age of population 0.0061 1.04 0.0062 1.05 0.0070 1.24 0.0067 1.18 0.0342 5.64**** 0.0344 5.64**** 0.0366 6.15**** 0.0359 5.93**** 
College graduate percentage 0.2598 1.47 0.2673 1.50 0.2834 1.63 0.2738 1.57 0.6051 2.78*** 0.5880 2.69*** 0.5344 2.47** 0.5688 2.64*** 
Intercept 0.0185 2.70*** 0.0172 2.49** 0.0166 2.47** 0.0197 2.97*** -24.8137 -5.95**** -24.9386 -5.92**** -23.8942 -5.79**** -24.0205 -5.85**** 
Number of observations 585  579  595  596  806  799  824  826  
Number of MSAs 185  184  191  192  185  184  191  192  
R2 Within 0.2832  0.2923  0.2948  0.2318  0.3315  0.3320  0.3231  0.3255  
Between 0.9010  0.9481  0.2750  0.1502  0.0005  0.0283  0.0795  0.0960  
Overall 0.0003  0.0633  0.0605  0.0446  0.0022  0.0485  0.0813  0.1011  
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 14: Regression Results using National Association of Realtors Median Home Price Data 
 Using First-Difference Estimator Using Fixed Effects Estimator  
Dependent variable: Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Log of real (2006), median sales price of 
existing single-family homes Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Housing Supply Effect 8.7258 7.74**** 8.3294 7.78**** 10.9947 6.89**** 6.7762 5.74**** 8.9272 9.77**** 8.8481 10.52**** 12.3377 8.54**** 6.7801 6.77**** 
Log of MSA Population -1.1786 -1.80* -0.9981 -1.65* 0.5812 1.13 0.7910 1.46 -1.1827 -2.44** -0.8160 -1.87* 0.9069 2.20** 0.9560 2.38** 
Median number of rooms 0.0149 0.48 0.0158 0.52 0.0107 0.35 0.0078 0.25 0.1514 2.55** 0.1327 2.27** 0.1031 1.58 0.1207 1.87* 
Median year constructed -0.0012 -0.57 -0.0014 -0.63 -0.0023 -1.09 -0.0022 -1.00 0.0073 1.78* 0.0053 1.33 -0.0016 -0.36 0.0005 0.12 
Murder rate -0.0034 -2.01** -0.0033 -2.00** -0.0030 -1.78* -0.0034 -1.95* -0.0071 -2.29** -0.0068 -2.22** -0.0042 -1.24 -0.0061 -1.81* 
African American percentage 1.0208 2.82*** 0.9914 2.75*** 1.0116 2.78*** 1.0739 2.89*** 0.2740 0.49 0.1703 0.30 -0.5173 -0.81 -0.1132 -0.18 
Commute time 0.0030 1.03 0.0031 1.07 0.0031 1.05 0.0031 1.03 0.0113 1.85* 0.0091 1.51 0.0060 0.88 0.0079 1.19 
Median age of population 0.0115 1.98** 0.0115 1.98** 0.0122 2.14** 0.0133 2.29** 0.0635 6.91**** 0.0624 6.93**** 0.0630 6.28**** 0.0635 6.20**** 
College graduate percentage -0.0251 -0.14 -0.0248 -0.14 0.0231 0.13 0.0265 0.15 1.0410 3.00*** 0.9556 2.78*** 0.8327 2.14** 1.0589 2.77*** 
Intercept 0.0219 3.51**** 0.0218 3.57**** 0.0154 2.53** 0.0160 2.59** -31.5971 -4.93**** -32.7705 -5.17**** -32.0829 -4.52**** -28.9197 -4.14**** 
Number of observations 420  420  424  424  566  566  574  574  
Number of MSAs 119  119  122  122  119  119  122  122  
R2 Within 0.6343  0.6611  0.6550  0.6225  0.5613  0.5720  0.4530  0.4655  
Between 0.1404  0.1526  0.2046  0.2961  0.3368  0.3274  0.1809  0.1262  
Overall 0.3805  0.3719  0.2680  0.1820  0.3399  0.3316  0.2275  0.1517  
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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 1 2
ˆln lnjt jt j jn MSA b cπ γ γ∂∆ ∂∆ = + ⋅  
 Inner and Outer Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only Undevelopable Areas – Area-UA Undevelopable Areas – Area-25 
Minimum -1.1116=-1.1827+8.9272×0.80% Huntington-Ashland, WV 
-0.7617=-0.8160+8.8481×0.61% 
Wichita, KS 
0.9287=0.9069+12.3377×0.18% 
Flint, MI 
0.9639=0.9560+6.7801×0.12% 
Anderson, IN 
25% -0.0709=-1.1827+8.9272×12.45% Springfield, OH 
0.1505=-0.8160+8.8481×10.92% 
Lancaster, PA 
0.9955=0.9069+12.3377×0.72% 
Columbus, OH 
1.1547=0.9560+6.7801×2.93% 
Jackson, MS 
50% 0.7702=-1.1827+8.9272×21.88% Casper, WY 
1.2828=-0.8160+8.8481×23.72% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 
1.5747=0.9069+12.3377×5.41% 
Raleigh-Cary, NC 
1.7160=0.9560+6.7801×11.21% 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-
75% 2.3571=-1.1827+8.9272×39.65% Dubuque, IA 
2.7855=-0.8160+8.8481×40.70% 
San Angelo, TX 
3.2097=0.9069+12.3377×18.66% 
Dalton, GA 
3.2413=0.9560+6.7801×33.71% 
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 
Maximum 7.7445=-1.1827+8.9272×100.00% Flagstaff, AZ 
8.0321=-0.8160+8.8481×100.00% 
Flagstaff, AZ 
9.9855=0.9069+12.3377×73.58% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, 
6.9387=0.9560+6.7801×88.24% 
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, 
 ( ) 2 ˆln lnjt j j jtn b c MSAγ π∂∆ ∂ = ⋅ ∆  
 Inner and Outer Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only Undevelopable Areas – Area-UA Undevelopable Areas – Area-25 
Minimum -2.2187=8.9272×-24.85% New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
-2.1991=8.8481×-24.85% 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
-3.0664=12.3377×-24.85% 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
-1.6851=6.7801×-24.85% 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
25% 0.0247=8.9272×0.28% Baltimore-Towson, MD 
0.0245=8.8481×0.28% 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 
0.0341=12.3377×0.28% 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 
0.0187=6.7801×0.28% 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 
50% 0.0874=8.9272×0.98% Medford, OR 
0.0866=8.8481×0.98% 
Medford, OR 
0.1208=12.3377×0.98% 
Medford, OR 
0.0664=6.7801×0.98% 
Medford, OR 
75% 0.1553=8.9272×1.74% Richmond, VA 
0.1540=8.8481×1.74% 
Richmond, VA 
0.2147=12.3377×1.74% 
Richmond, VA 
0.1180=6.7801×1.74% 
Richmond, VA 
Maximum 0.5183=8.9272×5.81% St. George, UT 
0.5137=8.8481×5.81% 
St. George, UT 
0.7162=12.3377×5.81% 
St. George, UT 
0.3936=6.7801×5.81% 
St. George, UT 
 
Table 15: Estimated Marginal Effects at Various Percentiles (using the Fixed-Effects Model and National Association of Realtors 
Median Home Price Data) 
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Table 16: Regression Results using American Community Survey Data on Median Home Values 
 Using First-Difference Estimator Using Fixed Effects Estimator  
Dependent variable: Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Log of real (2006), median value for owner 
occupied housing units Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Housing Supply Effect 5.7203 5.04**** 6.5623 5.71**** 5.2757 2.98*** 3.0400 2.51** 3.9022 5.59**** 4.5209 6.41**** 1.1131 1.08 0.2501 0.35 
Log of MSA Population 0.2758 0.42 -0.2870 -0.44 1.9401 3.53**** 1.9747 3.48**** 1.1231 3.40*** 0.7740 2.32** 2.6358 9.02**** 2.8464 9.70**** 
Median number of rooms 0.1009 3.11*** 0.1023 3.19*** 0.0944 2.87*** 0.0953 2.91*** 0.1953 3.78**** 0.1848 3.65**** 0.1767 3.32*** 0.1676 3.15*** 
Median year constructed 0.0029 1.32 0.0034 1.56 0.0015 0.70 0.0014 0.66 -0.0012 -0.36 0.0003 0.10 -0.0062 -1.73* -0.0072 -2.04** 
Murder rate 0.0041 2.46** 0.0038 2.27** 0.0037 2.16** 0.0035 2.07** 0.0073 2.78*** 0.0061 2.38** 0.0067 2.47** 0.0065 2.42** 
African American percentage -0.9471 -2.79*** -0.9287 -2.78*** -0.8646 -2.50** -0.8446 -2.46** -1.2749 -2.89*** -1.2117 -2.81*** -1.0709 -2.36** -1.0864 -2.39** 
Commute time -0.0031 -1.20 -0.0032 -1.26 -0.0032 -1.21 -0.0032 -1.24 -0.0037 -0.83 -0.0024 -0.53 -0.0075 -1.62 -0.0083 -1.80* 
Median age of population 0.0044 0.76 0.0044 0.77 0.0048 0.84 0.0055 0.97 0.0384 4.80**** 0.0399 5.11**** 0.0318 3.94**** 0.0319 3.88**** 
College graduate percentage 0.3139 1.80* 0.2917 1.70* 0.3614 2.05** 0.3688 2.11** 0.9528 3.30*** 0.9484 3.36*** 0.9566 3.23*** 0.9673 3.27*** 
Intercept 0.0224 3.36*** 0.0254 3.87**** 0.0161 2.41** 0.0167 2.54** -24.5057 -4.44**** -25.6656 -4.74**** -22.3816 -3.98**** -21.5608 -3.85**** 
Number of observations 606  600  616  617  836  829  854  856  
Number of MSAs 190  189  196  197  190  189  196  197  
R2 Within 0.4137  0.4002  0.4272  0.4307  0.4107  0.4078  0.4012  0.3998  
Between 0.4863  0.3720  0.6779  0.8173  0.1693  0.1643  0.1574  0.1279  
Overall 0.2303  0.2196  0.1656  0.1770  0.2141  0.2037  0.1788  0.1492  
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 17: Regression Results using American Community Survey Data on Median Gross Rent 
 Using First-Difference Estimator Using Fixed Effects Estimator  
Dependent variable: 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Log of real (2006), median gross rent Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Housing Supply Effect 1.0919 1.53 1.4201 1.95* 1.1919 1.10 1.4978 2.02** 0.8598 2.93*** 0.8983 2.97*** 0.0793 0.19 0.1186 0.41 
Log of MSA Population 0.6432 1.55 0.4623 1.12 0.8813 2.62*** 0.7564 2.17** 0.1174 0.84 0.1026 0.72 0.5130 4.28**** 0.5124 4.24**** 
Median number of rooms -0.0090 -0.44 -0.0066 -0.33 -0.0071 -0.35 -0.0082 -0.41 0.0495 2.28** 0.0479 2.21** 0.0439 2.01** 0.0420 1.92* 
Median year constructed -0.0011 -0.79 -0.0011 -0.80 -0.0016 -1.17 -0.0015 -1.15 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0001 -0.05 -0.0017 -1.16 -0.0017 -1.20 
Murder rate -0.0023 -2.20** -0.0024 -2.30** -0.0023 -2.17** -0.0022 -2.16** -0.0011 -0.98 -0.0013 -1.19 -0.0011 -1.04 -0.0011 -1.00 
African American percentage -0.0163 -0.08 -0.0065 -0.03 0.0327 0.15 0.0267 0.13 -0.0407 -0.22 -0.0243 -0.13 0.0115 0.06 -0.0074 -0.04 
Commute time -0.0044 -2.77*** -0.0046 -2.89*** -0.0043 -2.71*** -0.0045 -2.81*** -0.0050 -2.65*** -0.0051 -2.69*** -0.0062 -3.26*** -0.0063 -3.32*** 
Median age of population 0.0038 1.07 0.0041 1.13 0.0046 1.31 0.0050 1.42 0.0071 2.10** 0.0074 2.22** 0.0061 1.86* 0.0065 1.92* 
College graduate percentage 0.3468 3.18*** 0.3313 3.04*** 0.3601 3.35*** 0.3623 3.37*** 0.4351 3.59**** 0.4253 3.51**** 0.4332 3.57**** 0.4266 3.51**** 
Intercept -0.0006 -0.15 0.0003 0.08 -0.0018 -0.43 -0.0017 -0.43 1.3873 0.60 1.4079 0.61 2.4469 1.06 2.3911 1.04 
Number of observations 606  600  616  617  836  829  854  856  
Number of MSAs 190  189  196  197  190  189  196  197  
R2 Within 0.1163  0.1141  0.1033  0.0972  0.1204  0.1192  0.1179  0.1121  
Between 0.6848  0.5085  0.7129  0.5879  0.2130  0.1973  0.1790  0.2517  
Overall 0.3700  0.3222  0.2234  0.2012  0.2902  0.2625  0.2194  0.2858  
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 18: Regression Results using American Community Survey Data on Median Household Income 
 Using First-Difference Estimator Using Fixed Effects Estimator  
Dependent variable: 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Outer Boundaries 
Only 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-UA 
Undev. Region 
Percent – Area-25 
Log of real (2006), median household 
income in the past 12 months Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
Housing Supply Effect 0.5133 0.68 0.7415 0.96 0.8205 0.70 0.3124 0.39 0.6020 2.34** 0.6143 2.31** 0.3957 1.05 0.1588 0.62 
Log of MSA Population 0.1816 0.41 0.0633 0.14 0.2639 0.73 0.2587 0.69 -0.2805 -2.30** -0.3061 -2.44** -0.1255 -1.18 -0.0772 -0.72 
Median number of rooms 0.1230 5.72**** 0.1272 5.91**** 0.1210 5.59**** 0.1205 5.57**** 0.1272 6.66**** 0.1287 6.74**** 0.1293 6.67**** 0.1266 6.56**** 
Median year constructed 0.0012 0.84 0.0009 0.61 0.0015 1.07 0.0016 1.13 -0.0015 -1.14 -0.0015 -1.16 -0.0015 -1.17 -0.0018 -1.37 
Murder rate -0.0002 -0.16 -0.0001 -0.08 -0.0007 -0.63 -0.0007 -0.62 0.0021 2.14** 0.0020 2.04** 0.0019 1.91* 0.0019 1.89* 
African American percentage -0.5305 -2.36** -0.5382 -2.40** -0.5132 -2.26** -0.5246 -2.31** -1.1154 -6.84**** -1.0997 -6.77**** -1.0460 -6.33**** -1.0546 -6.39**** 
Commute time -0.0027 -1.58 -0.0026 -1.51 -0.0027 -1.59 -0.0027 -1.58 -0.0016 -0.98 -0.0014 -0.83 -0.0019 -1.15 -0.0022 -1.29 
Median age of population -0.0023 -0.60 -0.0023 -0.60 -0.0031 -0.81 -0.0031 -0.82 -0.0093 -3.14*** -0.0094 -3.18*** -0.0105 -3.58**** -0.0103 -3.46*** 
College graduate percentage 0.4079 3.54**** 0.4021 3.49**** 0.3369 2.91*** 0.3356 2.90*** 0.4059 3.81**** 0.4105 3.85**** 0.3500 3.25*** 0.3518 3.28*** 
Intercept -0.0073 -1.66* -0.0067 -1.53 -0.0072 -1.64 -0.0066 -1.51 14.8778 7.30**** 15.2038 7.45**** 14.4123 7.04**** 14.5935 7.17**** 
Number of observations 606  600  616  617  836  829  854  856  
Number of MSAs 190  189  196  197  190  189  196  197  
R2 Within 0.0487  0.0585  0.0431  0.0451  0.1468  0.1510  0.1371  0.1376  
Between 0.8202  0.5920  0.7774  0.9374  0.0429  0.0287  0.0261  0.0151  
Overall 0.1091  0.0660  0.0573  0.0668  0.0475  0.0316  0.0242  0.0110  
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Household-Level Regression Results using 2000-2006 American Community Survey Data 
So far, the empirical findings reported in this thesis have been based simple correlations 
or on data that was aggregated and averaged on the MSA level.  In this section, we describe 
results that are based on household level data reported in the U.S. Census Bureau’s American 
Community Survey in 2005 and 2006.  Primary findings that use the survey respondent’s 
estimated home value as the dependent variable are reported in Table 19 through Table 22.  
Results that use household income as the dependent variable are reported in Table 23 through 
Table 26.  Supplementary results using the respondent’s reported rent and average household 
wage are included the Appendix. 
In the first column of Table 19 through Table 22, we report the results of a regression on 
estimated home values of the following form: 
7.1) ijtjt
j
j
jt
j
j
jtijttijt uAMSc
b
AMS
c
s
ZHdn +⋅Ω⋅+⋅Ω++++= 21321 ˆlnˆlnln γγβββδ .  
All of the variables in Equation 7.1 signify the same values that we identified in equation 5.5,   
except in Equation 7.1, we have variables that explicitly represent home values and housing 
characteristics on the household level (notice the we subscript on nijt and Hijt) instead of citywide 
average values.  We have also added sj, which indicates a vector of the size of the individual, 
time-invariant amenities that constrain urban development (e.g., oceanfronts, mountain ranges, 
park boundaries).  The elements of the sj vector represent the individual components of the bj 
variable, but since many supply-constraining features overlap (i.e., a national park that is also a 
seashore) bj is not necessarily the sum of the elements of sj.  As in Equation 5.5, our theory 
predicts that γ2 (the Housing Supply Effect) will be positive and significant – the most populated 
cities with tightest constraints on urban development should have the highest home values, even 
after controlling for differences in population. 
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In the first column of Table 19, we see that the HSE is positive, but not significant, which 
slightly contradicts our expectations.  This finding appears to be the result of how constraints on 
urban development are measured in Table 19.  As predicted, the HSE is positive and strongly 
significant in the first columns of Table 20, Table 21 and Table 22, where we construct the HSE 
from our other three exogenous region percentages.   
In the second and third columns of Table 19, we report the results of Equation 7.1 where 
we have restricted to sample of observations to only those survey respondents who live in 
unbounded and bounded PUMAs, respectively.  In this thesis, a PUMA’s boundedness measure 
ranges from 0.5% to 100%, where the maximum value indicates that the urbanized areas in the 
PUMA are completely surrounded by exogenous regions and therefore these urban areas have no 
room to expand horizontally.  The minimum value indicates that the exogenous regions only 
barely touch the boundaries of the PUMA’s urban areas.  Most PUMAs where the boundedness 
measure is zero are excluded because these communities are generally surrounded by other 
PUMAs.  A PUMA with a boundedness measure less than 42% (the mean boundedness value) is 
categorized as unbounded; if this measure is greater than 42%, then the PUMA is classified as 
bounded. 
We have previously shown that the value of new homes is not significantly correlated 
with our exogenous region percentages and argued that this may be because newly-built homes 
are concentrated in subdivisions where land supply is less constrained (i.e., the outermost 
suburbs).  The PUMA’s boundedness measure permits us to test this proposition directly.  We 
expect the Housing Supply Effect to be most pronounced in PUMAs that are bounded and least 
evident in unbounded PUMAs; the results in the second and third columns of Table 19 confirm 
this expectation.  The predicted result also holds in Table 20 and Table 22. 
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In the fourth column of Table 19, we report the results of the model in Equation 7.1 that 
excludes the Housing Supply Effect.  We view this specification as being representative of 
results that are typically reported in the Quality of Life (QOL) literature.  Comparing the first and 
fourth columns of Table 19, we get a clear sense of the impact of the HSE on standard models 
and conclusions in QOL studies.   By definition, there is a positive correlation between bj and the 
elements of the sj vector (the sj/cj variables have “Pct” prefix in Table 19).  Due to this positive 
correlation, in Table 19 we see that the magnitude of the coefficients of the sj variables in the 
first column with the HSE are always less than those reported in the fourth column without the 
HSE.  This indicates that the amenity value of many features (e.g., the relative length of the 
urban area’s boundary with steep hillsides) are overestimated in standard models that exclude the 
HSE, and the disamenity value of some other features (e.g., the relative length of the urban area’s 
boundary with Mexico) are underestimated.  This pattern is replicated in Table 20, Table 21 and 
Table 22.  
My finding that the price effect of individual supply-constraining components is reduced 
in the presence of the HSE is not surprising, and this result is predictable based on the how these 
variables are defined and constructed (see Section V).  But the effect of adding the HSE to the 
standard empirical model should be emphasized, and the impact of the HSE on the “Pct Coastal” 
variable is particularly noteworthy.  Excluding the HSE from the empirical analysis as in the 
fourth column of Table 19, we would conclude that the relative length of the urban area’s 
coastline has a positive and statistically significant effect on home values.  This result is in line 
with conventional expectations: a relatively long coastline is generally considered to be an 
attractive amenity.  But when the HSE variable is included in the empirical analysis as in the first 
column of Table 19, we reach a different conclusion:  after controlling for the housing supply 
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effect of relatively long coastlines, the “true” amenity value of this feature essentially drops to 
zero.  Importantly, the empirical results in the first and fourth columns control for whether or not 
the PUMA in which the respondent’s home is located abuts an ocean or Great Lake, and this 
value remains positive and statistically significant in both specifications.  Based on these 
findings, we conclude that homes in the non-waterfront communities of coastal urban areas are 
more expensive because new residential development in these cities is constrained, not because 
coastlines are metrowide amenities.  This result is also evident in Table 20, Table 21 and Table 
22. 
The fifth column of Table 19 reports the results of Equation 7.1 without the 2SLS 
instruments for population.  Compared to the 2SLS Model in the first column, excluding the 
population instrument from the OLS model in the fifth column inflates the HSE, but the 
difference in magnitude and statistical significance between the two models is slight.  These 
findings are repeated in Table 20 and Table 21. 
In the final column of Table 19, we report the results of the following model: 
7.2) ijtjt
j
j
jtjjtijttijt uAMSc
b
AMSdMSAZHdn +⋅Ω⋅+⋅Ω++++= 21321 ˆlnˆlnln γγβββδ .  
All of the variables in Equation 7.2 represent the same values as in Equation 7.1, except we now 
include dMSAj, which is a vector of indicator variables that equals 1 if the home is located in 
MSAj, 0 otherwise.  Because the dummy variable regression in Equation 7.2 allows us to 
completely control for unobserved heterogeneity among the MSAs, we refer to it as the MSA 
Effects model.  Of course, all other time-invariant MSA-level variables must be eliminated from 
this regression.  Our expectation that γ2 (the Housing Supply Effect) will be positive and 
significant is unchanged.  We present the 2SLS results of this model in Table 19 through Table 
22, but due to computing resource and time constraints, the OLS findings for this model are 
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reported in similar specifications using rents, household incomes and wages as the dependent 
variable. 
As predicted, we find that the HSE is positive and significant in Table 19 through Table 
22.  These values are also of the same magnitude that we earlier reported using aggregated MSA-
level variables in Table 14 and Table 16.  This result suggests that the estimated marginal effects 
that we reported in Table 15 remain valid even after we include dozens of other control variables 
and examine hundreds of thousands of household-level observations.  Also notice that the 
magnitude and statistical significance of HSE in Table 19 is always exceeded by the HSE of the 
equivalent model in Table 20.  This lends additional support to our view that the “outer 
boundaries only” percentage does a better job of measuring land supply constraints because these 
boundaries place stricter limits on new urban development than inner boundaries.  
Most of the other control variables in Table 19 through Table 22 conform to the standard 
expectations, especially those findings reported in the final column.  For example, homes with 
more rooms on larger lots are significantly more valuable than tinier houses, ceteris paribus, and 
the highest priced homes are also in communities with the most college graduates (although this 
effect evidently does not extend to the entire metro area).  Homes headed by young, single, black 
women with high school diplomas are generally not as pricey as homes headed by mature, 
married, white men with advanced degrees. 
Comparing the final column of Table 19 through Table 22 (which uses estimated home 
value as the dependent variable) to the final column of Table 40 through Table 43 in the 
appendix (which uses gross rent as the dependent variable), we once again conclude that the 
magnitude of the HSE is more pronounced on the price of homes than apartments.  We also 
discovered this result when we examined the data aggregated on the MSA-level.  Since the cost 
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of migration is greater for homeowners than apartment renters, this result is in line with our 
theory. 
Considering the final column of Table 23 through Table 26, we find that the HSE is an 
essentially non-existent factor in explaining annual household income.  This also confirms our 
previous finding: limits on the supply of land influence prices in the housing market much more 
than in the labor market.  This indicates that the combined Housing Supply Effects in these two 
markets will not cancel out.  Based on these results, urban areas with more exogenous regions 
will outrank other areas in standard, cost-of-living-based QOL studies partly because the supply 
of their developable regions is more limited, not due to their inherent attractiveness.
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Table 19: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Home Values – Inner and Outer Boundaries  
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
owner occupied housing 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects 2SLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0507 1.34 0.0197 0.42 0.0979 3.12*** 0.0636 1.76* 4.2321 2.57**
Log of MSA Population -0.0401 -0.86 -0.0818 -1.58 0.0102 0.20 -0.0111 -0.19 -0.0683 -2.28** -0.2633 -0.28
African-American Pct -1.3331 -3.97**** -1.3338 -3.79**** -1.3374 -3.23*** -1.3134 -3.76**** -1.3657 -4.20**** -1.0150 -1.00
College Graduate Pct 0.0111 0.04 0.2916 1.04 0.0254 0.06 0.0465 0.18 0.0328 0.13 0.0987 0.19
Murder Rate 0.0166 1.94* 0.0239 2.85*** 0.0154 1.45 0.0148 1.70* 0.0183 2.13** 0.0013 0.34
Mean Commute Time 0.0626 6.91**** 0.0593 5.56**** 0.0499 3.77**** 0.0622 5.55**** 0.0662 8.35**** -0.0067 -1.32
Pct Coastal -0.1920 -0.48 -0.1974 -0.38 -0.3603 -1.16 0.2792 1.68* -0.3094 -0.82  
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.5954 -1.31 -0.3258 -0.55 -0.8270 -2.60** -0.0970 -0.46 -0.7212 -1.64  
Pct Steep Hillsides 1.1674 2.86*** 0.8537 1.51 0.7139 1.80* 1.5324 4.68**** 1.0938 2.56**  
Pct Federal Property 0.1039 0.22 0.1277 0.20 -0.1911 -0.54 0.5772 1.89* -0.0200 -0.04  
Pct Protected Areas 0.2436 0.47 0.5057 0.87 -0.2260 -0.56 0.8262 3.67**** 0.0858 0.18  
Pct Canada 1.2127 0.89 2.8197 2.00** -1.0457 -0.60 1.7207 1.21 1.2529 1.00  
Pct Mexico -5.6479 -4.99**** -4.7829 -4.48**** -5.3331 -3.84**** -4.9398 -4.34**** -5.7487 -4.92****  
PUMA          
African-American Pct -0.1558 -3.08*** -0.1167 -1.67* -0.0419 -0.52 -0.1555 -3.11*** -0.1577 -3.18*** -0.0820 -2.69***
College Graduate Pct 1.2076 21.41**** 1.3401 11.81**** 1.4262 13.86**** 1.2103 20.74**** 1.2082 21.58**** 1.2091 27.94****
Contains the CBD -0.0143 -0.62 -0.0644 -2.33** -0.0374 -0.90 -0.0116 -0.51 -0.0168 -0.73 0.0013 0.13
Log of Area -0.0486 -2.30** -0.0495 -2.16** -0.0261 -1.12 -0.0449 -2.02** -0.0548 -3.36**** -0.0250 -2.32**
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0174 -0.85 0.0268 0.93 -0.0406 -1.51 -0.0244 -0.84 -0.0072 -0.53 -0.0290 -3.23****
Log of Elevation Change 0.0576 2.24** 0.0947 3.65**** 0.0407 1.28 0.0632 2.37** 0.0540 2.09** 0.0158 1.21
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.1833 4.16**** 0.2417 4.07**** 0.1224 2.24** 0.1912 4.29**** 0.1767 4.11**** 0.0755 4.87****
Abuts River -0.0035 -0.14 0.0057 0.19 -0.0209 -0.38 -0.0078 -0.31 -0.0008 -0.03 0.0101 0.70
Abuts Other Water Body -0.0064 -0.21 0.0147 0.43 -0.0235 -0.63 0.0070 0.20 -0.0115 -0.39 -0.0264 -2.01**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0084 -0.27 0.0408 0.79 0.0183 0.40 -0.0069 -0.21 -0.0099 -0.33 -0.0190 -1.06
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.2183 24.74**** 0.2217 23.32**** 0.1872 10.94**** 0.2175 24.49**** 0.2186 24.79**** 0.2285 36.00****
Number of Bedrooms 0.1196 14.51**** 0.1200 13.86**** 0.1267 10.39**** 0.1201 14.37**** 0.1194 14.44**** 0.1104 18.56****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1175 4.78**** 0.1217 3.31**** 0.1259 2.17** 0.1138 4.78**** 0.1190 4.82**** 0.1211 5.25****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0219 1.21 0.0102 0.43 0.0394 1.12 0.0204 1.10 0.0226 1.24 0.0100 0.56
Number of Rooms 0.1211 25.21**** 0.1333 29.59**** 0.1141 18.59**** 0.1215 25.04**** 0.1212 24.99**** 0.1341 38.79****
Number of Cars 0.0536 10.27**** 0.0520 14.80**** 0.0573 10.56**** 0.0534 10.19**** 0.0534 10.24**** 0.0403 10.33****
Year Built -0.0356 -7.26**** -0.0504 -13.10**** -0.0345 -6.22**** -0.0342 -6.41**** -0.0356 -7.15**** -0.0355 -9.16****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1965 - -0.1612 -9.46**** -0.2110 -10.51**** -0.1979 -12.03**** -0.1963 -11.95**** -0.2086 -13.68****
Years of Schooling 0.0534 20.45**** 0.0570 30.59**** 0.0538 18.84**** 0.0535 20.57**** 0.0534 20.42**** 0.0510 21.75****
Age 0.0014 3.65**** 0.0024 6.00**** 0.0008 1.76* 0.0014 3.62**** 0.0014 3.58**** 0.0009 2.43**
Female -0.0142 -5.60**** -0.0193 -5.97**** -0.0096 -2.45** -0.0139 -5.41**** -0.0144 -5.56**** -0.0204 -12.44****
Married 0.1075 27.15**** 0.1129 24.01**** 0.1050 24.44**** 0.1081 26.99**** 0.1076 26.53**** 0.1076 28.84****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0558 -7.41**** -0.0580 -6.44**** -0.0550 -4.47**** -0.0567 -7.35**** -0.0562 -7.41**** -0.0440 -3.52****
Intercept 8.0559 16.82**** 8.3298 14.13**** 7.6599 13.94**** 7.6418 12.12**** 8.3692 27.36**** 12.3407 1.07
Number of observations 934,562  384,186 259,739 934,562  934,562 934,562
R2  0.5242 0.4864 0.5376 0.5223  0.5245 0.5913
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
77 
 
 
 
Table 20: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Home Values – Outer Boundaries Only 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
owner occupied housing 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects 2SLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0391 2.41** 0.0232 1.21 0.0640 3.48**** 0.0443 2.88*** 3.6408 3.29****
Log of MSA Population -0.0521 -1.03 -0.0810 -1.50 0.0037 0.07 -0.0111 -0.19 -0.0759 -2.64*** 0.1955 0.29
African-American Pct -1.3882 -4.15**** -1.3639 -3.84**** -1.4224 -3.42**** -1.3134 -3.76**** -1.4226 -4.46**** -1.3883 -1.45
College Graduate Pct 0.2459 0.85 0.3696 1.21 0.4223 1.04 0.0465 0.18 0.2995 1.07 0.0949 0.19
Murder Rate 0.0199 2.25** 0.0241 2.82*** 0.0219 2.07** 0.0148 1.70* 0.0216 2.52** 0.0017 0.44
Mean Commute Time 0.0630 6.80**** 0.0586 5.44**** 0.0499 3.74**** 0.0622 5.55**** 0.0662 8.51**** -0.0078 -1.52
Pct Coastal -0.0977 -0.47 -0.2368 -0.98 -0.0454 -0.24 0.2792 1.68* -0.1450 -0.72  
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.4742 -2.01** -0.3520 -1.20 -0.5030 -2.21** -0.0970 -0.46 -0.5229 -2.27**  
Pct Steep Hillsides 1.1804 3.37**** 0.7416 1.48 0.9646 2.65*** 1.5324 4.68**** 1.1512 3.13***  
Pct Federal Property 0.2487 0.77 0.1499 0.33 0.1347 0.57 0.5772 1.89* 0.2024 0.62  
Pct Protected Areas 0.3593 1.24 0.4616 1.39 0.1405 0.49 0.8262 3.67**** 0.2894 1.08  
Pct Canada 0.3512 0.26 2.1254 1.46 -2.2442 -1.30 1.7207 1.21 0.3212 0.25  
Pct Mexico -5.7974 -5.87**** -5.1089 -5.23**** -4.9398 -3.82**** -4.9398 -4.34**** -5.8398 -5.71****  
PUMA          
African-American Pct -0.1528 -3.05*** -0.1166 -1.73* -0.0468 -0.57 -0.1555 -3.11*** -0.1540 -3.13*** -0.0822 -2.69***
College Graduate Pct 1.2093 21.92**** 1.3270 11.99**** 1.4398 14.47**** 1.2103 20.74**** 1.2102 22.10**** 1.2091 27.93****
Contains the CBD -0.0165 -0.73 -0.0634 -2.30** -0.0381 -0.96 -0.0116 -0.51 -0.0187 -0.83 0.0013 0.13
Log of Area -0.0482 -2.23** -0.0472 -2.06** -0.0200 -0.82 -0.0449 -2.02** -0.0533 -3.22*** -0.0251 -2.32**
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0180 -0.82 0.0229 0.78 -0.0503 -1.91* -0.0244 -0.84 -0.0097 -0.70 -0.0290 -3.23****
Log of Elevation Change 0.0557 2.14** 0.0925 3.64**** 0.0348 1.08 0.0632 2.37** 0.0529 2.02** 0.0158 1.21
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.1733 4.00**** 0.2373 3.96**** 0.1084 1.90* 0.1912 4.29**** 0.1669 3.97**** 0.0755 4.87****
Abuts River -0.0048 -0.19 0.0092 0.31 -0.0132 -0.23 -0.0078 -0.31 -0.0030 -0.12 0.0101 0.70
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0124 0.40 0.0242 0.68 0.0251 0.57 0.0070 0.20 0.0116 0.39 -0.0264 -2.01**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0090 -0.30 0.0388 0.79 0.0237 0.52 -0.0069 -0.21 -0.0102 -0.35 -0.0190 -1.06
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.2192 24.84**** 0.2218 22.91**** 0.1883 11.26**** 0.2175 24.49**** 0.2194 24.88**** 0.2286 35.99****
Number of Bedrooms 0.1183 14.76**** 0.1196 13.82**** 0.1247 10.81**** 0.1201 14.37**** 0.1179 14.60**** 0.1104 18.56****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1188 4.83**** 0.1223 3.32**** 0.1254 2.20** 0.1138 4.78**** 0.1201 4.88**** 0.1211 5.26****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0223 1.22 0.0104 0.43 0.0375 1.07 0.0204 1.10 0.0229 1.25 0.0101 0.56
Number of Rooms 0.1222 24.88**** 0.1340 28.25**** 0.1158 18.01**** 0.1215 25.04**** 0.1224 24.75**** 0.1341 38.79****
Number of Cars 0.0535 10.31**** 0.0521 14.78**** 0.0571 10.83**** 0.0534 10.19**** 0.0533 10.37**** 0.0403 10.33****
Year Built -0.0360 -7.43**** -0.0509 -13.84**** -0.0346 -6.37**** -0.0342 -6.41**** -0.0359 -7.34**** -0.0355 -9.16****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1963 - -0.1602 -9.48**** -0.2145 -10.61**** -0.1979 -12.03**** -0.1962 -11.95**** -0.2086 -13.68****
Years of Schooling 0.0533 20.55**** 0.0569 30.22**** 0.0534 19.07**** 0.0535 20.57**** 0.0532 20.52**** 0.0510 21.75****
Age 0.0014 3.56**** 0.0024 5.97**** 0.0007 1.62 0.0014 3.62**** 0.0014 3.50**** 0.0009 2.43**
Female -0.0144 -5.72**** -0.0193 -5.97**** -0.0098 -2.37** -0.0139 -5.41**** -0.0146 -5.67**** -0.0204 -12.43****
Married 0.1070 27.29**** 0.1125 23.90**** 0.1044 24.24**** 0.1081 26.99**** 0.1070 27.03**** 0.1076 28.82****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0569 -7.23**** -0.0585 -6.35**** -0.0539 -4.54**** -0.0567 -7.35**** -0.0574 -7.05**** -0.0378 -3.20***
Intercept 8.1519 15.72**** 8.3257 14.27**** 7.6296 12.49**** 7.6418 12.12**** 8.4038 30.23**** 6.7996 0.83
Number of observations 934,562  384,186 259,739 934,562  934,562 934,562
R2  0.5255 0.4870 0.5393 0.5223  0.5257 0.5913
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 21: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Home Values – Undevelopable Region Percentage – 
Area-UA 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
owner occupied housing 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects 2SLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0556 3.86**** 0.0429 2.43** 0.0414 2.46** 0.0560 3.88**** 5.4092 3.15***
Log of MSA Population -0.0144 -0.32 -0.0625 -1.26 0.0931 1.50 -0.0111 -0.19 -0.0605 -2.25** 0.8157 1.28
African-American Pct -1.4182 -4.35**** -1.3824 -4.02**** -1.4059 -3.35**** -1.3134 -3.76**** -1.4803 -4.66**** -1.5880 -1.66*
College Graduate Pct 0.1187 0.41 0.3141 1.11 0.2180 0.54 0.0465 0.18 0.1874 0.62 0.1870 0.36
Murder Rate 0.0194 2.38** 0.0244 3.05*** 0.0147 1.33 0.0148 1.70* 0.0221 2.61*** 0.0025 0.64
Mean Commute Time 0.0621 6.91**** 0.0579 5.43**** 0.0445 3.31**** 0.0622 5.55**** 0.0697 9.28**** -0.0078 -1.50
Pct Coastal -0.1842 -1.05 -0.3469 -1.48 0.1420 0.72 0.2792 1.68* -0.1815 -1.06  
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.4810 -2.35** -0.4075 -1.52 -0.1954 -0.88 -0.0970 -0.46 -0.4810 -2.40**  
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.8976 2.23** 0.3741 0.69 0.9646 2.59** 1.5324 4.68**** 0.9360 2.20**  
Pct Federal Property 0.4093 1.39 0.2031 0.46 0.5156 2.42** 0.5772 1.89* 0.4007 1.34  
Pct Protected Areas 0.6282 3.13*** 0.6272 2.51** 0.6390 2.78*** 0.8262 3.67**** 0.6059 3.06***  
Pct Canada -3.4919 -2.24** -1.3006 -0.67 -4.8890 -2.40** 1.7207 1.21 -3.1519 -2.11**  
Pct Mexico -8.2108 -7.07**** -7.1394 -5.35**** -6.4525 -4.22**** -4.9398 -4.34**** -8.0570 -6.84****  
PUMA          
African-American Pct -0.1624 -3.31**** -0.1201 -1.82* -0.0461 -0.58 -0.1555 -3.11*** -0.1664 -3.47**** -0.0822 -2.69***
College Graduate Pct 1.2189 23.70**** 1.3377 12.44**** 1.4522 14.55**** 1.2103 20.74**** 1.2216 24.37**** 1.2090 27.93****
Contains the CBD -0.0176 -0.78 -0.0623 -2.27** -0.0333 -0.81 -0.0116 -0.51 -0.0216 -0.95 0.0013 0.13
Log of Area -0.0333 -1.69* -0.0400 -1.76* 0.0112 0.40 -0.0449 -2.02** -0.0449 -3.17*** -0.0251 -2.32**
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0341 -1.55 0.0148 0.49 -0.0765 -2.42** -0.0244 -0.84 -0.0156 -1.16 -0.0290 -3.23****
Log of Elevation Change 0.0476 2.15** 0.0916 3.79**** 0.0303 1.01 0.0632 2.37** 0.0429 1.92* 0.0158 1.21
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.1481 4.04**** 0.2189 4.08**** 0.1124 2.08** 0.1912 4.29**** 0.1377 3.92**** 0.0755 4.87****
Abuts River -0.0146 -0.59 0.0019 0.06 -0.0503 -0.83 -0.0078 -0.31 -0.0112 -0.45 0.0101 0.70
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0387 1.25 0.0357 1.01 0.0428 0.93 0.0070 0.20 0.0352 1.18 -0.0264 -2.01**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0087 -0.33 0.0274 0.57 0.0155 0.30 -0.0069 -0.21 -0.0113 -0.44 -0.0191 -1.06
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.2186 25.11**** 0.2208 22.73**** 0.1844 10.92**** 0.2175 24.49**** 0.2188 25.12**** 0.2286 35.99****
Number of Bedrooms 0.1162 14.80**** 0.1187 13.64**** 0.1261 10.81**** 0.1201 14.37**** 0.1159 14.74**** 0.1104 18.57****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1204 5.04**** 0.1227 3.33**** 0.1137 2.03** 0.1138 4.78**** 0.1219 5.08**** 0.1210 5.26****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0223 1.21 0.0115 0.49 0.0364 1.07 0.0204 1.10 0.0232 1.26 0.0101 0.56
Number of Rooms 0.1239 26.13**** 0.1346 29.55**** 0.1156 18.60**** 0.1215 25.04**** 0.1243 26.27**** 0.1341 38.80****
Number of Cars 0.0524 10.22**** 0.0517 14.90**** 0.0574 10.44**** 0.0534 10.19**** 0.0519 10.15**** 0.0403 10.34****
Year Built -0.0367 -7.25**** -0.0512 -13.98**** -0.0366 -6.02**** -0.0342 -6.41**** -0.0360 -7.13**** -0.0355 -9.15****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1939 - -0.1553 -9.24**** -0.2174 -10.82**** -0.1979 -12.03**** -0.1941 -11.91**** -0.2085 -13.68****
Years of Schooling 0.0533 20.69**** 0.0569 30.40**** 0.0536 18.63**** 0.0535 20.57**** 0.0532 20.72**** 0.0510 21.75****
Age 0.0014 3.59**** 0.0024 6.03**** 0.0008 1.76* 0.0014 3.62**** 0.0014 3.49**** 0.0009 2.43**
Female -0.0146 -5.70**** -0.0190 -5.83**** -0.0095 -2.26** -0.0139 -5.41**** -0.0148 -5.75**** -0.0204 -12.45****
Married 0.1062 26.56**** 0.1118 23.94**** 0.1043 24.38**** 0.1081 26.99**** 0.1068 26.08**** 0.1076 28.81****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0528 -6.37**** -0.0552 -5.89**** -0.0518 -4.23**** -0.0567 -7.35**** -0.0540 -6.39**** -0.0338 -3.05***
Intercept 7.7743 17.49**** 8.1346 16.17**** 6.8147 9.87**** 7.6418 12.12**** 8.2367 35.06**** -1.0085 -0.13
Number of observations 934,562  384,186 259,739 934,562  934,562 934,562
R2  0.5277 0.4884 0.5354 0.5223  0.5284 0.5913
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 22: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Home Values – Undevelopable Region Percentage – 
Area-25 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
owner occupied housing 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects 2SLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0312 2.06** 0.0227 1.30 0.0446 3.00*** 0.0252 1.79* 9.4750 2.59***
Log of MSA Population 0.0195 0.37 -0.0504 -0.93 0.1307 1.79* -0.0111 -0.19 -0.0315 -1.16 0.6526 0.76
African-American Pct -1.3501 -4.03**** -1.3356 -3.85**** -1.4266 -3.41**** -1.3134 -3.76**** -1.4032 -4.15**** -1.3474 -1.18
College Graduate Pct -0.0467 -0.17 0.2392 0.83 -0.0633 -0.15 0.0465 0.18 0.0378 0.14 0.1272 0.22
Murder Rate 0.0173 2.15** 0.0236 3.04*** 0.0174 1.52 0.0148 1.70* 0.0195 2.23** 0.0006 0.14
Mean Commute Time 0.0611 6.31**** 0.0585 5.46**** 0.0458 3.35**** 0.0622 5.55**** 0.0688 8.55**** -0.0137 -2.02**
Pct Coastal 0.0702 0.38 -0.1596 -0.68 0.1570 0.83 0.2792 1.68* 0.1160 0.64  
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.3323 -1.52 -0.2780 -1.01 -0.2094 -1.06 -0.0970 -0.46 -0.2847 -1.31  
Pct Steep Hillsides 1.3129 3.05*** 0.7719 1.42 1.0670 2.74*** 1.5324 4.68**** 1.3968 3.17***  
Pct Federal Property 0.5024 1.64 0.2270 0.50 0.5915 2.85*** 0.5772 1.89* 0.5095 1.65*  
Pct Protected Areas 0.6349 2.70*** 0.6191 2.37** 0.5350 2.32** 0.8262 3.67**** 0.6511 2.80***  
Pct Canada -1.3405 -0.68 0.6527 0.32 -5.3730 -2.35** 1.7207 1.21 -0.3865 -0.23  
Pct Mexico -6.8450 -5.36**** -5.9200 -4.49**** -6.3572 -4.38**** -4.9398 -4.34**** -6.3077 -5.05****  
PUMA          
African-American Pct -0.1581 -3.18*** -0.1174 -1.72* -0.0261 -0.33 -0.1555 -3.11*** -0.1615 -3.30**** -0.0820 -2.68***
College Graduate Pct 1.2257 22.18**** 1.3653 12.48**** 1.4799 14.26**** 1.2103 20.74**** 1.2254 22.63**** 1.2092 27.92****
Contains the CBD -0.0136 -0.59 -0.0631 -2.30** -0.0384 -0.95 -0.0116 -0.51 -0.0170 -0.75 0.0013 0.13
Log of Area -0.0341 -1.55 -0.0402 -1.64 0.0084 0.28 -0.0449 -2.02** -0.0477 -3.15*** -0.0251 -2.32**
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0343 -1.44 0.0151 0.46 -0.0672 -1.87* -0.0244 -0.84 -0.0142 -1.08 -0.0289 -3.23****
Log of Elevation Change 0.0453 1.91* 0.0877 3.60**** 0.0153 0.54 0.0632 2.37** 0.0441 1.88* 0.0158 1.21
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.1572 4.27**** 0.2218 3.96**** 0.1104 2.13** 0.1912 4.29**** 0.1538 4.20**** 0.0756 4.88****
Abuts River -0.0068 -0.26 0.0045 0.15 -0.0396 -0.65 -0.0078 -0.31 -0.0036 -0.14 0.0101 0.70
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0186 0.57 0.0225 0.62 0.0360 0.75 0.0070 0.20 0.0128 0.41 -0.0264 -2.01**
Abuts Protected Area 0.0000 0.00 0.0357 0.69 0.0298 0.61 -0.0069 -0.21 -0.0038 -0.13 -0.0190 -1.05
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.2222 25.69**** 0.2231 22.67**** 0.1946 12.14**** 0.2175 24.49**** 0.2215 25.41**** 0.2286 36.01****
Number of Bedrooms 0.1166 15.18**** 0.1191 13.61**** 0.1228 10.80**** 0.1201 14.37**** 0.1171 15.17**** 0.1105 18.57****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1166 4.99**** 0.1230 3.31**** 0.1045 1.99** 0.1138 4.78**** 0.1174 4.98**** 0.1216 5.28****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0213 1.17 0.0109 0.46 0.0337 1.02 0.0204 1.10 0.0220 1.21 0.0099 0.55
Number of Rooms 0.1231 25.78**** 0.1342 28.75**** 0.1165 18.91**** 0.1215 25.04**** 0.1231 25.86**** 0.1341 38.80****
Number of Cars 0.0533 10.11**** 0.0520 14.79**** 0.0573 10.64**** 0.0534 10.19**** 0.0529 9.98**** 0.0403 10.34****
Year Built -0.0341 -6.51**** -0.0499 -13.06**** -0.0335 -5.68**** -0.0342 -6.41**** -0.0334 -6.37**** -0.0355 -9.14****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1957 - -0.1594 -9.30**** -0.2144 -10.56**** -0.1979 -12.03**** -0.1964 -12.02**** -0.2085 -13.68****
Years of Schooling 0.0535 20.66**** 0.0570 30.64**** 0.0537 18.82**** 0.0535 20.57**** 0.0534 20.69**** 0.0511 21.76****
Age 0.0014 3.61**** 0.0024 5.93**** 0.0007 1.70* 0.0014 3.62**** 0.0014 3.54**** 0.0009 2.43**
Female -0.0141 -5.48**** -0.0192 -5.87**** -0.0095 -2.34** -0.0139 -5.41**** -0.0143 -5.58**** -0.0204 -12.44****
Married 0.1073 27.22**** 0.1123 24.03**** 0.1047 23.96**** 0.1081 26.99**** 0.1080 25.97**** 0.1076 28.80****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0528 -6.22**** -0.0561 -5.90**** -0.0470 -3.79**** -0.0567 -7.35**** -0.0547 -6.61**** -0.0273 -2.00**
Intercept 7.3430 14.02**** 7.9655 13.97**** 6.3314 8.09**** 7.6418 12.12**** 7.8519 31.50**** 1.2005 0.12
Number of observations 934,562  384,186 259,739 934,562  934,562 934,562
R2  0.5237 0.4866 0.5355 0.5223  0.5245 0.5913
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 23: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Income – Inner and Outer Boundaries 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
total household income 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0259 2.54** 0.0223 1.71* 0.0208 2.61*** 0.0271 2.72*** -0.0058 -0.01
Log of MSA Population 0.0368 2.65*** 0.0282 1.45 0.0165 0.99 0.0630 2.79*** 0.0043 0.54 0.2260 1.54
African-American Pct -0.2204 -2.18** -0.1757 -1.69* -0.2215 -1.79* -0.1934 -1.72* -0.2629 -2.63*** -0.5780 -1.99**
College Graduate Pct 0.0140 0.13 -0.0910 -0.68 0.1810 1.53 0.0131 0.11 0.0619 0.65 -0.3934 -2.39**
Murder Rate 0.0035 1.49 0.0007 0.26 0.0083 3.35**** 0.0019 0.66 0.0054 2.31** 0.0003 0.26
Mean Commute Time 0.0088 2.51** 0.0072 1.73* 0.0117 3.12*** 0.0066 1.44 0.0141 5.84**** 0.0013 0.65
Pct Coastal -0.2829 -2.90*** -0.3109 -2.14** -0.2063 -2.53** -0.0445 -0.75 -0.2887 -3.25****
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.3055 -2.86*** -0.2517 -1.61 -0.2079 -2.38** -0.0518 -0.91 -0.3147 -3.10***
Pct Steep Hillsides -0.1104 -1.00 -0.1863 -1.03 -0.0528 -0.49 0.0647 0.70 -0.0872 -0.74
Pct Federal Property -0.2116 -1.71* -0.2452 -1.59 -0.1309 -1.40 0.0334 0.51 -0.2265 -1.92*
Pct Protected Areas -0.1387 -1.06 -0.1208 -0.72 -0.0604 -0.59 0.1657 2.58** -0.1662 -1.34
Pct Canada -0.2556 -0.79 0.7557 1.63 -0.5173 -1.20 -0.0949 -0.26 -0.0007 0.00
Pct Mexico -2.0717 -7.79**** -2.2711 -7.31**** -1.4126 -5.40**** -1.7601 -7.24**** -1.9605 -7.54****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0071 0.36 0.0042 0.17 -0.0096 -0.31 0.0081 0.41 0.0044 0.24 0.0195 1.25
College Graduate Pct 0.6846 32.44**** 0.7005 17.32**** 0.7286 14.06**** 0.6858 32.61**** 0.6855 30.38**** 0.6593 33.51****
Contains the CBD -0.0009 -0.14 -0.0058 -0.75 -0.0064 -0.54 0.0014 0.20 -0.0036 -0.62 -0.0035 -0.78
Log of Area -0.0110 -1.93* -0.0127 -1.53 -0.0126 -1.73* -0.0063 -0.91 -0.0192 -4.27**** -0.0172 -4.10****
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0138 -2.06** 0.0001 0.01 -0.0085 -1.14 -0.0218 -2.13** -0.0011 -0.23 -0.0105 -2.81***
Log of Elevation Change 0.0063 0.93 0.0068 0.83 0.0078 0.87 0.0104 1.40 0.0029 0.45 0.0146 3.11***
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0590 4.64**** 0.0576 3.51**** 0.0636 3.74**** 0.0658 5.56**** 0.0515 4.22**** 0.0320 3.39****
Abuts River 0.0067 0.98 0.0093 0.88 -0.0107 -0.55 0.0037 0.49 0.0091 1.31 0.0001 0.02
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0036 0.33 0.0158 1.10 -0.0136 -0.97 0.0114 0.92 0.0009 0.09 -0.0023 -0.26
Abuts Protected Area -0.0119 -1.45 0.0004 0.03 -0.0064 -0.52 -0.0105 -1.33 -0.0137 -1.68* -0.0066 -1.05
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0061 1.21 0.0048 1.07 0.0143 1.30 0.0056 1.09 0.0062 1.26 0.0037 0.82
Number of Bedrooms 0.0449 17.01**** 0.0473 19.36**** 0.0433 11.25**** 0.0453 15.88**** 0.0447 16.92**** 0.0434 17.71****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1417 7.17**** 0.0963 3.43**** 0.1407 3.59**** 0.1405 7.04**** 0.1419 7.18**** 0.1448 7.37****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0456 2.97*** 0.0624 2.47** 0.0533 1.75* 0.0445 2.87*** 0.0464 3.02*** 0.0428 2.79***
Number of Rooms 0.0831 43.10**** 0.0836 47.86**** 0.0820 32.22**** 0.0832 41.58**** 0.0834 44.61**** 0.0843 49.12****
Number of Cars 0.2049 70.77**** 0.1939 65.74**** 0.2063 50.41**** 0.2049 70.49**** 0.2046 71.03**** 0.2039 71.95****
Year Built -0.0263 - -0.0311 -24.57**** -0.0269 -13.74**** -0.0258 -15.16**** -0.0259 -15.83**** -0.0304 -18.70****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1518 - -0.1401 -15.91**** -0.1634 -12.01**** -0.1523 -13.24**** -0.1521 -13.42**** -0.1546 -14.08****
Years of Schooling 0.0833 64.39**** 0.0818 77.36**** 0.0846 62.67**** 0.0834 63.17**** 0.0833 64.61**** 0.0831 65.49****
Age -0.0042 - -0.0037 -15.07**** -0.0050 -10.45**** -0.0042 -12.80**** -0.0043 -12.76**** -0.0043 -12.79****
Female -0.1031 - -0.1069 -39.23**** -0.1066 -23.99**** -0.1030 -46.17**** -0.1032 -45.50**** -0.1039 -46.76****
Married 0.3361 66.71**** 0.3449 70.26**** 0.3323 50.99**** 0.3362 66.66**** 0.3365 66.52**** 0.3334 67.90****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0022 -0.98 0.0016 0.50 0.0022 0.60 -0.0024 -1.04 -0.0030 -1.38 0.0012 0.41
Intercept 7.8868 55.62**** 8.1396 36.69**** 8.0288 45.70**** 7.5625 33.02**** 8.2138 80.51**** 5.5766 3.03***
Number of observations 1,058,044  430,304 293,809 1,058,044  1,058,044 1,058,044
R2  0.4153 0.4163 0.4073 0.4144  0.4156 0.4204
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
81 
 
 
 
Table 24: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Income – Outer Boundaries Only 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
total household income 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0089 1.58 0.0114 1.68* 0.0053 1.15 0.0115 2.03** 0.1007 0.21
Log of MSA Population 0.0387 2.77*** 0.0306 1.62 0.0287 1.63 0.0630 2.79*** 0.0048 0.57 0.1990 1.39
African-American Pct -0.2309 -2.13** -0.1867 -1.71* -0.2103 -1.65 -0.1934 -1.72* -0.2773 -2.57** -0.5604 -1.96*
College Graduate Pct 0.0812 0.74 -0.0456 -0.33 0.2551 2.20** 0.0131 0.11 0.1421 1.37 -0.3987 -2.39**
Murder Rate 0.0039 1.46 0.0008 0.27 0.0083 3.06*** 0.0019 0.66 0.0061 2.30** 0.0002 0.21
Mean Commute Time 0.0093 2.64*** 0.0072 1.70* 0.0106 2.94*** 0.0066 1.44 0.0146 6.03**** 0.0013 0.63
Pct Coastal -0.1272 -1.87* -0.2039 -2.21** -0.0691 -1.05 -0.0445 -0.75 -0.1472 -2.43**
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.1364 -1.99** -0.1296 -1.42 -0.0559 -0.74 -0.0518 -0.91 -0.1592 -2.29**
Pct Steep Hillsides -0.0001 0.00 -0.1367 -0.81 0.0457 0.45 0.0647 0.70 0.0076 0.07
Pct Federal Property -0.0450 -0.58 -0.1198 -1.29 0.0097 0.15 0.0334 0.51 -0.0713 -0.94
Pct Protected Areas 0.0517 0.57 -0.0018 -0.02 0.1027 1.26 0.1657 2.58** 0.0065 0.08
Pct Canada -0.2819 -0.74 0.5451 1.08 -0.7367 -1.57 -0.0949 -0.26 -0.1103 -0.32
Pct Mexico -1.8938 -6.95**** -2.2672 -7.00**** -1.2260 -4.33**** -1.7601 -7.24**** -1.8250 -6.79****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0075 0.39 0.0060 0.24 -0.0088 -0.29 0.0081 0.41 0.0050 0.27 0.0195 1.25
College Graduate Pct 0.6859 32.33**** 0.6980 17.51**** 0.7275 14.29**** 0.6858 32.61**** 0.6868 30.31**** 0.6593 33.51****
Contains the CBD -0.0009 -0.14 -0.0053 -0.67 -0.0045 -0.38 0.0014 0.20 -0.0038 -0.65 -0.0035 -0.78
Log of Area -0.0108 -1.95* -0.0122 -1.55 -0.0085 -1.08 -0.0063 -0.91 -0.0190 -4.27**** -0.0172 -4.10****
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0145 -2.16** -0.0011 -0.11 -0.0130 -1.67* -0.0218 -2.13** -0.0016 -0.35 -0.0105 -2.81***
Log of Elevation Change 0.0072 1.06 0.0068 0.81 0.0095 1.06 0.0104 1.40 0.0035 0.55 0.0146 3.11***
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0582 4.54**** 0.0555 3.35**** 0.0665 4.03**** 0.0658 5.56**** 0.0499 4.04**** 0.0320 3.39****
Abuts River 0.0054 0.77 0.0079 0.73 -0.0157 -0.78 0.0037 0.49 0.0079 1.14 0.0001 0.02
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0114 1.03 0.0221 1.51 -0.0056 -0.40 0.0114 0.92 0.0094 0.95 -0.0023 -0.26
Abuts Protected Area -0.0118 -1.47 0.0001 0.01 -0.0081 -0.67 -0.0105 -1.33 -0.0136 -1.70* -0.0066 -1.05
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0060 1.20 0.0050 1.11 0.0135 1.23 0.0056 1.09 0.0063 1.26 0.0037 0.82
Number of Bedrooms 0.0448 17.29**** 0.0470 19.15**** 0.0436 11.33**** 0.0453 15.88**** 0.0445 17.29**** 0.0434 17.71****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1413 7.17**** 0.0967 3.45**** 0.1391 3.55**** 0.1405 7.04**** 0.1417 7.18**** 0.1448 7.37****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0453 2.95*** 0.0621 2.47** 0.0524 1.72* 0.0445 2.87*** 0.0462 3.00*** 0.0428 2.79***
Number of Rooms 0.0835 44.13**** 0.0841 48.48**** 0.0820 32.05**** 0.0832 41.58**** 0.0838 46.24**** 0.0843 49.12****
Number of Cars 0.2048 71.20**** 0.1940 65.68**** 0.2063 50.41**** 0.2049 70.49**** 0.2045 71.51**** 0.2039 71.96****
Year Built -0.0260 - -0.0311 -25.01**** -0.0269 -13.58**** -0.0258 -15.16**** -0.0256 -15.74**** -0.0304 -18.70****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1522 - -0.1398 -15.88**** -0.1643 -12.12**** -0.1523 -13.24**** -0.1524 -13.43**** -0.1546 -14.08****
Years of Schooling 0.0833 64.43**** 0.0818 77.87**** 0.0846 62.25**** 0.0834 63.17**** 0.0832 64.78**** 0.0831 65.49****
Age -0.0042 - -0.0037 -15.06**** -0.0050 -10.42**** -0.0042 -12.80**** -0.0043 -12.77**** -0.0043 -12.79****
Female -0.1031 - -0.1070 -39.41**** -0.1064 -24.00**** -0.1030 -46.17**** -0.1033 -45.53**** -0.1039 -46.76****
Married 0.3362 66.88**** 0.3447 70.40**** 0.3323 51.16**** 0.3362 66.66**** 0.3366 66.88**** 0.3334 67.90****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0028 -1.25 0.0010 0.31 0.0019 0.52 -0.0024 -1.04 -0.0036 -1.57 0.0011 0.39
Intercept 7.8269 55.34**** 8.0992 38.18**** 7.8751 42.27**** 7.5625 33.02**** 8.1728 80.77**** 5.4470 2.99***
Number of observations 1,058,044  430,304 293,809 1,058,044  1,058,044 1,058,044
R2  0.4151 0.4162 0.4071 0.4144  0.4155 0.4204
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
total household income 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0097 2.04** 0.0140 2.39** 0.0015 0.36 0.0097 2.14** -0.0010 0.00
Log of MSA Population 0.0479 2.80*** 0.0362 1.84* 0.0347 1.75* 0.0630 2.79*** 0.0094 1.26 0.2246 2.04**
African-American Pct -0.2306 -2.14** -0.1872 -1.78* -0.1992 -1.61 -0.1934 -1.72* -0.2814 -2.52** -0.5772 -2.01**
College Graduate Pct 0.0471 0.42 -0.0725 -0.52 0.2431 2.14** 0.0131 0.11 0.1059 1.02 -0.3935 -2.39**
Murder Rate 0.0035 1.35 0.0009 0.30 0.0076 3.05*** 0.0019 0.66 0.0058 2.16** 0.0003 0.26
Mean Commute Time 0.0090 2.25** 0.0071 1.63 0.0104 2.41** 0.0066 1.44 0.0154 5.99**** 0.0013 0.65
Pct Coastal -0.1230 -1.88* -0.1993 -2.47** -0.0387 -0.60 -0.0445 -0.75 -0.1169 -1.99**
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.1170 -1.96* -0.1063 -1.48 -0.0173 -0.23 -0.0518 -0.91 -0.1144 -2.02**
Pct Steep Hillsides -0.0310 -0.26 -0.2098 -1.25 0.0637 0.61 0.0647 0.70 0.0075 0.06
Pct Federal Property 0.0011 0.02 -0.0741 -0.89 0.0490 0.89 0.0334 0.51 -0.0040 -0.06
Pct Protected Areas 0.1247 1.85* 0.0980 1.05 0.1509 2.25** 0.1657 2.58** 0.1073 1.66*
Pct Canada -0.8891 -1.45 -0.4155 -0.56 -0.7909 -1.39 -0.0949 -0.26 -0.5611 -1.04
Pct Mexico -2.2732 -5.82**** -2.8277 -6.37**** -1.2371 -3.40**** -1.7601 -7.24**** -2.1161 -6.06****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0058 0.30 0.0057 0.23 -0.0087 -0.29 0.0081 0.41 0.0026 0.14 0.0195 1.25
College Graduate Pct 0.6880 31.77**** 0.7052 17.23**** 0.7268 14.54**** 0.6858 32.61**** 0.6892 29.46**** 0.6593 33.51****
Contains the CBD -0.0008 -0.12 -0.0051 -0.65 -0.0039 -0.32 0.0014 0.20 -0.0040 -0.68 -0.0035 -0.78
Log of Area -0.0079 -1.29 -0.0106 -1.26 -0.0070 -0.82 -0.0063 -0.91 -0.0177 -4.26**** -0.0172 -4.10****
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0177 -2.13** -0.0025 -0.22 -0.0140 -1.48 -0.0218 -2.13** -0.0025 -0.53 -0.0105 -2.81***
Log of Elevation Change 0.0061 0.94 0.0070 0.85 0.0101 1.13 0.0104 1.40 0.0021 0.36 0.0146 3.11***
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0546 4.72**** 0.0499 2.95*** 0.0685 4.33**** 0.0658 5.56**** 0.0459 3.86**** 0.0320 3.39****
Abuts River 0.0035 0.50 0.0040 0.37 -0.0189 -0.93 0.0037 0.49 0.0063 0.93 0.0001 0.02
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0159 1.41 0.0248 1.71* -0.0060 -0.43 0.0114 0.92 0.0129 1.32 -0.0023 -0.26
Abuts Protected Area -0.0115 -1.57 -0.0031 -0.25 -0.0095 -0.78 -0.0105 -1.33 -0.0136 -1.85* -0.0066 -1.05
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0058 1.15 0.0047 1.02 0.0131 1.18 0.0056 1.09 0.0060 1.20 0.0037 0.82
Number of Bedrooms 0.0446 16.78**** 0.0467 19.08**** 0.0439 11.19**** 0.0453 15.88**** 0.0443 17.00**** 0.0434 17.71****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1418 7.16**** 0.0972 3.47**** 0.1383 3.51**** 0.1405 7.04**** 0.1420 7.17**** 0.1448 7.37****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0452 2.92*** 0.0625 2.48** 0.0522 1.71* 0.0445 2.87*** 0.0461 2.98*** 0.0428 2.79***
Number of Rooms 0.0838 44.50**** 0.0842 48.93**** 0.0819 31.60**** 0.0832 41.58**** 0.0841 48.01**** 0.0843 49.12****
Number of Cars 0.2046 71.46**** 0.1938 65.69**** 0.2063 50.29**** 0.2049 70.49**** 0.2042 71.60**** 0.2039 71.95****
Year Built -0.0260 - -0.0311 -24.12**** -0.0269 -13.11**** -0.0258 -15.16**** -0.0255 -13.75**** -0.0304 -18.70****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1518 - -0.1385 -15.62**** -0.1645 -12.26**** -0.1523 -13.24**** -0.1522 -13.52**** -0.1546 -14.08****
Years of Schooling 0.0833 63.97**** 0.0818 77.30**** 0.0847 62.27**** 0.0834 63.17**** 0.0833 64.42**** 0.0831 65.49****
Age -0.0042 - -0.0037 -15.03**** -0.0050 -10.42**** -0.0042 -12.80**** -0.0043 -12.82**** -0.0043 -12.79****
Female -0.1031 - -0.1069 -39.33**** -0.1064 -23.95**** -0.1030 -46.17**** -0.1032 -45.55**** -0.1039 -46.77****
Married 0.3361 67.28**** 0.3445 70.63**** 0.3323 51.18**** 0.3362 66.66**** 0.3366 66.60**** 0.3334 67.90****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0020 -0.86 0.0020 0.61 0.0018 0.48 -0.0024 -1.04 -0.0030 -1.29 0.0012 0.41
Intercept 7.7307 47.02**** 8.0371 37.87**** 7.8130 38.34**** 7.5625 33.02**** 8.1152 85.84**** 5.5713 2.58**
Number of observations 1,058,044  430,304 293,809 1,058,044  1,058,044 1,058,044
R2  0.4150 0.4162 0.4071 0.4144  0.4155 0.4204
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 25: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Income – Undevelopable Region Percentage 
– Area-UA 
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
total household income 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0081 1.62 0.0062 0.99 0.0021 0.52 0.0020 0.54 0.3586 0.65
Log of MSA Population 0.0610 2.72*** 0.0458 1.92* 0.0359 1.75* 0.0630 2.79*** 0.0124 1.66* 0.1826 1.57
African-American Pct -0.2160 -1.98** -0.1616 -1.49 -0.2022 -1.61 -0.1934 -1.72* -0.2653 -2.32** -0.5272 -1.82*
College Graduate Pct 0.0025 0.02 -0.1142 -0.76 0.2282 1.88* 0.0131 0.11 0.0870 0.87 -0.4032 -2.46**
Murder Rate 0.0031 1.22 0.0002 0.05 0.0078 3.19*** 0.0019 0.66 0.0051 1.90* 0.0002 0.17
Mean Commute Time 0.0080 1.78* 0.0065 1.46 0.0106 2.45** 0.0066 1.44 0.0152 5.83**** 0.0012 0.58
Pct Coastal -0.0964 -1.59 -0.1351 -1.68* -0.0417 -0.70 -0.0445 -0.75 -0.0503 -0.82
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.1114 -1.76* -0.0588 -0.78 -0.0217 -0.31 -0.0518 -0.91 -0.0639 -1.10
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.0194 0.19 -0.0736 -0.45 0.0656 0.65 0.0647 0.70 0.1024 1.09
Pct Federal Property 0.0120 0.18 -0.0635 -0.71 0.0511 1.03 0.0334 0.51 0.0212 0.36
Pct Protected Areas 0.1110 1.58 0.1032 1.03 0.1442 2.10** 0.1657 2.58** 0.1290 1.94*
Pct Canada -0.8112 -1.25 0.2963 0.37 -0.8358 -1.45 -0.0949 -0.26 0.1435 0.34
Pct Mexico -2.2143 -5.04**** -2.3838 -5.10**** -1.2539 -3.33**** -1.7601 -7.24**** -1.6751 -5.24****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0066 0.34 0.0068 0.26 -0.0081 -0.26 0.0081 0.41 0.0035 0.19 0.0195 1.26
College Graduate Pct 0.6901 30.64**** 0.7104 16.20**** 0.7286 14.38**** 0.6858 32.61**** 0.6885 29.72**** 0.6593 33.51****
Contains the CBD 0.0001 0.01 -0.0050 -0.61 -0.0043 -0.35 0.0014 0.20 -0.0031 -0.52 -0.0035 -0.78
Log of Area -0.0060 -0.81 -0.0094 -0.95 -0.0072 -0.81 -0.0063 -0.91 -0.0189 -4.52**** -0.0172 -4.10****
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0204 -2.07** -0.0050 -0.38 -0.0133 -1.37 -0.0218 -2.13** -0.0016 -0.34 -0.0105 -2.81***
Log of Elevation Change 0.0046 0.69 0.0068 0.78 0.0091 1.03 0.0104 1.40 0.0037 0.60 0.0146 3.11***
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0543 4.29**** 0.0542 3.09*** 0.0679 4.15**** 0.0658 5.56**** 0.0514 3.95**** 0.0320 3.39****
Abuts River 0.0046 0.63 0.0049 0.44 -0.0182 -0.89 0.0037 0.49 0.0076 1.06 0.0001 0.02
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0137 1.15 0.0205 1.31 -0.0061 -0.41 0.0114 0.92 0.0082 0.81 -0.0023 -0.26
Abuts Protected Area -0.0092 -1.30 0.0006 0.05 -0.0088 -0.74 -0.0105 -1.33 -0.0129 -1.79* -0.0066 -1.05
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0068 1.32 0.0054 1.16 0.0135 1.23 0.0056 1.09 0.0061 1.19 0.0037 0.82
Number of Bedrooms 0.0443 17.78**** 0.0469 19.18**** 0.0437 11.45**** 0.0453 15.88**** 0.0447 17.45**** 0.0434 17.71****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1414 7.14**** 0.0970 3.45**** 0.1380 3.50**** 0.1405 7.04**** 0.1410 7.09**** 0.1448 7.37****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0450 2.91*** 0.0620 2.46** 0.0522 1.71* 0.0445 2.87*** 0.0458 2.97*** 0.0428 2.79***
Number of Rooms 0.0837 45.19**** 0.0841 48.33**** 0.0819 32.24**** 0.0832 41.58**** 0.0838 47.98**** 0.0843 49.12****
Number of Cars 0.2048 70.65**** 0.1940 65.75**** 0.2063 50.23**** 0.2049 70.49**** 0.2044 71.32**** 0.2039 71.95****
Year Built -0.0256 - -0.0306 -22.69**** -0.0268 -13.39**** -0.0258 -15.16**** -0.0251 -12.88**** -0.0304 -18.70****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1519 - -0.1396 -15.64**** -0.1644 -12.22**** -0.1523 -13.24**** -0.1527 -13.55**** -0.1546 -14.08****
Years of Schooling 0.0833 64.05**** 0.0819 76.96**** 0.0847 62.34**** 0.0834 63.17**** 0.0833 64.29**** 0.0831 65.49****
Age -0.0042 - -0.0037 -15.04**** -0.0050 -10.43**** -0.0042 -12.80**** -0.0043 -12.80**** -0.0043 -12.79****
Female -0.1030 - -0.1069 -39.24**** -0.1064 -23.90**** -0.1030 -46.17**** -0.1031 -45.44**** -0.1039 -46.76****
Married 0.3362 67.14**** 0.3447 70.23**** 0.3323 51.02**** 0.3362 66.66**** 0.3369 66.04**** 0.3334 67.90****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0016 -0.62 0.0019 0.56 0.0021 0.55 -0.0024 -1.04 -0.0034 -1.49 0.0011 0.36
Intercept 7.5838 35.65**** 7.9227 30.82**** 7.7982 37.70**** 7.5625 33.02**** 8.0685 79.21**** 5.2764 2.95***
Number of observations 1,058,044  430,304 293,809 1,058,044  1,058,044 1,058,044
R2  0.4146 0.4157 0.4071 0.4144  0.4153 0.4204
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 26: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Income – Undevelopable Region Percentage 
– Area-25 
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
mean household wage 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0080 2.46** 0.0073 1.55 0.0118 3.30**** 0.0040 1.27 1.1991 1.57
Log of MSA Population 0.0339 2.40** 0.0322 1.84* 0.0525 2.35** 0.0254 1.42 0.0014 0.20 0.1401 0.71
African-American Pct -0.1328 -1.43 0.0096 0.10 -0.2341 -1.45 -0.1247 -1.27 -0.1674 -1.86* -0.6584 -1.30
College Graduate Pct -0.2512 -2.81*** -0.1962 -1.78* -0.1636 -1.09 -0.2267 -2.37** -0.1994 -2.24** -0.4562 -1.77*
Murder Rate 0.0039 1.94* 0.0002 0.09 0.0037 1.23 0.0032 1.41 0.0052 2.52** -0.0007 -0.48
Mean Commute Time 0.0095 3.33**** 0.0073 2.24** 0.0077 1.71* 0.0099 2.96*** 0.0144 7.00**** 0.0008 0.25
Pct Coastal -0.1491 -3.31**** -0.1582 -2.92*** -0.1379 -2.59** -0.0958 -2.12** -0.1177 -2.73***
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.0351 -0.51 -0.0821 -0.88 -0.0444 -0.68 0.0248 0.36 -0.0031 -0.05
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3781 3.62**** 0.2350 1.89* 0.3593 2.94*** 0.4335 3.77**** 0.4343 4.24****
Pct Federal Property -0.0498 -0.76 -0.0512 -0.56 -0.0650 -1.10 -0.0314 -0.46 -0.0447 -0.67
Pct Protected Areas -0.0002 0.00 -0.0080 -0.11 -0.0747 -0.98 0.0497 0.89 0.0114 0.20
Pct Canada 1.5082 3.37**** 2.0657 3.33**** 1.1910 1.70* 2.2996 7.54**** 2.1314 5.04****
Pct Mexico -1.5001 -4.61**** -2.0005 -5.72**** -1.2677 -2.84*** -1.0135 -3.72**** -1.1487 -3.71****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0166 0.88 0.0085 0.31 0.0269 0.72 0.0172 0.92 0.0148 0.79 0.0374 2.73***
College Graduate Pct 0.7440 17.70**** 0.6107 14.76**** 0.8303 11.06**** 0.7400 18.20**** 0.7435 17.00**** 0.7393 17.41****
Contains the CBD -0.0071 -1.03 -0.0086 -1.05 -0.0146 -1.09 -0.0066 -1.00 -0.0091 -1.38 -0.0080 -1.59
Log of Area 0.0150 2.27** 0.0018 0.22 0.0199 2.30** 0.0120 1.66* 0.0065 1.32 0.0046 1.09
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0115 -1.52 -0.0031 -0.28 -0.0129 -1.12 -0.0088 -1.00 0.0010 0.22 0.0009 0.19
Log of Elevation Change 0.0169 2.82*** 0.0355 4.92**** 0.0082 0.84 0.0215 3.37**** 0.0161 2.71*** 0.0215 4.15****
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0760 6.19**** 0.0666 4.45**** 0.0774 3.87**** 0.0851 7.09**** 0.0739 6.16**** 0.0750 5.79****
Abuts River -0.0056 -0.78 -0.0112 -1.17 -0.0093 -0.39 -0.0057 -0.77 -0.0036 -0.51 -0.0081 -1.37
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0096 1.03 0.0197 1.85* 0.0099 0.55 0.0064 0.69 0.0060 0.72 -0.0011 -0.10
Abuts Protected Area -0.0016 -0.19 -0.0137 -1.06 0.0042 0.25 -0.0034 -0.45 -0.0041 -0.48 -0.0014 -0.26
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0688 11.77**** 0.0616 9.64**** 0.0897 5.70**** 0.0676 11.61**** 0.0684 11.55**** 0.0701 13.08****
Number of Bedrooms -0.0141 -4.18**** -0.0081 -2.16** -0.0167 -3.33**** -0.0132 -3.90**** -0.0138 -4.02**** -0.0144 -4.37****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1007 4.46**** 0.0733 1.92* 0.1156 2.93*** 0.0997 4.41**** 0.1004 4.45**** 0.1018 4.50****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0282 1.27 0.0404 1.19 0.0378 1.32 0.0278 1.25 0.0288 1.30 0.0261 1.18
Number of Rooms 0.0740 23.52**** 0.0676 24.21**** 0.0786 20.79**** 0.0735 23.49**** 0.0740 23.68**** 0.0760 26.40****
Number of Cars -0.2257 - -0.2156 -57.33**** -0.2385 -35.55**** -0.2256 -65.40**** -0.2260 -64.54**** -0.2281 -69.86****
Year Built -0.0252 - -0.0299 -24.45**** -0.0274 -14.12**** -0.0253 -19.30**** -0.0249 -19.35**** -0.0265 -21.82****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1414 - -0.1432 -13.68**** -0.1641 -7.11**** -0.1420 -11.10**** -0.1421 -10.98**** -0.1460 -11.49****
Years of Schooling 0.0839 82.10**** 0.0792 70.75**** 0.0873 55.76**** 0.0839 81.88**** 0.0839 81.61**** 0.0834 79.30****
Age 0.0228 59.17**** 0.0237 67.20**** 0.0231 47.88**** 0.0228 59.34**** 0.0227 59.23**** 0.0227 59.44****
Female -0.0922 - -0.0926 -26.99**** -0.0977 -19.20**** -0.0921 -33.72**** -0.0923 -33.64**** -0.0930 -35.03****
Married -0.0919 - -0.0993 -22.54**** -0.0691 -8.99**** -0.0916 -23.06**** -0.0913 -22.92**** -0.0923 -23.78****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 0.0196 7.98**** 0.0191 4.93**** 0.0209 4.00**** 0.0185 7.86**** 0.0183 7.67**** 0.0243 5.28****
Intercept -0.1529 -1.03 -0.0902 -0.48 -0.4467 -2.23** -0.0685 -0.37 0.1725 1.83* -4.3005 -1.64
Number of observations 865,867  353,554 235,637 865,867  865,867 865,867
R2  0.2350 0.2203 0.2422 0.2350  0.2352 0.2389
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 27: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Hourly Wage – Undevelopable Region 
Percentage – Area-25 
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Household Level Regression Results using 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census Data39 
In this section, we present the results of following estimation model: 
7.3) ijtjt
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All of the variables in Equation 7.3 represent the same values as in Equation 7.2, except we have now 
added a t subscript to b and c to indicate that these variables may change over time.  We have also added 
the separate fraction bjt/cjt to the regression, which allows the exogenous region percentage to have an 
independent effect on prices and incomes.  This independent boundary effect can be estimated in this 
model because the geographic extent of urban areas is reported on separate GIS maps produced by the 
Census Bureau in 1990 and 2000.  Finally, due to computing resource constraints, we are no longer able 
to estimate this model using 2SLS.  Previously, we have used the population of MSA’s census division 
to proxy for the population of the MSA.  In these prior models, this instrument has not produced 
substantially different findings compared to the OLS results (though we might expect this instrument to 
make a bigger difference in Equation 7.3 since migration over a ten year period may be more responsive 
to local housing prices).  The results of Equation 7.3 on home values and rents are presented in Table 28 
and Table 29. 
 In Table 28, we show that the independent population effect on home prices is positive and 
significant.  This result is not surprising – home prices are higher in the most populated cities where the 
demand for housing is greatest.  We also find that the independent boundary effect on home prices is 
positive and significant, which is also expected.  Home prices are highest in cities with (proportionately) 
longest coastlines, mountain ranges, and borders created by federal property because these features are 
amenities that constrain land supply. 
                                                 
39 Using 1% sample, to facilitate the analysis, only one-third of the decennial census sample was used in this 
analysis. 
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But we also find that the Housing Supply Effect is negative and significant, which contradicts 
our theoretical expectations and the findings presented earlier in this section.  Imagine two cities that 
have the same population and are also similar in every other way that we control for in Table 28, except 
one city is totally surrounded by exogenous regions and the other is completely free of constraints.  The 
negative coefficient on the Housing Supply Effect in the first column of Table 28 indicates that this 
effect on home prices will be 335% lower in the completely constrained city (assuming a median MSA 
population of 236,857).  But the positive coefficient on the independent boundary effect indicates that 
housing prices in the constrained city will be simultaneously 382% higher than in the unbounded city.  
For most cities (all but the least populated), lower housing prices in bounded cities due to the Housing 
Supply Effect are practically cancelled out by higher housing prices in these same cities due to the 
independent boundary effect.  This suggests that the overall growth in home prices is approximately the 
same for almost all cities, regardless of the exogenous boundary percentage. 
Similarly, the negative HSE also indicates that a one percent increase in population will cause 
home prices to rise fastest in the least constrained cities.  Specifically, a one percent increase in 
population will lead to an estimated 0.47% home price increase in a totally unconstrained city compared 
to a 0.20% increase in a completely bounded urban area.  But this conclusion must also be viewed in 
light of the fact that home prices in the most constrained cities are likely to have already been 
significantly higher than in unbounded cities. 
While this is not the most favorable result in terms of the theory advanced in this thesis, there are 
at least three explanations for this finding.  One explanation is that migration costs can be minimized 
over the course of decade.  This reasoning, which is consistent with the heterogeneous moving cost 
theory presented in this dissertation, implies that constraints on land supply have an insignificant effect 
on prices in a setting where migrants can more freely move between bounded and unbounded cities.  If 
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this explanation is correct, it suggests that the zero migration cost assumption and conclusions of 
Roback and later authors are reasonable in a longer term setting, whereas the heterogeneous migration 
costs theory advanced in this thesis is more applicable in a shorter run analysis. 
A second explanation for this latest finding is that land and housing supply are not fixed in the 
long run, as we have been assuming in the short run.  As the rising population forces home prices to 
increase, developers naturally respond to this increase in demand and prices by building in the city’s 
non-urban peripheral regions and thereby expanding the geographic extent of the urban area.  This long-
run expansion of the urban area helps to moderate home price growth compared to the short-run case 
where supply is assumed to be fixed. 
In this context, we note that our resolution to apparent errors in the 1990 GIS map of urban areas 
produced by the U.S. Census Bureau might contribute (slightly) to the moderating effect of recently 
developed land on home prices.  The red, shaded area of Figure 14 shows the geographic extent of the 
Tampa Bay urban area in 1990 as reported by the Census Bureau.  The large section of the bay and other 
waterways that are indicated as urbanized is an apparent error – it is inconceivable that these sections of 
the MSA contain 1,000 residents per square mile, as required by the Census Bureau’s definition of urban 
area.   The problem illustrated in Figure 14 is representative of many similar errors that we have 
identified in the Census Bureau’s 1990 GIS maps.  The red shaded area of Figure 15 illustrates the 
geographic extent of the Tampa Bay urban area in the 1990 GIS map that is used in this thesis, and it is 
the intersection of urban areas identified in the Census Bureau’s 1990 and 2000 GIS maps.  This 
solution appears to fix the problem of phantom urbanization in 1990, but it assumes that any urban area 
that was included on 1990 GIS map and missing from 2000 GIS map was reported in error.  
Consequently, any urban section that was legitimately “de-urbanized” in the 1990s will be absent from 
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this analysis, and the size and shape of the urban areas analyzed in 2000 will always be at least as large 
as the “corrected” urban areas reviewed in 1990. 
A third explanation seems most consistent with the overall pattern of these latest findings, as 
well as our previous empirical results: new development in the most well-bounded cities must occur in 
the most distant and least valuable sections of the urban area because the most desirable and accessible 
property is used up the fastest in cities with the longest or tightest exogenous boundaries.  In other 
words, we am arguing that new residents to the most bounded cities are forced to live very far away 
from the CBD, and they significantly lower the city’s overall median property values by moving to these 
exurban fringe districts.  We have already shown that home prices in these newly built, frontier 
communities do not depend on metro-wide exogenous limits on the supply of land.  So in this sense, the 
negative coefficient on the interaction effect is also understandable.  However, it remains noteworthy 
that the independent positive price effect of the boundary seems to almost exactly offset the negative 
interaction effect. 
Also notice in Table 28 that many neighborhood features that are generally viewed to be 
amenities seem to have a negative effect on prices, once we control for the supply effect.  Such features 
include close proximity to a river or Great Lake.  In Table 29, we once again see that higher wages in 
the labor market in response to tighter boundaries are not large enough to compensate for higher land 
prices in the housing market. 
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Figure 14: "Wrong" Map of Tampa Bay Urban Area in 
1990 
Figure 15: "Corrected" Map of Tampa Bay Urban 
Area in 1990 
In the figure above, the red shaded region illustrates the 
geographic extent of the Tampa Bay Urban Area in 1990, 
as identified on the official Census Bureau GIS map.  
Large sections of the bay are reported as urbanized, which 
is an apparent error. 
In the figure above, the red shaded region illustrates the 
geographic extent of the Tampa Bay Urban in 1990 that 
is used in this analysis.  This shape is the union of 
official Census Bureau GIS map in 1990 and the official 
Census Bureau GIS map in 2000. 
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Table 28: Regression Results using 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census Data on Home Values 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of owner 
occupied housing 
Inner and Outer Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only
No PUMA Controls With PUMA Controls No PUMA Controls With PUMA Controls
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA    
Independent Population Effect 0.4667 2.52** 0.4388 2.40** 0.4547 2.49** 0.4254 2.35**
Independent Boundary Effect 3.8164 2.79*** 3.7929 2.75*** 3.1814 2.77*** 3.1330 2.70***
Housing Supply Effect -0.2705 -3.24**** -0.2698 -3.19*** -0.2338 -3.31**** -0.2315 -3.24****
PUMA   
Abuts Federal Property -0.0308 -2.35**  -0.0310 -2.36**
Abuts Protected Area 0.0010 0.04  0.0026 0.11
Abuts Canada 0.0229 0.27  0.0172 0.21
Abuts Mexico -0.1200 -2.33**  -0.1206 -2.34**
Abuts Ocean 0.0495 1.66*  0.0495 1.66*
Abuts River -0.0526 -1.71*  -0.0533 -1.72*
Abuts Great Lake -0.0366 -1.74*  -0.0377 -1.82*
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0142 0.50  0.0151 0.54
Log of Elevation Change 0.0099 0.83  0.0097 0.82
HOUSEHOLD   
Number of Bedrooms 0.0604 10.79**** 0.0605 10.61**** 0.0604 10.81**** 0.0606 10.63****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1173 7.41**** 0.1170 7.42**** 0.1171 7.40**** 0.1168 7.41****
Plumbing Facilities 0.1414 7.91**** 0.1400 7.82**** 0.1412 7.90**** 0.1399 7.82****
Number of Rooms 0.1437 31.67**** 0.1436 31.84**** 0.1436 31.52**** 0.1435 31.67****
Number of Cars -0.0004 -0.15 -0.0003 -0.12 -0.0003 -0.14 -0.0003 -0.11
Year Built -0.0356 -6.94**** -0.0366 -7.36**** -0.0356 -6.93**** -0.0365 -7.34****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD   
African-American -0.2909 -12.83**** -0.2948 -13.34**** -0.2909 -12.83**** -0.2947 -13.34****
Amount of Schooling 0.0550 24.23**** 0.0547 24.44**** 0.0550 24.21**** 0.0547 24.41****
Age 0.0031 7.10**** 0.0031 7.04**** 0.0031 7.10**** 0.0031 7.03****
Female -0.0293 -10.14**** -0.0296 -10.32**** -0.0293 -10.09**** -0.0296 -10.27****
Married 0.1338 34.38**** 0.1342 34.95**** 0.1338 34.45**** 0.1343 35.02****
TIME  
Dummy variable for 2000 -0.0084 -0.20 0.0049 0.11 -0.0054 -0.14 0.0077 0.19
Intercept 3.1521 1.20 3.5418 1.36 3.3613 1.29 3.7724 1.46
Number of observations 1,360,759 1,360,759 1,360,759 1,360,759
R2  0.5139 0.5147 0.5142 0.5150
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 29: Regression Results using 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census Data on Household Income 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of total 
household income 
Inner and Outer Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only
No PUMA Controls With PUMA Controls No PUMA Controls With PUMA Controls
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA    
Independent Population Effect 0.1327 3.45**** 0.1106 2.80*** 0.1314 3.43**** 0.1093 2.77***
Independent Boundary Effect 0.4660 1.72* 0.3679 1.33 0.4240 1.58 0.3587 1.32
Housing Supply Effect -0.0329 -1.97** -0.0273 -1.61 -0.0310 -1.88* -0.0274 -1.64
PUMA   
Abuts Federal Property -0.0186 -2.06**  0.0008 0.07
Abuts Protected Area -0.0008 -0.07  -0.0186 -2.06**
Abuts Canada -0.0761 -2.56**  -0.0005 -0.04
Abuts Mexico -0.0389 -1.74*  -0.0766 -2.57**
Abuts Ocean 0.0325 1.56  -0.0389 -1.75*
Abuts River -0.0206 -1.53  0.0325 1.56
Abuts Great Lake -0.0235 -2.14**  -0.0208 -1.54
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0006 0.05  -0.0237 -2.15**
Log of Elevation Change 0.0047 0.52  0.0047 0.51
HOUSEHOLD   
Number of Bedrooms 0.0520 18.83**** 0.0521 18.96**** 0.0520 18.83**** 0.0521 18.95****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1404 8.02**** 0.1404 8.05**** 0.1404 8.02**** 0.1403 8.04****
Plumbing Facilities 0.1643 9.89**** 0.1634 9.87**** 0.1643 9.89**** 0.1633 9.87****
Number of Rooms 0.0834 40.42**** 0.0834 39.43**** 0.0834 40.35**** 0.0834 39.37****
Number of Cars 0.0070 4.23**** 0.0071 4.28**** 0.0070 4.23**** 0.0071 4.28****
Year Built -0.0228 -12.44**** -0.0235 -11.83**** -0.0228 -12.43**** -0.0235 -11.82****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD   
African-American -0.1182 -10.52**** -0.1212 -10.14**** -0.1182 -10.51**** -0.1212 -10.14****
Amount of Schooling 0.0803 59.92**** 0.0801 58.59**** 0.0803 59.91**** 0.0801 58.56****
Age -0.0061 -19.63**** -0.0061 -19.44**** -0.0061 -19.63**** -0.0061 -19.44****
Female -0.1785 -50.92**** -0.1787 -50.42**** -0.1785 -50.91**** -0.1787 -50.40****
Married 0.3816 91.23**** 0.3820 92.28**** 0.3816 91.18**** 0.3820 92.25****
TIME  
Dummy variable for 2000 0.0723 10.81**** 0.0761 9.90**** 0.0728 11.24**** 0.0767 10.21****
Intercept 7.3439 13.34**** 7.6678 13.16**** 7.3684 13.38**** 7.6901 13.21****
Number of observations 1,350,809 1,350,809 1,350,809 1,350,809
R2  0.3734 0.3736 0.3734 0.3736
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Conclusion 
 
Imagine how much different New Orleans would be today if Hurricane Katrina had 
flooded one-third of the homes of only one subdivision and left the rest of the city unscathed.  In 
this case, residents of the ruined dwellings could relocate to an adjacent subdivision and suffer 
very little in terms of utility cost.  For any displaced resident who greatly anticipates and 
appreciates the annual Mardi Gras celebration or the New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival, life 
would eventually return to normal.   Because New Orleans and all major cities have many 
essentially interchangeable subdivisions, we would not expect a reduction in the number of 
dwellings in any single neighborhood to result in a general metro-wide increase in housing 
prices.  But we would expect a reduction in home prices in that single hypothetical, newly flood-
prone subdivision (signaling a less desirable neighborhood), and this reduction in price can be 
reasonably used to estimate the value of a neighborhood’s “flooding-propensity” attribute. 
As in other sections of this thesis, this example of New Orleans is intended to highlight 
the effect that migration costs can have on home prices in analysis that also features shifts in the 
supply of housing.  In particular, in this dissertation we have argued that exogenous regions 
affect land prices throughout the urban area because inter-city migration is more costly for some 
than for others, and these regions effectively constrain the supply of land and housing.  we have 
explained how this aspect of the land market has been overlooked in the literature and provided a 
detailed theoretical justification for this new view. 
We have also developed four original exogenous region percentages to test this 
hypothesis, and presented many empirical findings that confirm the theory on both the 
metrowide and household level, including correlations between these exogenous region measures 
and other published QOL rankings and various measures local home prices.  we have also 
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disaggregated the features that impose exogenous boundaries and determined (for example) that 
the supply effect of a river is different from the effect of an ocean or state park or Air Force base.  
we have shown that homes in the noncoastal neighborhoods in seaside metro areas are more 
expensive because land in these communities is limited, not because convenient beach access is a 
metrowide amenity.  Finally, we have shown that the Housing Supply Effect is greatly 
diminished when viewed over the course of a decade, perhaps due to minimized migration costs, 
expanding housing supply, or differences in the geography bounded and unbounded cities. 
Most importantly, we have shown that home prices are highest in cities with the most 
restrictive exogenous boundaries, ceteris paribus.  Furthermore, this increase in land prices is 
evidently not compensated by an increase in household income.  This new finding implies that 
researchers who do not control for exogenous boundaries are introducing a systematic bias in 
their results if they use land prices or rents to measure the value of public amenities in urban 
areas or the relative desirability of different cities. 
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Appendix 
Visual Basic Code Used to Determine the Change in Elevation within 0.01DD Squares 
Option Explicit 
Const tempDir = "D:\Dissertation\Map\Layers\Temp" 
Const strFolder As String = "D:\Dissertation\Map\Layers\MSA Coords" 
Const myIncrement As Double = 0.01 
Dim strName As String 
 
Sub createMountainLayer() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
     
    Dim pCBDLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pCBDClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pCBDCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pCBD As IFeature 
         
    Dim pCBDCircleLayer(1) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pCBDCircleClass(1) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pCBDCircleCursor(1) As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pCBDCircle(2) As IFeature 
         
    Dim pUrbanLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pUrbanClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pUrbanCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pUrban As IFeature 
         
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
     
    Dim pCheckLayer(5) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pCheckClass(5) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim checkIndex(5) As Integer 
    Dim checkFail As Boolean, checkFail1 As Boolean 
     
    Dim pTestLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pTestClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pTestCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pTest As IFeature 
     
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator3 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim pSpatialFilter1 As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pQueryFilter1 As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pArea As IArea 
    Dim f As Integer, fc As Integer, x As Integer, f1 As Double 
    Dim x1 As Integer, x2 As Integer, y1 As Integer, y2 As Integer 
    Dim xStep As Integer, yStep As Integer 
    Dim xCoord As Double, yCoord As Double 
    Dim myElev As Double 
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    Dim myArea As String, myDir As String, myFile As String, myFileName As String 
    Dim fs As Object 
    Dim pRasLyr As IRasterLayer 
    Dim pConversionOp As IConversionOp 
    Dim pWSF As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim pWS As IWorkspace 
    Dim pFWS As IFeatureWorkspace 
    Dim pFClassOut As IGeoDataset 
    Dim sOutFCname As String 
    Dim classIndex As Integer 
    Dim myElevCount As Integer 
    Dim myElevs() As Double 
    Dim myCircle As Integer 
    Dim pNewFeatClass() As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pNewFeatCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pNewFeat As IFeature 
    Dim foundOne As Boolean 
    Dim myPoint As IPoint 
    Dim pEnvelope As IEnvelope 
    Dim pSegments As ISegmentCollection 
    Dim pTmpPoint1 As IPoint, pTmpPoint2 As IPoint 
    Dim minElev As Double, maxElev As Double, centralElev As Double 
    Dim myArg As Double, myLenInMiles As Double, myLenInMeters As Double, myMaxLen As Double 
    Dim myMaxCheck As Double, myMinCheck As Double 
    Dim saveThisSquare As Boolean 
    Dim circleCheck As Boolean 
    Dim pCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pData As IDataStatistics 
    Dim pStatResults As IStatisticsResults 
    Dim startID As Integer 
    Dim pShpWksFact As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim pFeatWks As IFeatureWorkspace 
    Dim w As Integer, n As Integer 
    Dim tValue1 As Integer, tValue2 As Integer 
    Dim foundASquare As Boolean 
 
    Set pWSF = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
    Set pFWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
     
    Set pConversionOp = New RasterConversionOp 
    Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pQueryFilter1 = New QueryFilter 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    'Set pData = New DataStatistics 
    'pData.Field = "GRIDCODE" 
 
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pCBDLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(0) 
    Set pCBDClass = pCBDLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pCBDCircleLayer(0) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pCBDCircleClass(0) = pCBDCircleLayer(0).FeatureClass 
     
    Set pCBDCircleLayer(1) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
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    Set pCBDCircleClass(1) = pCBDCircleLayer(1).FeatureClass 
     
    Set pUrbanLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(6) 
    Set pUrbanClass = pUrbanLayer.FeatureClass 
     
    checkIndex(0) = 6 
    checkIndex(1) = 7 
    checkIndex(2) = 8 
    checkIndex(3) = 11 
    checkIndex(4) = 12 
    checkIndex(5) = 14 
    For x = 0 To 5 
        Set pCheckLayer(x) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(checkIndex(x)) 
        Set pCheckClass(x) = pCheckLayer(x).FeatureClass 
        Debug.Print pCheckLayer(x).Name 
    Next 
     
    foundASquare = True 
    Set pTestLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(pMxDoc.FocusMap.LayerCount - 2) 
    Set pTestClass = pTestLayer.FeatureClass 
    If pTestLayer.Name <> "Mtn_Squares" Then Exit Sub 
     
    Set pCursor = pTestClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pData = New DataStatistics 
    pData.Field = "PID" 
    Set pData.Cursor = pCursor 
    Set pStatResults = pData.Statistics 
    startID = pStatResults.Maximum 
    startID = 298 
     
    'pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "PID >= " & startID 
    'Set pTestCursor = pTestClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    'Set pTest = pTestCursor.NextFeature 
    'Remove all the objects in the output layer 
    'Do Until pTest Is Nothing 
    '    Call pTest.Delete 
    '    Set pTest = pTestCursor.NextFeature 
    'Loop 
     
    Set pShpWksFact = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pFeatWks = pShpWksFact.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
     
    'Gather all the CBD Circles and loop through them 
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "FID >= " & startID 
    fc = pCBDClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    Set pCBDCursor = pCBDClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pCBD = pCBDCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pCBD Is Nothing 
        f = f + 1 
        classIndex = 0 
        'Figure out if both CBDCircles exist and which is biggest 
        pQueryFilter1.WhereClause = "ID = " & pCBD.Value(2) 
        Set pCBDCircleCursor(1) = pCBDCircleClass(1).Search(pQueryFilter1, False) 
        Set pCBDCircle(1) = pCBDCircleCursor(1).NextFeature 
        If pCBDCircle(1) Is Nothing Then GoTo endOfloop 
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        Set pCBDCircleCursor(0) = pCBDCircleClass(0).Search(pQueryFilter1, False) 
        Set pCBDCircle(0) = pCBDCircleCursor(0).NextFeature 
        If pCBDCircle(0) Is Nothing Then GoTo endOfloop 
 
        If pCBDCircle(1).Value(3) > pCBDCircle(0).Value(3) Then myCircle = 1 Else myCircle = 0 
         
        'Remove all the files in the temporary directory 
        Call fs.deletefile(tempDir & "\*.*", True) 
        'Identify the geographic extent of the circle 
        Set pTopoOp = New Polygon 
        x1 = Int(Abs(pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.XMin)) + 1 
        x2 = Int(Abs(pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.XMax)) + 1 
        y1 = Int(Abs(pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.YMin)) 
        y2 = Int(Abs(pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.YMax)) 
        If x2 > x1 Then xStep = 1 Else xStep = -1 
        If y2 > y1 Then yStep = 1 Else yStep = -1 
        centralElev = 0 
 
        'Identify the rasters that touch the circle and convert them to polygons for querying 
        For xCoord = x1 To x2 Step xStep 
            For yCoord = y1 To y2 Step yStep 
                If Int(Abs(yCoord)) < 42 Then myArea = "Area02" Else myArea = "Area01" 
                myDir = "w" & Format(Int(Abs(xCoord)), "000") 
                myFile = "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".dt1" 
                myFileName = "C:\ESRI\ESRIDATA\" & myArea & "\" & myArea & "\dted\" & myDir & "\" & myFile 
                If fs.fileExists(myFileName) Then 
                    ReDim Preserve pNewFeatClass(classIndex) As IFeatureClass 
                    Set pRasLyr = New RasterLayer 
                    pRasLyr.CreateFromFilePath myFileName 
                    sOutFCname = "w" & Int(Abs(xCoord)) & "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".shp" 
                    Call pConversionOp.RasterDataToPolygonFeatureData(pRasLyr.Raster, pWS, sOutFCname, True) 
                    Set pNewFeatClass(classIndex) = pFWS.OpenFeatureClass(sOutFCname) 
                    If centralElev = 0 Then 
                        With pSpatialFilter 
                            Set .Geometry = pCBD.Shape 
                            .GeometryField = "Shape" 
                            .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
                        End With 
                        Set pNewFeatCursor = pNewFeatClass(classIndex).Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
                        Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                        If Not pNewFeat Is Nothing Then centralElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                    End If 
                    classIndex = classIndex + 1 
                End If 
            Next 
        Next 
         
        f1 = 0 
        circleCheck = True 
        For xCoord = pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.XMin To pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.XMax Step myIncrement 
            For yCoord = pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.YMin To pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape.Envelope.YMax Step myIncrement 
                f1 = f1 + 1 
                Debug.Print f & "/" & fc & "/" & f1 & " " & pCBD.Value(2) & " " & pCBD.Value(3) & " " & pCBD.Value(4) 
                Set pEnvelope = New Envelope 
                Call pEnvelope.PutCoords(xCoord - myIncrement / 2, yCoord - myIncrement / 2, xCoord + myIncrement / 2, yCoord + myIncrement / 2) 
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                Set pTmpPoint1 = pEnvelope.LowerLeft 
                Set pTmpPoint2 = pEnvelope.LowerRight 
                myArg = Sin(pTmpPoint2.y / 57.2958) * Sin(pTmpPoint1.y / 57.2958) + Cos(pTmpPoint2.y / 57.2958) * Cos(pTmpPoint1.y / 57.2958) * 
Cos(pTmpPoint2.x / 57.2958 - pTmpPoint1.x / 57.2958) 
                myLenInMiles = 3963 * (Atn(-myArg / Sqr(-myArg * myArg + 1)) + 2 * Atn(1)) 
                myLenInMeters = myLenInMiles * 1609.344 
                'myMaxLen = 0.15 * Abs(myLenInMeters) 
                myMaxLen = Abs(myLenInMeters) 
                'If centralElev < myMaxLen / 2.01 Then centralElev = myMaxLen / 2.01 
                'myMaxCheck = centralElev + myMaxLen / 2.01 
                'myMinCheck = centralElev - myMaxLen / 2.01 
                 
                'Check if this circle has any points that are good candidates for being too steep 
                'If circleCheck Then 
                '    With pSpatialFilter 
                '        Set .Geometry = pCBDCircle(myCircle).Shape 
                '        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelContains 
                '        .WhereClause = "GRIDCODE > " & myMaxCheck & " OR GRIDCODE < " & myMinCheck 
                '    End With 
                '    For x = 0 To classIndex - 1 
                '        If pNewFeatClass(x).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then circleCheck = False 
                '        If Not circleCheck Then Exit For 
                '    Next 
                '    If circleCheck Then GoTo endOfloop 
                'End If 
 
                'Check if this point is in the circle of interest 
                Set myPoint = New Point 
                myPoint.x = xCoord 
                myPoint.y = yCoord 
                With pSpatialFilter 
                    Set .Geometry = myPoint 
                    .GeometryField = "Shape" 
                    .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
                    .WhereClause = "ID = " & pCBDCircle(myCircle).Value(2) 
                End With 
                If pCBDCircleClass(myCircle).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) = 0 Then GoTo nextSquare 
                 
                'Create a square around the point 
                Set pSegments = New Polygon 
                Call pSegments.SetRectangle(pEnvelope) 
                With pSpatialFilter 
                    Set .Geometry = pSegments 
                    .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelContains 
                    .WhereClause = "PID=" & startID 
                End With 
                 
                'Check if this square has already been created 
                If foundASquare Then 
                    If pTestClass.featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then GoTo nextSquare 
                End If 
                 
                foundASquare = False 
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                With pSpatialFilter 
                    .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
                    .WhereClause = "" 
                End With 
                     
                'check if this square is in a check zone 
                'checkFail = False 
                'For x = 0 To 5 
                '    If pCheckClass(x).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then 
                '        checkFail = True 
                '        Exit For 
                '    End If 
                'Next 
                'If checkFail Then GoTo nextSquare 
                 
                'Check if this square has any points that are good candidates for being too steep 
                'pSpatialFilter.SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelContains 
                'pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "GRIDCODE > " & myMaxCheck & " OR GRIDCODE < " & myMinCheck 
                'checkFail = True 
                'For x = 0 To classIndex - 1 
                '    If pNewFeatClass(x).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then checkFail = False 
                '    If Not checkFail Then Exit For 
                'Next 
                'If checkFail Then GoTo nextSquare 
                 
                pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "" 
                minElev = 10000 
                maxElev = -10000 
                tValue1 = pEnvelope.XMin 
                tValue2 = pEnvelope.XMax 
                For w = Int(pEnvelope.XMin) To Int(pEnvelope.XMax) 
                    For n = Int(pEnvelope.YMin) To Int(pEnvelope.YMax) 
                        myFileName = "w" & Abs(w) & "n" & Abs(n) 
                        If fs.fileExists(tempDir & "\" & myFileName & ".shp") Then 
                            Set pNewFeatClass(0) = pFeatWks.OpenFeatureClass(myFileName) 
                            Set pNewFeatCursor = pNewFeatClass(0).Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
                            Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                            myElevCount = 0 
                            Do Until pNewFeat Is Nothing 
                                If pNewFeat.Value(3) < minElev Then minElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                                If pNewFeat.Value(3) > maxElev Then maxElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                                Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                            Loop 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                Next 
                 
                If minElev = 10000 Or maxElev = -10000 Then 
                    maxElev = 0 
                    minElev = 0 
                End If 
                Set pTest = pTestClass.CreateFeature 
                Set pTest.Shape = pSegments 
                Set pArea = pSegments 
                'Debug.Print myMaxLen & " " & maxElev - minElev 
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                pTest.Value(2) = pCBDCircle(myCircle).Value(2) 
                pTest.Value(3) = pArea.Area 
                pTest.Value(4) = pCBD.Value(0) 
                pTest.Value(5) = (maxElev - minElev) / myMaxLen 
                Call pTest.Store 
nextSquare: 
            Next 
        Next 
endOfloop: 
        Set pCBD = pCBDCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code Used to Generate Data Needed for Boundary Measures 
Option Explicit 
Const tempDir = "D:\Dissertation\Map\Layers\Temp" 
Const strFolder As String = "D:\Dissertation\Map\Layers\MSA Coords" 
Const myIncrement As Double = 0.01 
 
Dim strName As String 
Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
Dim pUrbanLayer As IFeatureLayer 
Dim pUrbanClass As IFeatureClass 
Dim pUrbanCursor As IFeatureCursor 
Dim pUrban As IFeature 
Dim pInBoundaryLayer(6) As IFeatureLayer 
Dim pInBoundaryClass(6) As IFeatureClass 
     
Dim pOutBoundaryLayer As IFeatureLayer 
Dim pOutBoundaryClass As IFeatureClass 
Dim pOutBoundaryCursor As IFeatureCursor 
Dim pOutBoundary As IFeature 
 
Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter, pSpatialFilter1 As ISpatialFilter 
Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
Dim pLine As IPolyline, pCrossHair As IPolyline 
Dim x As Integer, f As Integer, fc As Integer 
Dim pPolygon As IPolygon 
Dim pGeoDataset As IGeoDataset 
Dim pSpatialReference As ISpatialReference 
Dim pMidPnt As IPoint 
Dim pOtrPnt As IPoint 
     
Sub createBoundaries() 
    Dim pExteriorRing() As IRing 
    Dim pInteriorRing() As IRing 
    Dim startID As Integer 
    Dim x1 As Integer, boundaryLayers(6) As Integer 
        
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    Set pSpatialFilter1 = New SpatialFilter 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pMidPnt = New Point 
    Set pOtrPnt = New Point 
    Set pLine = New Polyline 
    Set pCrossHair = New Polyline 
     
    boundaryLayers(0) = 2 
    boundaryLayers(1) = 3 
    boundaryLayers(2) = 4 
    boundaryLayers(3) = 5 
    boundaryLayers(4) = 6 
    boundaryLayers(5) = 1 
    boundaryLayers(6) = 7 
    For x = 0 To 6 
        Set pInBoundaryLayer(x) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(boundaryLayers(x)) 
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        Set pInBoundaryClass(x) = pInBoundaryLayer(x).FeatureClass 
    Next 
     
    startID = 66 
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "ID >= " & startID 
    Set pOutBoundaryLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(0) 
    If pOutBoundaryLayer.Name <> "Boundary1990UAs" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pOutBoundaryClass = pOutBoundaryLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutBoundaryCursor = pOutBoundaryClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pOutBoundary = pOutBoundaryCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pOutBoundary Is Nothing 
        Call pOutBoundary.Delete 
        Set pOutBoundary = pOutBoundaryCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
     
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    With pSpatialFilter1 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "FID >= " & startID & " AND STATE <> 'AK' AND STATE <> 'HI' AND STATE <> 'PR'" 
    Set pUrbanLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    If pUrbanLayer.Name <> "Combined1990UrbanAreas" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pUrbanClass = pUrbanLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pGeoDataset = pUrbanLayer 
    Set pSpatialReference = pGeoDataset.SpatialReference 
    fc = pUrbanClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    Set pUrbanCursor = pUrbanClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
     
    Do Until pUrban Is Nothing 
        f = f + 1 
        If pUrban.Shape.GeometryType = esriGeometryPolygon Then 
            'Set the polygon 
            Set pPolygon = pUrban.ShapeCopy 
            Set pPolygon.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
            'Redim the exterior ring array based on number of exterior rings 
            If pPolygon.ExteriorRingCount > 0 Then 
                ReDim pExteriorRing(pPolygon.ExteriorRingCount - 1) 
                'Get all the exterior rings 
                pPolygon.QueryExteriorRings pExteriorRing(0) 
                For x = 0 To pPolygon.ExteriorRingCount - 1 
                    Call createBoundary(pExteriorRing(x), 0) 
                    If pPolygon.InteriorRingCount(pExteriorRing(x)) > 0 Then 
                        ReDim pInteriorRing(pPolygon.InteriorRingCount(pExteriorRing(x)) - 1) 
                        pPolygon.QueryInteriorRings pExteriorRing(x), pInteriorRing(0) 
                        For x1 = 0 To pPolygon.InteriorRingCount(pExteriorRing(x)) - 1 
                            Call createBoundary(pInteriorRing(x1), x1 + 1) 
                        Next 
                    End If 
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                Next 
            End If 
        End If 
        'If pUrban.Value(0) = 10 Then Exit Sub 
        Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub createBoundary(pRing As IRing, pos As Integer) 
    Dim pSegments As ISegmentCollection 
    Dim y As Integer, z As Integer 
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator 
 
    Set pSegments = pRing 
    For y = 0 To pSegments.SegmentCount - 1 
        Debug.Print f & "/" & fc & " " & x & "." & pos & "/" & pPolygon.ExteriorRingCount - 1 & " " & y & "/" & pSegments.SegmentCount - 1 & " " & 
pUrban.Value(4) 
        pLine.FromPoint = pSegments.Segment(y).FromPoint 
        pLine.ToPoint = pSegments.Segment(y).ToPoint 
        Set pOutBoundary = pOutBoundaryClass.CreateFeature 
        Set pOutBoundary.Shape = pLine 
        pOutBoundary.Value(2) = pUrban.Value(0) 
        pOutBoundary.Value(3) = pUrban.Value(3) 
        If pos = 0 Then 
            For z = 0 To 3 
                pMidPnt.x = (pLine.FromPoint.x + pLine.ToPoint.x) / 2 
                pMidPnt.y = (pLine.FromPoint.y + pLine.ToPoint.y) / 2 
                Select Case z 
                Case 0: 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pMidPnt.x 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pUrban.Extent.YMax 
                    pMidPnt.y = pMidPnt.y + 0.00001 
                Case 1: 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pMidPnt.x 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pUrban.Extent.YMin 
                    pMidPnt.y = pMidPnt.y - 0.00001 
                Case 2: 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pMidPnt.y 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pUrban.Extent.XMax 
                    pMidPnt.x = pMidPnt.x + 0.00001 
                Case 3: 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pMidPnt.y 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pUrban.Extent.XMin 
                    pMidPnt.x = pMidPnt.x - 0.00001 
                End Select 
                pCrossHair.FromPoint = pMidPnt 
                pCrossHair.ToPoint = pOtrPnt 
                pSpatialFilter1.WhereClause = "FID=" & pUrban.Value(0) 
                Set pSpatialFilter1.Geometry = pCrossHair 
                If pUrbanClass.featureCount(pSpatialFilter1) = 0 Then 
                    pOutBoundary.Value(4) = 1 
                    Exit For 
                End If 
            Next 
        End If 
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        pOutBoundary.Value(5) = pLine.Length 
         
        Set pLine.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
        Set pTopoOp = pLine 
        Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Buffer(0.005) 
        With pSpatialFilter 
            Set .Geometry = pTopoOp 
            .WhereClause = "" 
        End With 
         
        For z = 0 To 5 
            If z = 5 Then pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE <> '" & pOutBoundary.Value(3) & "'" 
            If pInBoundaryClass(z).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then pOutBoundary.Value(z + 6) = 1 
        Next 
         
        For z = 1 To 3 
            pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "GAPCAT=" & z 
            If pInBoundaryClass(6).featureCount(pSpatialFilter) > 0 Then pOutBoundary.Value(12 + z) = 1 
        Next 
        pOutBoundary.Store 
    Next 
End Sub 
 
Sub updateBoundaries() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pBndryLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pBndryClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pBndryCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pBndry As IFeature 
    Dim pOutsideLayer(5) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutsideClass(5) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim x As Integer, pOutsideIndices(5) As Integer 
    Dim f As Double, fc As Double, bfc As Double 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pSpatialFilter(1) As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim pGeoDataset As IGeoDataset 
    Dim pSpatialReference As ISpatialReference 
    Dim myTime As Double, myRate As Double, mySeconds As Double 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    pOutsideIndices(0) = 5 
    pOutsideIndices(1) = 6 
    pOutsideIndices(2) = 7 
    pOutsideIndices(3) = 8 
    pOutsideIndices(4) = 9 
    pOutsideIndices(5) = 4 
    For x = 0 To 5 
        Set pOutsideLayer(x) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer((pOutsideIndices(x))) 
        Set pOutsideClass(x) = pOutsideLayer(x).FeatureClass 
    Next 
     
    For x = 0 To 1 
        Set pSpatialFilter(x) = New SpatialFilter 
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        With pSpatialFilter(x) 
            .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
            .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        End With 
    Next 
     
    Set pBndryLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    If pBndryLayer.Name <> "Boundaries" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pBndryClass = pBndryLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pGeoDataset = pBndryLayer 
    Set pSpatialReference = pGeoDataset.SpatialReference 
    'pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE = '45300'" 
    fc = pBndryClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    Set pBndryCursor = pBndryClass.Update(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
    myTime = Now 
    Do Until pBndry Is Nothing 
        If f Mod 50 = 0 And f > 0 Then 
            mySeconds = (CDbl(Now) - myTime) * 24 * 60 * 60 
            myRate = f / mySeconds 
            Debug.Print f & "/" & fc & " since " & Format(myTime, "h:mm ampm") & ". Rate is " & Format(myRate, "0.0") & " records per second." 
        End If 
        f = f + 1 
        Set pBndry.Shape.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
        Set pTopoOp = pBndry.Shape 
        Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Buffer(0.005) 
        Set pSpatialFilter(0).Geometry = pTopoOp 
        pSpatialFilter(0).WhereClause = "" 
        For x = 0 To 5 
            If x = 5 Then pSpatialFilter(0).WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE <> '" & pBndry.Value(3) & "'" 
            bfc = pOutsideClass(x).featureCount(pSpatialFilter(0)) 
            If bfc > 0 Then pBndry.Value(6 + x) = 1 Else pBndry.Value(6 + x) = 0 
        Next 
        Call pBndry.Store 
        Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Sub updateOuterPoint() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
     
    Dim pUrbanLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pUrbanClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pUrbanCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pUrban As IFeature 
     
    Dim pBndryLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pBndryClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pBndryCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pBndry As IFeature 
     
    Dim myCounts(5) As Integer, z As Integer 
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    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
    Set pMidPnt = New Point 
    Set pOtrPnt = New Point 
    Set pCrossHair = New Polyline 
     
    Set pBndryLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pBndryClass = pBndryLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pUrbanLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(6) 
    Set pUrbanClass = pUrbanLayer.FeatureClass 
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE <> '41860'" 
    Set pUrbanCursor = pUrbanClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
     
    Do Until pUrban Is Nothing 
        Debug.Print pUrban.Value(0) & " " & pUrban.Value(4) 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "OUTER_PNT = 0 AND CBSA_CODE = '" & pUrban.Value(3) & "'" 
        Set pBndryCursor = pBndryClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
        Do Until pBndry Is Nothing 
            For z = 0 To 3 
                Set pLine = pBndry.Shape 
                pMidPnt.x = (pLine.FromPoint.x + pLine.ToPoint.x) / 2 
                pMidPnt.y = (pLine.FromPoint.y + pLine.ToPoint.y) / 2 
                Select Case z 
                Case 0: 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pMidPnt.x 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pUrban.Extent.YMax 
                    pMidPnt.y = pMidPnt.y + 0.00001 
                Case 1: 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pMidPnt.x 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pUrban.Extent.YMin 
                    pMidPnt.y = pMidPnt.y - 0.00001 
                Case 2: 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pMidPnt.y 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pUrban.Extent.XMax 
                    pMidPnt.x = pMidPnt.x + 0.00001 
                Case 3: 
                    pOtrPnt.y = pMidPnt.y 
                    pOtrPnt.x = pUrban.Extent.XMin 
                    pMidPnt.x = pMidPnt.x - 0.00001 
                End Select 
                pCrossHair.FromPoint = pMidPnt 
                pCrossHair.ToPoint = pOtrPnt 
                Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pCrossHair 
                pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE = '" & pUrban.Value(3) & "'" 
                If pUrbanClass.featureCount(pSpatialFilter) = 0 Then 
                    pBndry.Value(4) = 1 
                    Call pBndry.Store 
                    Exit For 
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                End If 
            Next 
            Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
        Loop 
        Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code Used to Determine the Size of Developable Areas 
Sub recreateDevelopableArea() 
    On Error GoTo recordErr 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pGeoDataset As IGeoDataset 
    Dim pSpatialReference As ISpatialReference 
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator3 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pPolygon As IPolygon 
    Dim pArea As IArea 
    Dim myTime As Double, myRate As Double, mySeconds As Double 
     
    Dim pDiffLayer(6) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pDiffClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pDiffCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pDiff As IFeature 
     
    Dim pCircleLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pCircleClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pCircleCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pCircle As IFeature 
     
    Dim pUrbanLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pUrbanClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pUrbanCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pUrban As IFeature 
         
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
     
    Dim pPADLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pPADClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pPADCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pPAD As IFeature 
    Dim x As Double, xc As Double, f As Integer 
    Dim errorLog() As String 
    Dim errorIndex As Integer 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    Set pOutputLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(2) 
    If pOutputLayer.Name <> "SaizDevelopableArea15" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pOutputClass = pOutputLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutputCursor = pOutputClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
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    Do Until pOutput Is Nothing 
        Call pOutput.Delete 
        Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
     
    Set pCircleLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    Set pCircleClass = pCircleLayer.FeatureClass 
    'pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "ID = 46700" 
    Set pCircleCursor = pCircleClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pCircle = pCircleCursor.NextFeature 
    Set pGeoDataset = pCircleLayer 
    Set pSpatialReference = pGeoDataset.SpatialReference 
     
    Set pUrbanLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pUrbanClass = pUrbanLayer.FeatureClass 
     
    For x = 0 To 6 
        Set pDiffLayer(x) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(x + 4) 
        Set pDiffLayer(x).SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
    Next 
     
    Do Until pCircle Is Nothing 
        Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pCircle.Shape 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "ID = " & pCircle.Value(2) 
        Set pUrbanCursor = pUrbanClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
        If Not pUrban Is Nothing Then 
            f = f + 1 
            Debug.Print f & ") " & pUrban.Value(4) 
            Set pTopoOp = pCircle.Shape 
            Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pTopoOp 
             
            For x = 0 To 6 
                Set pDiffClass = pDiffLayer(x).FeatureClass 
                pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "" 
                If x = 6 Then pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "Grade >= 0.15 AND ID = " & pCircle.Value(2) 
                Set pDiffCursor = pDiffClass.Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
                Set pDiff = pDiffCursor.NextFeature 
                Do Until pDiff Is Nothing 
                    Set pDiff.Shape.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
                    Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Difference(pDiff.Shape) 
                    Set pDiff = pDiffCursor.NextFeature 
                Loop 
            Next 
             
            pSpatialFilter.WhereClause = "" 
            Set pDiffCursor = pUrbanClass.Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
            Set pDiff = pDiffCursor.NextFeature 
            Do Until pDiff Is Nothing 
                Set pDiff.Shape.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
                Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Union(pDiff.Shape) 
                Set pDiff = pDiffCursor.NextFeature 
            Loop 
             
            Set pCircle.Shape.SpatialReference = pSpatialReference 
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            Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Intersect(pCircle.Shape, esriGeometry2Dimension) 
            Set pOutput = pOutputClass.CreateFeature 
            Set pOutput.Shape = pTopoOp 
            Set pArea = pTopoOp 
            pOutput.Value(2) = pCircle.Value(2) 
            pOutput.Value(3) = pArea.Area 
            pOutput.Value(4) = pCircle.Value(3) 
            pOutput.Value(5) = pOutput.Value(3) / pOutput.Value(4) 
            pOutput.Store 
        End If 
        Set pCircle = pCircleCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
    Debug.Print String(72, "-") 
    For x = 0 To errorIndex - 1 
        Debug.Print errorLog(x) 
    Next 
    Exit Sub 
recordErr: 
    ReDim Preserve errorLog(errorIndex) As String 
    errorLog(errorIndex) = pUrban.Value(4) & " - Layer: " & pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(x + 4).Name 
    errorIndex = errorIndex + 1 
    Resume Next 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code Used to Determine the Change in Elevation within a 0.05 DD radius of the border 
Option Explicit 
Const tempDir = "D:\Dissertation\Map\Layers\Temp" 
 
Dim myTime As Double, f As Double, g As Double, gc As Double, tc As Double 
Dim endID As Integer 
Dim myFileName As String 
Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
Dim fs As Object 
Dim pFeatWks As IFeatureWorkspace 
 
Dim pUrbanLayer As IFeatureLayer 
Dim pUrbanClass As IFeatureClass 
Dim pUrbanCursor As IFeatureCursor 
Dim pUrban As IFeature 
 
Sub updateGrades() 
    Dim startID As Integer 
    myTime = Now 
    startID = 254 
    endID = 312 
    Do Until startID = endID + 1 
        Call updateGrade(startID) 
        startID = startID + 1 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Sub updateGrade(startID As Integer) 
    'On Error Resume Next 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
         
    Dim pBndryLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pBndryClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pBndryCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pBndry As IFeature 
     
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator3 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pArea As IArea 
    Dim x As Integer 
    Dim x1 As Integer, x2 As Integer, y1 As Integer, y2 As Integer 
    Dim xCoord As Integer, yCoord As Integer 
    Dim myElev As Double 
    Dim myArea As String, myDir As String, myFile As String 
    Dim pRasLyr As IRasterLayer 
    Dim pConversionOp As IConversionOp 
    Dim pWSF As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim pWS As IWorkspace 
    Dim pFWS As IFeatureWorkspace 
    Dim pFClassOut As IGeoDataset 
    Dim sOutFCname As String 
    Dim pShpWksFact As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim xStep As Integer, yStep As Integer 
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    Set pWSF = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
    Set pFWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
    Set pShpWksFact = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pFeatWks = pShpWksFact.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
     
    Set pConversionOp = New RasterConversionOp 
    Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pBndryLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(0) 
    Set pBndryClass = pBndryLayer.FeatureClass 
    If tc = 0 Then 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "WATER=0 AND GOVT=0 AND CANADA=0 AND MEXICO=0 " & _ 
            "AND NOTUSA=0 AND OTHERUA=0 AND GRADE=0 AND ID >= " & startID 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "GRADE = 0 AND ID >= " & startID 
        tc = pBndryClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    End If 
     
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "FID = " & startID 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    'Gather all the Boundaries and loop through them 
    Set pUrbanLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    If pUrbanLayer.Name <> "Combined1990UrbanAreas" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pUrbanClass = pUrbanLayer.FeatureClass 
    'ec = pUrbanClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    Set pUrbanCursor = pUrbanClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
     
    Do Until pUrban Is Nothing 
        'e = e + 1 
        'Identify the geographic extent of the urban area 
        x1 = Int(pUrban.Shape.Envelope.XMin) 
        x2 = Int(pUrban.Shape.Envelope.XMax) 
        y1 = Int(pUrban.Shape.Envelope.YMin) 
        y2 = Int(pUrban.Shape.Envelope.YMax) 
        If x2 > x1 Then xStep = 1 Else xStep = -1 
        If y2 > y1 Then yStep = 1 Else yStep = -1 
         
        'Identify the rasters that touch the urban area and convert them to polygons for querying 
        For xCoord = x1 To x2 Step xStep 
            For yCoord = y1 To y2 Step yStep 
                If Int(Abs(yCoord)) < 42 Then myArea = "area02" Else myArea = "area01" 
                myDir = "w" & Format(Int(Abs(xCoord)), "000") 
                myFile = "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".dt1" 
                myFileName = "C:\ESRI\ESRIDATA\" & myArea & "\dted\" & myDir & "\" & myFile 
                If fs.fileExists(myFileName) Then 
                    Set pRasLyr = New RasterLayer 
                    pRasLyr.CreateFromFilePath myFileName 
                    sOutFCname = "u" & startID & "w" & Int(Abs(xCoord)) & "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".shp" 
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                    If Not fs.fileExists(tempDir & "\" & sOutFCname) Then 
                        Call pConversionOp.RasterDataToPolygonFeatureData(pRasLyr.Raster, pWS, sOutFCname, True) 
                    End If 
                End If 
            Next 
        Next 
         
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "WATER=0 AND GOVT=0 AND CANADA=0 AND MEXICO=0 " & _ 
            "AND NOTUSA=0 AND OTHERUA=0 AND GRADE=0 AND ID = " & startID 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "GRADE = 0 AND ID = " & startID 
        gc = pBndryClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
        g = 0 
        Set pBndryCursor = pBndryClass.Update(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
        Do Until pBndry Is Nothing 
            Call updateGradeFeature(startID, pBndry) 
            Set pBndry = pBndryCursor.NextFeature 
        Loop 
        'Remove all the files in the temporary directory 
        Call fs.deletefile(tempDir & "\*.*", True) 
        Set pUrban = pUrbanCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Sub updateGradeFeature(startID As Integer, pBndry As IFeature) 
    Dim myArg As Double, myLenInMiles As Double, myLenInMeters As Double 
    Dim myRate As Double, mySeconds As Double, myFinish As Double 
    Dim pPolyline As IPolyline, pMidPoint As IPoint, pPolygon As IPolygon 
    Dim pCarc As ICircularArc, pEdgePoint As IPoint 
    Dim pTmpPoint1 As IPoint, pTmpPoint2 As IPoint 
    Dim pSegments As ISegmentCollection 
    Dim minElev As Double, maxElev As Double, myMaxLen As Double 
    Dim w As Integer, n As Integer 
    Dim myTempFileName As String, newFile As Boolean, fileExists As Boolean 
    Dim pNewFeatClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pNewFeatCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pNewFeat As IFeature 
     
    Set pMidPoint = New Point 
    Set pEdgePoint = New Point 
    Set pPolyline = New Polyline 
    Set pPolygon = New Polygon 
    Set pCarc = New CircularArc 
    Set pSegments = New Polygon 
    If f Mod 25 = 0 And f > 0 Then 
        mySeconds = (CDbl(Now) - myTime) * 24 * 60 * 60 
        myRate = f / mySeconds 
        myFinish = (tc - f) * (1 / myRate) * (1 / 60) * (1 / 60) 
        Debug.Print "Wrote " & f & " of " & tc & " records since " & Format(myTime, "m/dd h:mm ampm") & "." & Chr(10) & _ 
            "Rate: " & Format(myRate, "0.000") & " rec/sec. " & _ 
            "Approximate finish: " & Int(myFinish) & " hours " & Int((myFinish - Int(myFinish)) * 60) & " minutes." & Chr(10) & _ 
            "Working on: " & pUrban.Value(4) & "." & Chr(10) & _ 
            startID & "/" & endID & " " & g & "/" & gc & " at " & Format(Now, "m/dd h:mm:ss ampm") & "." & _ 
            Chr(10) & String(72, "-") 
    End If 
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    f = f + 1 
    g = g + 1 
     
    Set pPolyline = pBndry.Shape 
    pMidPoint.x = (pPolyline.FromPoint.x + pPolyline.ToPoint.x) / 2 
    pMidPoint.y = (pPolyline.FromPoint.y + pPolyline.ToPoint.y) / 2 
    pEdgePoint.x = pMidPoint.x 
    pEdgePoint.y = pMidPoint.y + 0.005 
             
    Call pCarc.PutCoords(pMidPoint, pEdgePoint, pEdgePoint, esriArcMajor) 
    Call pSegments.AddSegment(pCarc) 
    Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pSegments 
             
    Set pTmpPoint1 = pCarc.Envelope.LowerLeft 
    Set pTmpPoint2 = pCarc.Envelope.LowerRight 
    myArg = Sin(pTmpPoint2.y / 57.2958) * Sin(pTmpPoint1.y / 57.2958) + Cos(pTmpPoint2.y / 57.2958) * Cos(pTmpPoint1.y / 57.2958) * Cos(pTmpPoint2.x 
/ 57.2958 - pTmpPoint1.x / 57.2958) 
    myLenInMiles = 3963 * (Atn(-myArg / Sqr(-myArg * myArg + 1)) + 2 * Atn(1)) 
    myLenInMeters = myLenInMiles * 1609.344 
    myMaxLen = Abs(myLenInMeters) 
             
    minElev = 10000 
    maxElev = -10000 
    For w = Int(pCarc.Envelope.XMin) To Int(pCarc.Envelope.XMax) 
        For n = Int(pCarc.Envelope.YMin) To Int(pCarc.Envelope.YMax) 
            myFileName = "u" & startID & "w" & Abs(w) & "n" & Abs(n) 
            If Not myFileName = myTempFileName Then 
                If fs.fileExists(tempDir & "\" & myFileName & ".shp") Then 
                    Set pNewFeatClass = pFeatWks.OpenFeatureClass(myFileName) 
                    fileExists = True 
                Else 
                    fileExists = False 
                End If 
                myTempFileName = myFileName 
            End If 
            If fileExists Then 
                Set pNewFeatCursor = pNewFeatClass.Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
                Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                Do Until pNewFeat Is Nothing 
                    If pNewFeat.Value(3) < minElev Then minElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                    If pNewFeat.Value(3) > maxElev Then maxElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                    Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                Loop 
            End If 
        Next 
    Next 
             
    If minElev = 10000 Or maxElev = -10000 Then 
        maxElev = 0 
        minElev = 0 
    End If 
    pBndry.Value(12) = (maxElev - minElev) / myMaxLen 
    Call pBndry.Store 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code Used to Create the Intersection of 1990 and 2000 Census Urban Areas 
Option Explicit 
Sub combine1990UAs() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pTopoOp1 As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim pTopoOp2 As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim foundOne As Boolean 
     
    Dim pRawUALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pRawUAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pRawUACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pRawUA As IFeature 
     
    Dim pMSALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pMSAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pMSACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pMSA As IFeature 
     
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelContains 
    End With 
    Set pRawUALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(4) 
    Set pRawUAClass = pRawUALayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pMSALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(5) 
    Set pMSAClass = pMSALayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutputLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(6) 
    Set pOutputClass = pOutputLayer.FeatureClass 
    If pOutputLayer.Name <> "Combined1990UAs" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pOutputCursor = pOutputClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pOutput Is Nothing 
        Call pOutput.Delete 
        Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
     
    Set pMSACursor = pMSAClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pMSA Is Nothing 
        Debug.Print pMSA.Value(0) 
        Set pTopoOp1 = pMSA.Shape 
        Set pTopoOp1 = pTopoOp1.Buffer(0.1) 
        Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pTopoOp1 
        Set pTopoOp2 = New Polygon 
        foundOne = False 
        Set pRawUACursor = pRawUAClass.Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
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        Set pRawUA = pRawUACursor.NextFeature 
        Do Until pRawUA Is Nothing 
            foundOne = True 
            Set pTopoOp2 = pTopoOp2.Union(pRawUA.Shape) 
            Set pRawUA = pRawUACursor.NextFeature 
        Loop 
        If foundOne Then 
            Set pOutput = pOutputClass.CreateFeature 
            Set pOutput.Shape = pTopoOp2 
            pOutput.Value(2) = pMSA.Value(0) 
            pOutput.Value(3) = pMSA.Value(2) 
            pOutput.Value(4) = pMSA.Value(3) 
            pOutput.Value(5) = Mid(pMSA.Value(3), InStr(pMSA.Value(3), ",") + 2, 2) 
            Call pOutput.Store 
        End If 
        Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Sub intersectUrbanAreas() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pInputLayer(1) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pInputClass(1) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pInputCursor(1) As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pInput(1) As IFeature 
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim x As Integer 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pOutputLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    Set pOutputClass = pOutputLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutputCursor = pOutputLayer.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pOutput Is Nothing 
        Call pOutput.Delete 
        Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
    Set pInputLayer(0) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(2) 
    Set pInputLayer(1) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pInputClass(0) = pInputLayer(0).FeatureClass 
    Set pInputClass(1) = pInputLayer(1).FeatureClass 
    Set pInputCursor(0) = pInputClass(0).Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pInput(0) = pInputCursor(0).NextFeature 
    Do Until pInput(0) Is Nothing 
        Debug.Print pInput(0).Value(0) 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE = '" & pInput(0).Value(3) & "'" 
        Set pInputCursor(1) = pInputClass(1).Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pInput(1) = pInputCursor(1).NextFeature 
        If Not pInput(1) Is Nothing Then 
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            Set pTopoOp = pInput(1).Shape 
            Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Intersect(pInput(0).Shape, esriGeometry2Dimension) 
            Set pOutput = pOutputClass.CreateFeature 
            Set pOutput.Shape = pTopoOp 
            For x = 2 To 5 
                pOutput.Value(x) = pInput(0).Value(x) 
            Next 
            Call pOutput.Store 
        End If 
        Set pInput(0) = pInputCursor(0).NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code Used to Collect Geographic properties of PUMAs 
Option Explicit 
Sub combine1990UAs() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pTopoOp1 As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim pTopoOp2 As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter 
    Dim foundOne As Boolean 
     
    Dim pRawUALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pRawUAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pRawUACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pRawUA As IFeature 
     
    Dim pMSALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pMSAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pMSACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pMSA As IFeature 
     
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelContains 
    End With 
    Set pRawUALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(4) 
    Set pRawUAClass = pRawUALayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pMSALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(5) 
    Set pMSAClass = pMSALayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutputLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(6) 
    Set pOutputClass = pOutputLayer.FeatureClass 
    If pOutputLayer.Name <> "Combined1990UAs" Then Exit Sub 
    Set pOutputCursor = pOutputClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pOutput Is Nothing 
        Call pOutput.Delete 
        Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
     
    Set pMSACursor = pMSAClass.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pMSA Is Nothing 
        Debug.Print pMSA.Value(0) 
        Set pTopoOp1 = pMSA.Shape 
        Set pTopoOp1 = pTopoOp1.Buffer(0.1) 
        Set pSpatialFilter.Geometry = pTopoOp1 
        Set pTopoOp2 = New Polygon 
        foundOne = False 
        Set pRawUACursor = pRawUAClass.Search(pSpatialFilter, False) 
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        Set pRawUA = pRawUACursor.NextFeature 
        Do Until pRawUA Is Nothing 
            foundOne = True 
            Set pTopoOp2 = pTopoOp2.Union(pRawUA.Shape) 
            Set pRawUA = pRawUACursor.NextFeature 
        Loop 
        If foundOne Then 
            Set pOutput = pOutputClass.CreateFeature 
            Set pOutput.Shape = pTopoOp2 
            pOutput.Value(2) = pMSA.Value(0) 
            pOutput.Value(3) = pMSA.Value(2) 
            pOutput.Value(4) = pMSA.Value(3) 
            pOutput.Value(5) = Mid(pMSA.Value(3), InStr(pMSA.Value(3), ",") + 2, 2) 
            Call pOutput.Store 
        End If 
        Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
 
Sub intersectUrbanAreas() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pInputLayer(1) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pInputClass(1) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pInputCursor(1) As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pInput(1) As IFeature 
    Dim pOutputLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pOutputClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pOutputCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pOutput As IFeature 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pTopoOp As ITopologicalOperator 
    Dim x As Integer 
     
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
    Set pOutputLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(1) 
    Set pOutputClass = pOutputLayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pOutputCursor = pOutputLayer.Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Do Until pOutput Is Nothing 
        Call pOutput.Delete 
        Set pOutput = pOutputCursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
    Set pInputLayer(0) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(2) 
    Set pInputLayer(1) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pInputClass(0) = pInputLayer(0).FeatureClass 
    Set pInputClass(1) = pInputLayer(1).FeatureClass 
    Set pInputCursor(0) = pInputClass(0).Search(Nothing, False) 
    Set pInput(0) = pInputCursor(0).NextFeature 
    Do Until pInput(0) Is Nothing 
        Debug.Print pInput(0).Value(0) 
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA_CODE = '" & pInput(0).Value(3) & "'" 
        Set pInputCursor(1) = pInputClass(1).Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pInput(1) = pInputCursor(1).NextFeature 
        If Not pInput(1) Is Nothing Then 
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            Set pTopoOp = pInput(1).Shape 
            Set pTopoOp = pTopoOp.Intersect(pInput(0).Shape, esriGeometry2Dimension) 
            Set pOutput = pOutputClass.CreateFeature 
            Set pOutput.Shape = pTopoOp 
            For x = 2 To 5 
                pOutput.Value(x) = pInput(0).Value(x) 
            Next 
            Call pOutput.Store 
        End If 
        Set pInput(0) = pInputCursor(0).NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
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Visual Basic Code used to Determine the Minimum and Maximum Elevation Within a PUMA 
Sub updatePUMAHeights() 
    Dim pMxDoc As IMxDocument 
    Dim pQueryFilter As IQueryFilter 
    Dim pSpatialFilter As ISpatialFilter, pSpatialFilter1 As ISpatialFilter, pSpatialFilter2 As ISpatialFilter 
     
    Dim pMSALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pMSAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pMSACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pMSA As IFeature 
     
    Dim pPUMALayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pPUMAClass As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pPUMACursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pPUMA As IFeature 
         
    Dim pCircleLayer(1) As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pCircleClass(1) As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pCircleCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pCircle As IFeature 
         
    Dim pRasLyr As IRasterLayer 
    Dim pRasClass 
    Dim pConversionOp As IConversionOp 
    Dim pWSF As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim pWS As IWorkspace 
    Dim pFWS As IFeatureWorkspace 
    Dim pFeatWks As IFeatureWorkspace 
    Dim pFClassOut As IGeoDataset 
    Dim sOutFCname As String, msaName As String 
    Dim pShpWksFact As IWorkspaceFactory 
    Dim pPoint As IPoint 
    Dim pEnvelope As IEnvelope 
    Dim pSegments As ISegmentCollection 
    Dim pArea As IArea 
    Dim pTmpPoint1 As IPoint, pTmpPoint2 As IPoint 
     
    Dim x As Integer, y As Integer, x1 As Integer, x2 As Integer, y1 As Integer, y2 As Integer 
    Dim f As Double 
    Dim skipSquare As Boolean 
    Dim xCoord As Double, yCoord As Double, xStep As Integer, yStep As Integer 
    Dim myArea As String, myDir As String, myFile As String, myFileName As String 
    Dim myArg As Double, myLenInMiles As Double, myLenInMeters As Double, myMaxLen As Double 
    Dim minElev As Double, maxElev As Double 
    Dim startID As Integer, classIndex As Integer 
    Dim fs As Object 
     
    Dim w As Integer, n As Integer 
    Dim myTempFileName As String, newFile As Boolean, fileExists As Boolean 
    Dim pNewFeatClass() As IFeatureClass 
    Dim pNewFeatCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pNewFeat As IFeature 
     
    Dim pMtnClass As IFeatureClass 
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    Dim pMtnLayer As IFeatureLayer 
    Dim pMtnCursor As IFeatureCursor 
    Dim pMtn As IFeature 
     
    Dim mTotal As Integer, mCount As Integer, pTotal As Integer, pCount As Integer 
    Dim myStartTime As Double 
     
    myStartTime = Now 
    Set pMxDoc = ThisDocument 
    Set pWSF = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
    Set pFWS = pWSF.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
    Set pShpWksFact = New ShapefileWorkspaceFactory 
    Set pFeatWks = pShpWksFact.OpenFromFile(tempDir, 0) 
     
    Set pConversionOp = New RasterConversionOp 
    Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") 
    Set pQueryFilter = New QueryFilter 
     
    Set pSpatialFilter = New SpatialFilter 
    Set pSpatialFilter1 = New SpatialFilter 
    Set pSpatialFilter2 = New SpatialFilter 
     
    With pSpatialFilter 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    Set pSpatialFilter1 = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter1 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    Set pSpatialFilter2 = New SpatialFilter 
    With pSpatialFilter2 
        .GeometryField = "Shape" 
        .SpatialRel = esriSpatialRelIntersects 
    End With 
     
    Set pPUMALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(0) 
    Set pPUMAClass = pPUMALayer.FeatureClass 
    Set pMtnLayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(2) 
    Set pMtnClass = pMtnLayer.FeatureClass 
    'pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "PUMAID <> 0" 
    'Set pMtnCursor = pMtnClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    'Set pMtn = pMtnCursor.NextFeature 
    'Do Until pMtn Is Nothing 
    '    Call pMtn.Delete 
    '    Set pMtn = pMtnCursor.NextFeature 
    'Loop 
    For x = 0 To 1 
        Set pCircleLayer(x) = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(4 + x) 
        Set pCircleClass(x) = pCircleLayer(x).FeatureClass 
    Next 
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    Set pMSALayer = pMxDoc.FocusMap.Layer(3) 
    Set pMSAClass = pMSALayer.FeatureClass 
    pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "FID >= 0" 
    mTotal = pMSAClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
    mCount = 0 
    Set pMSACursor = pMSAClass.Search(pQueryFilter, False) 
    Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Set pPoint = New Point 
    Do Until pMSA Is Nothing 
        mCount = mCount + 1 
        'Identify the geographic extent of the urban area 
        x1 = Int(pMSA.Shape.Envelope.XMin) 
        x2 = Int(pMSA.Shape.Envelope.XMax) 
        y1 = Int(pMSA.Shape.Envelope.YMin) 
        y2 = Int(pMSA.Shape.Envelope.YMax) 
        If x2 > x1 Then xStep = 1 Else xStep = -1 
        If y2 > y1 Then yStep = 1 Else yStep = -1 
         
        'Identify the rasters that touch the urban area and convert them to polygons for querying 
        classIndex = 0 
        For xCoord = x1 To x2 Step xStep 
            For yCoord = y1 To y2 Step yStep 
                If Int(Abs(yCoord)) < 42 Then myArea = "area02" Else myArea = "area01" 
                myDir = "w" & Format(Int(Abs(xCoord)), "000") 
                myFile = "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".dt1" 
                myFileName = "C:\ESRI\ESRIDATA\" & myArea & "\dted\" & myDir & "\" & myFile 
                If fs.fileExists(myFileName) Then 
                    Set pRasLyr = New RasterLayer 
                    pRasLyr.CreateFromFilePath myFileName 
                    sOutFCname = "p" & pMSA.Value(0) & "w" & Int(Abs(xCoord)) & "n" & Int(Abs(yCoord)) & ".shp" 
                    If Not fs.fileExists(tempDir & "\" & sOutFCname) Then 
                        Call pConversionOp.RasterDataToPolygonFeatureData(pRasLyr.Raster, pWS, sOutFCname, True) 
                    End If 
                    ReDim Preserve pNewFeatClass(classIndex) As IFeatureClass 
                    Set pNewFeatClass(classIndex) = pFWS.OpenFeatureClass(sOutFCname) 
                    classIndex = classIndex + 1 
                End If 
            Next 
        Next 
         
        pQueryFilter.WhereClause = "CBSA = '" & pMSA.Value(2) & "'" 
        pTotal = pPUMAClass.featureCount(pQueryFilter) 
        pCount = 0 
        Set pPUMACursor = pPUMAClass.Update(pQueryFilter, False) 
        Set pPUMA = pPUMACursor.NextFeature 
        Do Until pPUMA Is Nothing 
            pCount = pCount + 1 
            msaName = Left(pMSA.Value(3), InStr(pMSA.Value(3), ",") + 3) 
            Debug.Print mCount & "/" & mTotal & " " & pCount & "/" & pTotal & " " & msaName 
            Debug.Print "Bgn: " & Format(myStartTime, "m/dd h:mm:ss ampm") 
            Debug.Print "Now: " & Format(Now, "m/dd h:mm:ss ampm") 
            Debug.Print "End: " & Format((mTotal - mCount) * ((CDbl(Now) - myStartTime) / mCount) * 24, "#0.0") & " Hours" 
            Debug.Print String(72, "-") 
            Set pSpatialFilter2.Geometry = pPUMA.Shape 
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            minElev = 10000 
            maxElev = -10000 
            For x = 0 To classIndex - 1 
                Set pNewFeatCursor = pNewFeatClass(x).Search(pSpatialFilter2, False) 
                Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                Do Until pNewFeat Is Nothing 
                    If pNewFeat.Value(3) < minElev Then minElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                    If pNewFeat.Value(3) > maxElev Then maxElev = pNewFeat.Value(3) 
                    Set pNewFeat = pNewFeatCursor.NextFeature 
                Loop 
            Next 
            If minElev = 10000 Then minElev = 0 
            If maxElev = -10000 Then maxElev = 0 
            pPUMA.Value(21) = maxElev 
            pPUMA.Value(22) = minElev 
            Call pPUMA.Store 
            Set pPUMA = pPUMACursor.NextFeature 
        Loop 
        Call fs.deletefile(tempDir & "\*.*", True) 
        Set pMSA = pMSACursor.NextFeature 
    Loop 
End Sub 
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Correlations Between Quality of Life Indexes and Home Price Measures and Exogenous Region Percentages 
Table 30: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Roback’s (1982) QOL Rankings 
 QOL 3 Rankings 
Inner and Outer 
Bounds Outer Bounds Only 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 
Los Angeles 1.7517 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
San Francisco 1.5841 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
Dallas 1.3378 17.28% 13.73% 2.90% 0.68%
Baltimore 1.0244 55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74%
St. Louis 0.9407 18.15% 19.03% 7.09% 6.54%
Milwaukee 0.9386 17.79% 30.44% 27.69% 28.95%
Boston 0.9296 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
Minneapolis 0.9047 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
New York 0.8962 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14%
Washington 0.8910 38.37% 30.18% 9.08% 5.38%
Philadelphia 0.8038 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Houston 0.7708 13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13%
Chicago 0.7416 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Detroit 0.6347 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Cleveland 0.6227 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Seattle 0.5871 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Pittsburgh 0.4961 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
Correlation  0.4295 0.3574 0.2454 0.0031
t-statistic  1.8421* 1.4819 0.9805 0.0123
r-squared  0.1845 0.1277 0.0602 0.0000
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 31: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Gyourko and Tracy’s (1991) QOL Rankings 
 
Random 
Effects 
Random Effects, 
Group Effects 
Included 
OLS: All 
Fiscal 
Variables 
OLS: No 
Taxes/No 
Union 
Inner and 
Outer Bounds
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-UA
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-25
Pensacola FL 2963 3812 3145 2588 59.83% 62.66% 48.16% 52.76%
Gainesville FL 2819 1019 3115 3026 26.12% 30.36% 15.09% 18.50%
San Diego CA 2574 4474 3586 2971 56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07%
Columbia SC 2459 3792 3556 4135 27.27% 27.91% 4.17% 7.38%
Santa Rosa CA 1955 1024 2443 2309 14.75% 15.16% 30.17% 36.09%
Bridgeport CT 1944 4532 2245 305 29.65% 35.30% 40.62% 41.78%
Tucson AZ 1822 2325 2259 929 38.42% 41.45% 12.32% 28.07%
Shreveport LA 1802 1318 1619 682 20.01% 14.21% 4.64% 6.67%
Lancaster PA 1784 2327 1582 762 6.40% 10.92% 0.20% 6.50%
Modesto CA 1678 517 2053 2141 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 3.73%
Asheville NC 1577 1418 1464 2364 36.68% 39.98% 35.17% 48.74%
New Orleans LA 1565 1170 1818 506 63.87% 59.94% 38.83% 60.83%
Amarillo TX 1475 680 1232 551 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 0.79%
Jacksonville FL 1463 -992 1113 694 54.95% 40.10% 12.94% 17.49%
San Francisco CA 1416 1578 2296 2046 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
San Jose CA 1403 208 1744 1849 60.94% 60.02% 27.32% 50.75%
Lake Charles LA 1388 -1636 1177 588 12.46% 5.41% 3.70% 8.42%
Tyler TX 1175 2773 776 1411 1.15% 2.40% 0.39% 1.74%
Odessa TX 1118 577 960 478 0.00% 0.00% 1.08% 0.35%
Erie PA 1103 2299 1250 -30 23.91% 34.07% 40.33% 47.70%
Phoenix AZ 1097 59 932 993 16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65%
Knoxville TN 1071 -143 1100 811 15.73% 6.61% 5.97% 6.59%
Lafayette LA 930 2615 1164 -290 0.97% 1.45% 0.47% 0.82%
Monroe LA 905 2287 524 82 13.90% 18.22% 0.75% 14.86%
Waco TX 880 2162 870 859 14.07% 10.61% 5.77% 2.98%
Springfield MO 753 2154 151 659 5.53% 3.74% 0.31% 1.48%
Sacramento CA 703 1832 991 753 20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42%
Lubbock TX 690 -1107 796 410 6.56% 9.89% 0.78% 1.30%
Los Angeles CA 605 2941 1804 1604 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
Birmingham AL 590 1201 507 1962 5.01% 8.61% 0.25% 0.84%
Fresno CA 542 604 1446 1668 1.25% 2.09% 0.40% 1.94%
Roanoke VA 518 -378 434 -79 46.53% 49.97% 12.57% 40.01%
Columbia MO 464 4155 -108 844 2.84% 3.54% 0.69% 10.42%
El Paso TX 438 3165 737 810 33.36% 42.05% 50.44% 54.87%
Savannah GA 428 787 294 899 36.62% 33.49% 11.85% 28.42%
Richmond VA 398 -1366* 548 604 10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44%
Topeka KS 383 478 532 450 12.03% 15.83% 0.34% 0.96%
Baton Rouge LA 376 -676 562 -756 16.72% 24.51% 6.55% 7.20%
Albuquerque NM 365 2166 183 -290 24.50% 37.19% 9.30% 25.12%
Memphis TN 325 1014 316 -156 12.21% 8.31% 4.42% 5.38%
Orlando FL 308 420 344 139 34.39% 30.89% 4.84% 4.76%
Fort Wayne IN 303 199 331 -216 13.28% 8.63% 0.34% 0.54%
Evansville IN 286 891 359 348 19.04% 19.50% 7.83% 4.40%
Pittsburgh PA 275 -647 589 -474 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
Fayetteville NC 274 1357 675 206 30.24% 33.31% 8.65% 15.36%
Mobile AL 250 2346 -91 299 16.53% 17.80% 45.08% 31.81%
Wichita KS 246 785 -286 -225 1.69% 0.61% 2.12% 0.70%
Lynchburg VA 241 1548 -211 -30 0.94% 1.15% 3.01% 11.92%
Worcester MA 216 2599 -379 969 34.77% 31.61% 4.99% 8.35%
Austin TX 180 1415 -24 479 9.16% 9.90% 4.11% 3.51%
Lawton OK 178 750 -20 308 34.95% 44.90% 2.62% 19.65%
San Antonio TX 110 3069 173 444 26.64% 22.75% 6.30% 9.37%
Springfield OH 101 1688 -184 -832 12.45% 15.00% 1.57% 2.06%
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Jackson MS 18 1237 -79 477 6.53% 6.69% 0.25% 2.93%
Chattanooga TN -41 430 -202 -540 48.47% 37.66% 20.19% 25.46%
St. Joseph MO -53 2735 -374 523 24.41% 18.10% 8.46% 5.39%
Pueblo CO -89 -861 185 513 14.55% 17.55% 0.86% 26.70%
Manchester NH -100 786 -135 45 27.57% 31.83% 5.70% 7.84%
Terre Haute IN -112 -677 -444 -491 2.88% 4.77% 0.44% 0.18%
Bakersfield CA -120 -1546 341 654 12.79% 0.00% 1.30% 6.10%
Macon GA -140 463 -562 259 12.37% 12.09% 0.68% 6.05%
Charleston WV -158 1370 177 -466 48.73% 50.72% 34.73% 48.65%
Decatur IL -161 -1161 -635 -207 24.89% 16.17% 7.46% 1.53%
Colorado Springs CO -165 384 -147 -605 47.09% 47.66% 10.68% 33.11%
Lincoln NE -185 1768 -638 -674 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 1.76%
Altoona PA -187 1396 -963 -700 15.74% 18.13% 28.06% 44.68%
Huntsville AL -199 1732 -926 -411 24.01% 23.23% 22.92% 20.46%
Anderson IN -234 -2951 -268 170 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.12%
Oklahoma City OK -257 769 -384 -98 5.19% 3.28% 1.68% 2.82%
Billings MT -285 -1649 -1375 -1361 34.31% 35.20% 7.46% 12.74%
Syracuse NY -301 1062 -188 -478 21.34% 25.28% 5.40% 13.08%
Columbus GA -305 808 -1135 223 29.52% 35.96% 11.13% 28.54%
Buffalo NY -314 -901 -287 86 27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49%
Canton OH -340 274 -296 -472 17.43% 13.58% 0.28% 1.45%
Omaha NE -379 -1051 -700 -283 16.42% 21.27% 1.73% 5.04%
Springfield IL -409 747 -566 -551 34.62% 21.18% 5.37% 1.79%
Miami FL -445 1439 411 -86 66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58%
South Bend IN -468 -1079 -649 -1116 1.37% 2.28% 0.23% 1.17%
Salem OR -488 -2898 -1070 -260 15.77% 10.99% 5.34% 9.77%
Tulsa OK -496 -31 -548 -792 5.06% 1.90% 0.43% 0.27%
Portland ME -498 1659 -597 15 40.93% 46.10% 21.39% 38.68%
Akron OH -520 173 -302 -1036 32.19% 33.64% 8.56% 8.89%
Harrisburg PA -537 -1408 -904 253 23.33% 19.73% 21.35% 25.42%
Cedar Rapids IA -544 363 -823 -659 4.46% 0.00% 0.38% 5.99%
Cincinnati OH -544 759 68 -426 21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52%
Indianapolis IN -600 -2147 -983 -935 9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87%
Reno NV -639 -2186 -816 315* 67.57% 70.62% 30.07% 62.42%
Sioux City IA -675 -653 -656 -582 44.45% 33.99% 7.27% 4.56%
Dayton OH -699 -536 -484 -863 19.01% 19.46% 2.42% 2.47%
Des Moines IA -700 -50 -884 -707 16.79% 13.45% 4.02% 6.60%
Trenton NJ -715 415 -1698 -68 34.96% 32.37% 5.11% 3.33%
Philadelphia PA -736 -1991 -1043 -1343 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Louisville KY -794 -2248 -433 -264 18.22% 16.80% 7.65% 7.85%
Columbus OH -811 -899 -514 -1756 12.66% 14.94% 0.72% 1.87%
Seattle WA -816 -58 -248 -690 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Rochester NY -842 -2607 -495 -298 7.77% 17.33% 14.31% 20.20%
Mansfield OH -965 934 -920 -2443 1.52% 1.37% 0.39% 1.88%
Boise ID -972 5117 -822 -596 23.75% 35.74% 35.53% 47.88%
Toledo OH -1013 -647 -761 -1974 30.34% 18.25% 3.48% 8.74%
Boston MA -1067 512 -764 -908 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
Minneapolis MN -1147 1082 -520 -1987 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
Chicago IL -1209 -1337 -1334 -1486 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Tuscaloosa AL -1259 -879 -1981 -475 4.54% 5.61% 0.62% 6.47%
Muncie IN -1373 -3290 -2021 -2122 0.00% 0.00% 0.43% 1.08%
Ann Arbor MI -1450 -376 -2215 7 5.68% 4.88% 0.24% 0.79%
Cleveland OH -1492 -1218 -851 -1833 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Rockford IL -1532 -431 -1955 -1845 32.41% 37.11% 2.03% 1.87%
Peoria IL -1634 -3052 -1937 -1396 14.79% 14.59% 8.47% 4.45%
Spokane WA -1815 -273 -1544 -1623 16.49% 21.00% 9.47% 18.15%
Portland OR -1874 388 -1640 -1890 32.92% 24.39% 12.13% 12.30%
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Kansas City MO -1900 -2523 -1634 -1600 12.61% 7.13% 2.22% 2.24%
Atlanta GA -1916 -1980 -1489 -1939 14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36%
Hartford CT -1931 0 -1631 -2839 27.56% 26.57% 3.99% 4.85%
Baltimore MD -1934 -1843 -1530 -1524 55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74%
Las Vegas NV -2832 -4198 -2125 -2637 57.70% 63.69% 8.53% 27.78%
Grand Rapids MI -2947 -865 -3908 -1991 10.65% 7.40% 0.28% 0.97%
Saginaw MI -3668 -5273 -3939 -1881 15.96% 10.93% 9.69% 6.18%
Detroit MI -4153 -5273 -4188 -2544 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Flint MI -4241 -3537 -4893 -2917 3.63% 5.08% 0.18% 1.62%
Correlation w/Random Effects 1.0000 0.6497 0.9537 0.8569 0.0504 0.0749 0.1581 0.1914
Correlation w/Random Effects, 
Group Effects Included  1.0000 0.6278 0.5596 0.0904 0.1437 0.2450 0.2224
Correlation w/OLS: All Fiscal 
Variables   1.0000 0.8353 0.1597 0.1859 0.2487 0.2492
Correlation w/OLS: No Taxes/No 
Union    1.0000 0.0866 0.1221 0.2133 0.2234
 
* Richmond, VA’s “Random Effects, Group Effects Included” index and Reno, NV’s “OLS: No Taxes/No Union” index are incorrectly reported in the published paper 
– the city indexes are not consistent with the city rankings.  To make the rankings consistent with the indexes for these two cities, we have multiplied the published 
indexes by -1.
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Table 32: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Gyourko and Tracy’s (1982) QOL Rankings,       
Most Populated (1 million +)  MSAs Only 
 
Random 
Effects 
Random Effects, 
Group Effects 
Included 
OLS: All 
Fiscal 
Variables 
OLS: No 
Taxes/No 
Union 
Inner and 
Outer Bounds
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-UA
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-25
San Diego CA 2574 4474 3586 2971 56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07%
New Orleans LA 1565 1170 1818 506 63.87% 59.94% 38.83% 60.83%
Jacksonville FL 1463 -992 1113 694 54.95% 40.10% 12.94% 17.49%
San Francisco CA 1416 1578 2296 2046 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
San Jose CA 1403 208 1744 1849 60.94% 60.02% 27.32% 50.75%
Phoenix AZ 1097 59 932 993 16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65%
Sacramento CA 703 1832 991 753 20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42%
Los Angeles CA 605 2941 1804 1604 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
Birmingham AL 590 1201 507 1962 5.01% 8.61% 0.25% 0.84%
Richmond VA 398 -1366 548 604 10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44%
Memphis TN 325 1014 316 -156 12.21% 8.31% 4.42% 5.38%
Orlando FL 308 420 344 139 34.39% 30.89% 4.84% 4.76%
Pittsburgh PA 275 -647 589 -474 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
Austin TX 180 1415 -24 479 9.16% 9.90% 4.11% 3.51%
San Antonio TX 110 3069 173 444 26.64% 22.75% 6.30% 9.37%
Oklahoma City OK -257 769 -384 -98 5.19% 3.28% 1.68% 2.82%
Buffalo NY -314 -901 -287 86 27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49%
Miami FL -445 1439 411 -86 66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58%
Cincinnati OH -544 759 68 -426 21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52%
Indianapolis IN -600 -2147 -983 -935 9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87%
Philadelphia PA -736 -1991 -1043 -1343 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Louisville KY -794 -2248 -433 -264 18.22% 16.80% 7.65% 7.85%
Columbus OH -811 -899 -514 -1756 12.66% 14.94% 0.72% 1.87%
Seattle WA -816 -58 -248 -690 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Rochester NY -842 -2607 -495 -298 7.77% 17.33% 14.31% 20.20%
Boston MA -1067 512 -764 -908 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
Minneapolis MN -1147 1082 -520 -1987 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
Chicago IL -1209 -1337 -1334 -1486 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Cleveland OH -1492 -1218 -851 -1833 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Portland OR -1874 388 -1640 -1890 32.92% 24.39% 12.13% 12.30%
Kansas City MO -1900 -2523 -1634 -1600 12.61% 7.13% 2.22% 2.24%
Atlanta GA -1916 -1980 -1489 -1939 14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36%
Hartford CT -1931 0 -1631 -2839 27.56% 26.57% 3.99% 4.85%
Baltimore MD -1934 -1843 -1530 -1524 55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74%
Las Vegas NV -2832 -4198 -2125 -2637 57.70% 63.69% 8.53% 27.78%
Detroit MI -4153 -5273 -4188 -2544 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Correlation w/Random Effects 1.0000 0.7134 0.9635 0.9054 0.1248 0.1116 0.1579 0.1735
Correlation w/Random Effects, 
Group Effects Included  1.0000 0.7646 0.6643 0.1974 0.1682 0.1971 0.0784
Correlation w/OLS: All Fiscal 
Variables   1.0000 0.8958 0.2590 0.2588 0.2796 0.2600
Correlation w/OLS: No Taxes/No 
Union    1.0000 0.1452 0.1919 0.2747 0.2329
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Table 33: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Kahn’s (1995) QOL Rankings 
 From Kahn (1995)     
 
1980 Pct 
Worse Off 
1980 
Median 
Worse Off 
1990 Pct 
Worse Off 
1990 
Median 
Worse Off 
Inner and 
Outer 
Bounds 
Outer 
Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-
UA 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-25
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI  37 242 38 295 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  44 228 49 310 13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  17.5 -68 15 -17 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA  18.6 36 23 264 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  17.2 110 10 -41 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
Correlation w/1980 Pct Worse Off 1.0000 0.8477 0.9675 0.7487 -0.9156 -0.9775 -0.6235 -0.3030
Correlation w/1980 Median Worse Off  1.0000 0.7626 0.6457 -0.5848 -0.7209 -0.2081 0.2222
Correlation w/1990 Pct Worse Off  1.0000 0.8695 -0.9632 -0.9582 -0.7455 -0.4402
Correlation w/1990 Median Worse Off    1.0000 -0.7768 -0.6949 -0.6164 -0.3142
 
Figure 16: Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Kahn's QOL Measures 
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Table 34: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and the U.S. Government's 2008 Locality Pay 
Adjustments 
 2008 Pct Pay Adjustment 
Inner and Outer 
Bounds 
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 
Atlanta  17.30% 14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36%
Boston  22.51% 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
Buffalo  15.37% 27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49%
Chicago  23.16% 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Cincinnati  17.77% 21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52%
Cleveland  17.11% 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Columbus  15.80% 29.52% 35.96% 11.13% 28.54%
Dallas  18.74% 17.28% 13.73% 2.90% 0.68%
Dayton  15.26% 19.01% 19.46% 2.42% 2.47%
Denver  21.03% 26.92% 27.80% 8.48% 9.50%
Detroit  22.53% 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Hartford  23.97% 27.56% 26.57% 3.99% 4.85%
Houston  27.39% 13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13%
Huntsville  14.23% 24.01% 23.23% 22.92% 20.46%
Indianapolis  13.51% 9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87%
Los Angeles  25.26% 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
Miami  19.11% 66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58%
Milwaukee  16.73% 17.79% 30.44% 27.69% 28.95%
Minneapolis  19.43% 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
New York  26.36% 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14%
Philadelphia  20.14% 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Phoenix  14.74% 16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65%
Pittsburgh  14.93% 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
Portland  18.72% 40.93% 46.10% 21.39% 38.68%
Raleigh  16.82% 19.52% 11.87% 5.41% 6.03%
Richmond  15.40% 10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44%
Sacramento  20.25% 20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42%
San Diego  22.00% 56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07%
San Francisco  32.53% 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
Seattle  19.75% 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Washington 20.89% 38.37% 30.18% 9.08% 5.38%
correlation  0.6173 0.5624 0.4751 0.3442
t-statistic 4.2253**** 3.6627**** 2.9071*** 1.9743*
r-squared 0.3810 0.3163 0.2257 0.1185
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Table 35: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and the Median Multiple (Median Home Value ÷ Median 
Income) 
 
2006 ACS 
Median Income
2006 ACS 
Median Home 
Value 
2006 Median 
Multiple 
Inner and 
Outer Bounds
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-UA
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-25 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA $55,516 $604,500 10.8888 52.69% 58.33% 7.22% 36.27%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA $70,463 $702,600 9.9712 72.24% 69.38% 61.47% 63.04%
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA $59,591 $572,000 9.5988 56.27% 65.81% 48.07% 52.28%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA $80,638 $740,500 9.1830 60.94% 60.02% 50.75% 27.32%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY- $59,281 $458,700 7.7377 52.22% 64.36% 22.14% 31.44%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA $56,953 $424,600 7.4553 20.00% 19.74% 6.42% 5.94%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA $53,243 $395,400 7.4263 27.95% 35.70% 16.91% 20.67%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL $46,637 $312,500 6.7007 66.82% 80.05% 43.58% 51.25%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH $64,144 $404,200 6.3014 60.55% 57.85% 20.03% 21.63%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV $53,536 $320,800 5.9922 57.70% 63.69% 27.78% 8.53%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA $51,797 $309,300 5.9714 46.77% 48.18% 9.64% 9.75%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD- $78,978 $454,100 5.7497 38.37% 30.18% 5.38% 9.08%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA $60,663 $347,500 5.7284 44.69% 49.63% 36.27% 32.21%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ $51,862 $266,300 5.1348 16.04% 20.28% 3.65% 3.98%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA $52,480 $268,600 5.1181 32.92% 24.39% 12.30% 12.13%
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL $48,934 $243,100 4.9679 34.39% 30.89% 4.76% 4.84%
Baltimore-Towson, MD $61,010 $300,600 4.9271 55.71% 46.05% 9.74% 12.45%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL $43,742 $202,300 4.6248 55.56% 56.15% 26.76% 26.10%
Denver-Aurora, CO $54,994 $245,200 4.4587 26.92% 27.80% 9.50% 8.48%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI $57,008 $251,700 4.4152 36.88% 36.15% 44.17% 46.01%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC $52,976 $225,000 4.2472 55.23% 60.10% 42.44% 41.34%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD $55,593 $230,300 4.1426 24.94% 24.42% 3.78% 3.91%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT $61,753 $246,900 3.9982 27.56% 26.57% 4.85% 3.99%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI $50,270 $197,300 3.9248 17.79% 30.44% 28.95% 27.69%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI $62,223 $242,100 3.8908 38.85% 18.19% 1.33% 2.85%
Jacksonville, FL $49,736 $192,800 3.8765 54.95% 40.10% 17.49% 12.94%
Richmond, VA $53,416 $203,400 3.8078 10.30% 9.66% 2.44% 1.92%
Salt Lake City, UT $53,587 $203,300 3.7938 31.32% 39.86% 41.34% 30.31%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA $46,459 $170,200 3.6634 63.87% 59.94% 60.83% 38.83%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA $55,552 $186,800 3.3626 14.10% 10.17% 0.36% 0.83%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI $52,004 $173,400 3.3344 36.72% 46.76% 39.71% 42.80%
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN $47,699 $158,900 3.3313 19.39% 12.99% 3.35% 3.14%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH $45,925 $149,600 3.2575 41.81% 46.33% 37.49% 38.31%
Columbus, OH $49,920 $162,100 3.2472 12.66% 14.94% 1.87% 0.72%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC $50,367 $157,600 3.1290 12.15% 10.43% 3.10% 3.50%
Austin-Round Rock, TX $52,882 $164,100 3.1031 9.16% 9.90% 3.51% 4.11%
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN $45,115 $139,000 3.0810 18.22% 16.80% 7.85% 7.65%
St. Louis, MO-IL $49,765 $152,300 3.0604 18.15% 19.03% 6.54% 7.09%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN $50,306 $152,100 3.0235 21.03% 15.72% 2.52% 2.57%
Memphis, TN-MS-AR $42,092 $125,600 2.9839 12.21% 8.31% 5.38% 4.42%
Birmingham-Hoover, AL $44,534 $131,400 2.9506 5.01% 8.61% 0.84% 0.25%
Kansas City, MO-KS $52,359 $153,000 2.9221 12.61% 7.13% 2.24% 2.22%
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN $50,841 $140,300 2.7596 9.20% 6.74% 0.87% 0.90%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX $52,001 $141,100 2.7134 17.28% 13.73% 0.68% 2.90%
Oklahoma City, OK $42,036 $109,600 2.6073 5.19% 3.28% 2.82% 1.68%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX $50,250 $129,800 2.5831 13.64% 17.79% 0.13% 1.51%
Pittsburgh, PA $43,260 $111,100 2.5682 6.88% 7.98% 2.19% 2.55%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY $42,831 $105,000 2.4515 27.30% 31.21% 28.49% 28.52%
Rochester, NY $47,749 $116,000 2.4294 7.77% 17.33% 20.20% 14.31%
San Antonio, TX $45,019 $105,600 2.3457 26.64% 22.75% 9.37% 6.30%
correlation  0.6722 0.7002 0.4261 0.5527
t-statistic 6.2896**** 6.7939**** 3.2628*** 4.5948****
r-squared 0.4518 0.4902 0.1815 0.3055
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Figure 17: Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and the Median Multiple 
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Table 36: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Growth in Home Price Index 
 
OFHEO Home 
Price Index - 
1996 
OFHEO Home 
Price Index - 
2006 
Annual Growth 
Rate 
Inner and 
Outer Bounds
Outer Bounds 
Only 
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-UA
Undev. Reg. 
Pct. Area-25 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 101.73 322.98 12.25% 56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07%
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 102.87 324.49 12.17% 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 103.47 321.34 12.00% 27.95% 35.70% 20.67% 16.91%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 103.04 310.25 11.65% 60.94% 60.02% 27.32% 50.75%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 101.10 297.93 11.41% 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 106.75 309.11 11.22% 66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 101.90 290.92 11.06% 20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 107.09 283.68 10.23% 16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 105.74 277.96 10.15% 55.56% 56.15% 26.10% 26.76%
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD- 104.45 272.58 10.07% 38.37% 30.18% 9.08% 5.38%
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 106.44 274.43 9.93% 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY- 104.83 266.33 9.77% 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14%
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 105.40 265.41 9.68% 34.39% 30.89% 4.84% 4.76%
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 105.24 259.37 9.44% 46.77% 48.18% 9.75% 9.64%
Jacksonville, FL 104.26 249.90 9.14% 54.95% 40.10% 12.94% 17.49%
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 105.87 253.63 9.13% 57.70% 63.69% 8.53% 27.78%
Baltimore-Towson, MD 104.71 240.82 8.69% 55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 105.00 237.61 8.51% 55.23% 60.10% 41.34% 42.44%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 103.83 230.89 8.32% 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 106.27 232.63 8.15% 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 104.34 212.54 7.37% 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 110.19 217.22 7.02% 32.92% 24.39% 12.13% 12.30%
Richmond, VA 104.75 202.81 6.83% 10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44%
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 104.90 197.22 6.52% 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 103.73 193.52 6.43% 27.56% 26.57% 3.99% 4.85%
Denver-Aurora, CO 106.69 198.38 6.40% 26.92% 27.80% 8.48% 9.50%
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 107.56 195.32 6.15% 63.87% 59.94% 38.83% 60.83%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 105.32 187.12 5.92% 17.79% 30.44% 27.69% 28.95%
St. Louis, MO-IL 104.34 183.16 5.79% 18.15% 19.03% 7.09% 6.54%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 108.27 189.29 5.75% 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Kansas City, MO-KS 105.18 176.98 5.34% 12.61% 7.13% 2.22% 2.24%
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 106.27 178.77 5.34% 14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 104.29 167.59 4.86% 13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13%
Austin-Round Rock, TX 106.42 169.77 4.78% 9.16% 9.90% 4.11% 3.51%
Salt Lake City, UT 111.44 176.60 4.71% 31.32% 39.86% 30.31% 41.34%
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 108.10 170.70 4.67% 19.39% 12.99% 3.14% 3.35%
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 106.78 167.99 4.64% 5.01% 8.61% 0.25% 0.84%
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 105.48 164.20 4.53% 18.22% 16.80% 7.65% 7.85%
Oklahoma City, OK 105.82 164.46 4.51% 5.19% 3.28% 1.68% 2.82%
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 105.04 157.56 4.14% 17.28% 13.73% 2.90% 0.68%
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 105.33 157.54 4.11% 21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52%
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 106.19 158.60 4.09% 12.15% 10.43% 3.50% 3.10%
Columbus, OH 106.01 156.85 4.00% 12.66% 14.94% 0.72% 1.87%
Pittsburgh, PA 106.16 156.48 3.96% 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
San Antonio, TX 105.97 155.59 3.92% 26.64% 22.75% 6.30% 9.37%
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 105.61 153.67 3.82% 12.21% 8.31% 4.42% 5.38%
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 107.69 152.17 3.52% 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 106.18 145.95 3.23% 9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 106.26 139.64 2.77% 27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49%
Rochester, NY 103.84 134.44 2.62% 7.77% 17.33% 14.31% 20.20%
correlation     0.7041 0.6844 0.4301 0.3352
t-statistic    6.8689**** 6.5035**** 3.3012*** 2.4653***
r-squared    0.4957 0.4684 0.1850 0.1124
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Figure 18: Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Growth in Home Price Index 
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Table 37: Correlation Between Measures of Constraints on Land Supply and Black’s (2002) Concentration of Gay Couples 
 Gay Concentration
Inner and Outer 
Bounds Outer Bounds Only
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-UA 
Undev. Reg. Pct. 
Area-25 
San Francisco 4.95 72.24% 69.38% 63.04% 61.47%
Washington 2.68 38.37% 30.18% 9.08% 5.38%
Austin 2.44 9.16% 9.90% 4.11% 3.51%
San Diego 2.38 56.27% 65.81% 52.28% 48.07%
Seattle 2.21 44.69% 49.63% 32.21% 36.27%
Los Angeles 2.11 52.69% 58.33% 36.27% 7.22%
Atlanta 1.96 14.10% 10.17% 0.83% 0.36%
Sacramento 1.71 20.00% 19.74% 5.94% 6.42%
Boston 1.67 60.55% 57.85% 21.63% 20.03%
Minneapolis 1.61 38.85% 18.19% 2.85% 1.33%
Orlando 1.61 34.39% 30.89% 4.84% 4.76%
Denver 1.53 26.92% 27.80% 8.48% 9.50%
New York 1.49 52.22% 64.36% 31.44% 22.14%
Miami 1.46 66.82% 80.05% 51.25% 43.58%
Portland 1.45 40.93% 46.10% 21.39% 38.68%
Houston 1.33 13.64% 17.79% 1.51% 0.13%
Dallas 1.32 17.28% 13.73% 2.90% 0.68%
Chicago 1.31 36.88% 36.15% 46.01% 44.17%
Indianapolis 1.12 9.20% 6.74% 0.90% 0.87%
New Orleans 1.12 63.87% 59.94% 38.83% 60.83%
Phoenix 1.07 16.04% 20.28% 3.98% 3.65%
Tampa 1.05 55.56% 56.15% 26.10% 26.76%
Kansas City 1.04 12.61% 7.13% 2.22% 2.24%
Milwaukee 1.01 17.79% 30.44% 27.69% 28.95%
Columbus 0.99 29.52% 35.96% 11.13% 28.54%
Baltimore 0.95 55.71% 46.05% 12.45% 9.74%
Rochester 0.89 10.55% 8.29% 2.07% 1.43%
Philadelphia 0.86 24.94% 24.42% 3.91% 3.78%
Albany 0.85 17.42% 9.81% 3.41% 2.06%
Nashville 0.85 19.39% 12.99% 3.14% 3.35%
Cincinnati 0.83 21.03% 15.72% 2.57% 2.52%
Oklahoma City 0.83 5.19% 3.28% 1.68% 2.82%
Salt Lake City 0.80 31.32% 39.86% 30.31% 41.34%
Virginia Beach 0.75 55.23% 60.10% 41.34% 42.44%
St. Louis 0.69 18.15% 19.03% 7.09% 6.54%
Las Vegas 0.69 57.70% 63.69% 8.53% 27.78%
Dayton 0.66 19.01% 19.46% 2.42% 2.47%
Memphis 0.65 12.21% 8.31% 4.42% 5.38%
San Antonio 0.64 26.64% 22.75% 6.30% 9.37%
Detroit 0.60 36.72% 46.76% 42.80% 39.71%
Richmond 0.51 10.30% 9.66% 1.92% 2.44%
Cleveland 0.51 41.81% 46.33% 38.31% 37.49%
Charlotte 0.49 12.15% 10.43% 3.50% 3.10%
Pittsburgh 0.49 6.88% 7.98% 2.55% 2.19%
Louisville/Jefferson 
County 0.47 18.22% 16.80% 7.65% 7.85%
Greensboro 0.38 5.25% 3.66% 2.43% 1.26%
Buffalo 0.35 27.30% 31.21% 28.52% 28.49%
Birmingham 0.34 5.01% 8.61% 0.25% 0.84%
correlation  0.4598 0.3931 0.4167 0.3106
t-statistic 3.5118**** 2.8997*** 3.1091*** 2.2160**
r-squared 0.2114 0.1545 0.1737 0.0965
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level 
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Extended Table of Data 
Table 38: Description of Exogenous Constraints on Urban Development 
All Features The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that intersects at least one of the exogenous features identified in this thesis (features can overlap; the sum of the individual percentages 
may exceed the total) 
Coasts The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that coincides with the perimeter of the United States, excluding the international borders with Canada and Mexico 
Rivers and Lakes The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that intersects a body of water within United States territory 
Hills and Mountains The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary where the elevation gradient is at estimated to be at least 15 percent (see Table 5 for details). 
Federal Property The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that intersects federal property (see Table 5 for details) 
Protected Areas The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that intersects a protected area that is not federal property (see Table 5 for details) 
Canada The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that coincides with the Canadian border 
Mexico The percent of the total length of the urban area’s boundary that coincides with the Mexican border 
 
Table 39: Measures of Exogenous Constraints on Urban Development 
 Inner and Outer Boundaries Outer Boundaries Only 
MSA Name 
All 
Features Coasts 
Rivers &  
Lakes 
Hills & 
Mounts. 
Federal 
Property 
Protected 
Area Canada Mexico 
All 
Features Coasts 
Rivers &  
Lakes 
Hills & 
Mounts. 
Federal 
Property 
Protected 
Area Canada Mexico 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 52.22% 24.85% 7.17% 2.37% 7.61% 19.33% - - 64.36% 39.49% 4.72% 3.71% 7.33% 21.56% - - 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 52.69% 14.10% 1.48% 31.19% 25.12% 12.52% - - 58.33% 26.76% 1.58% 26.94% 25.93% 16.26% - - 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 36.88% - 10.11% - 3.46% 25.74% - - 36.15% - 24.40% - 7.36% 11.68% - - 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 17.28% - 16.82% - 7.18% 0.14% - - 13.73% - 13.55% - 7.32% 0.18% - - 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA 24.94% 0.12% 9.92% 0.27% 2.27% 15.35% - - 24.42% 0.36% 6.98% - 0.61% 19.53% - - 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 13.64% 5.04% 7.88% - 0.17% 1.37% - - 17.79% 13.12% 3.65% - 0.01% 1.59% - - 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, 66.82% 32.96% 15.67% - 3.21% 43.75% - - 80.05% 39.62% 19.89% - 8.35% 49.66% - - 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC 38.37% 10.47% 3.31% 0.13% 20.38% 13.33% - - 30.18% 5.97% 0.91% 0.40% 14.91% 12.15% - - 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 14.10% - 4.14% 0.02% 8.07% 6.01% - - 10.17% - 5.17% - 5.17% 5.00% - - 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 36.72% 5.27% 18.72% - 0.55% 16.95% 4.54% - 46.76% 10.81% 26.11% - 0.44% 14.56% 7.19% - 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA 60.55% 11.16% 2.14% - 2.47% 52.05% - - 57.85% 25.65% 3.24% - 0.70% 43.00% - - 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 72.24% 23.84% 2.24% 27.94% 16.99% 34.45% - - 69.38% 22.05% 3.67% 27.01% 23.68% 29.30% - - 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 16.04% - - 1.99% 4.30% 9.81% - - 20.28% - - 2.88% 7.47% 10.00% - - 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 27.95% - 1.23% 10.93% 7.97% 15.76% - - 35.70% - 2.23% 14.62% 14.03% 18.66% - - 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 44.69% - 30.74% 7.96% 4.17% 5.48% - - 49.63% - 30.85% 8.34% 8.02% 8.92% - - 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN 38.85% - 10.96% - 19.08% 11.64% - - 18.19% - 3.90% - 5.62% 10.27% - - 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 56.27% 17.32% 3.44% 16.95% 33.33% 7.45% - 0.57% 65.81% 27.74% 0.77% 19.30% 40.87% 8.65% - 1.58% 
St. Louis, MO 18.15% - 10.79% 0.08% 2.80% 7.63% - - 19.03% - 11.21% - 2.08% 7.91% - - 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 55.56% 37.56% 4.94% - 1.19% 43.94% - - 56.15% 38.75% 1.71% - 2.55% 46.54% - - 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 55.71% 33.58% 5.65% 0.18% 5.98% 23.16% - - 46.05% 27.12% 2.97% 0.63% 8.53% 21.14% - - 
Denver-Aurora, CO 26.92% - 5.29% 8.84% 9.58% 6.71% - - 27.80% - 1.18% 11.28% 7.81% 7.52% - - 
Pittsburgh, PA 6.88% - 0.17% 5.84% 0.17% 1.02% - - 7.98% - 0.47% 7.41% 0.47% 0.11% - - 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR 32.92% 13.78% 2.65% 9.17% 3.73% 8.39% - - 24.39% 4.01% 2.94% 7.33% 5.86% 5.86% - - 
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Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 41.81% - 11.51% - 7.49% 25.43% - - 46.33% - 30.72% - 4.15% 18.40% - - 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH 21.03% - 7.76% 0.36% 0.35% 14.19% - - 15.72% - 4.44% - 0.94% 12.60% - - 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 20.00% - 10.57% 1.74% 15.89% 4.11% - - 19.74% - 5.05% 3.67% 14.71% 5.03% - - 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 34.39% - 20.95% - 1.44% 15.06% - - 30.89% - 16.69% - 0.30% 16.91% - - 
Kansas City, MO 12.61% - 10.37% - 0.39% 2.12% - - 7.13% - 5.11% - - 2.02% - - 
San Antonio, TX 26.64% - 1.87% - 19.72% 5.05% - - 22.75% - 3.50% - 17.66% 1.60% - - 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 60.94% - 2.57% 42.87% 3.89% 32.57% - - 60.02% - 3.72% 41.94% 3.32% 31.79% - - 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 57.70% - - 2.85% 14.58% 41.23% - - 63.69% - - 4.59% 15.08% 45.65% - - 
Columbus, OH 12.66% - 8.34% - 0.81% 11.14% - - 14.94% - 10.00% - 1.86% 12.93% - - 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 9.20% - 9.04% - - 0.31% - - 6.74% - 6.74% - - - - - 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, 55.23% 40.09% 1.94% - 22.95% 5.18% - - 60.10% 47.77% 3.24% - 32.28% 4.66% - - 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI 46.77% 26.46% 5.12% - 1.33% 21.07% - - 48.18% 24.43% 6.53% - - 26.53% - - 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC 12.15% - 9.52% - - 3.52% - - 10.43% - 8.99% - - 1.80% - - 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 9.16% - 0.39% - 2.20% 6.57% - - 9.90% - 1.02% - - 8.89% - - 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 17.79% - 10.36% - - 8.74% - - 30.44% - 20.04% - - 13.82% - - 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-- 19.39% - 16.22% 0.21% 16.51% 2.67% - - 12.99% - 10.76% - 10.63% 2.36% - - 
Jacksonville, FL 54.95% 45.91% - - 6.57% 11.19% - - 40.10% 32.36% - - 5.82% 13.59% - - 
Memphis, TN 12.21% - 5.51% - 3.50% 3.21% - - 8.31% - 3.36% - 3.79% 1.16% - - 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY 18.22% - 14.87% - 1.17% 5.22% - - 16.80% - 13.77% - 1.42% 2.82% - - 
Richmond, VA 10.30% 0.99% 3.78% - 2.59% 3.35% - - 9.66% 1.13% 2.10% - 2.63% 4.24% - - 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 27.56% - 2.77% 2.18% - 23.55% - - 26.57% - 4.23% 2.80% - 20.67% - - 
Oklahoma City, OK 5.19% - 1.34% - 2.63% 2.56% - - 3.28% - 1.59% - 1.25% 2.02% - - 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 27.30% 6.31% 19.75% 0.15% - 6.29% 0.18% - 31.21% 10.38% 19.66% - - 9.50% 0.46% - 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 5.01% - 0.41% 2.10% - 2.58% - - 8.61% - - 3.31% - 5.52% - - 
Salt Lake City, UT 31.32% - - 27.08% 14.47% 6.50% - - 39.86% - - 34.72% 18.11% 8.37% - - 
Rochester, NY 7.77% - 5.41% - - 4.01% - - 17.33% - 14.01% - - 8.00% - - 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 63.87% - 54.62% - 7.14% 15.04% - - 59.94% - 54.12% - 9.43% 14.46% - - 
Raleigh-Cary, NC 19.52% - 5.59% - 2.44% 14.58% - - 11.87% - 3.22% - 1.87% 8.64% - - 
Tucson, AZ 38.42% - - 5.44% 18.41% 19.22% - - 41.45% - - 7.44% 18.91% 22.00% - - 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 29.65% 13.29% 2.85% 2.64% 0.57% 13.61% - - 35.30% 29.80% 1.75% 1.70% 1.34% 6.59% - - 
Tulsa, OK 5.06% - 0.31% - - 4.76% - - 1.90% - 0.52% - - 1.37% - - 
Fresno, CA 1.25% - - - - 1.25% - - 2.09% - - - - 2.09% - - 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 12.40% - 2.06% 0.27% 0.85% 9.37% - - 8.95% - 2.94% 0.64% 1.41% 3.97% - - 
New Haven-Milford, CT 42.72% 22.70% 0.61% 2.33% - 29.11% - - 58.09% 40.95% - 3.18% - 32.37% - - 
Dayton, OH 19.01% - - - 2.80% 16.21% - - 19.46% - - - 2.75% 16.70% - - 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE 16.42% - 12.73% - 2.16% 5.63% - - 21.27% - 17.89% - 2.62% 3.36% - - 
Albuquerque, NM 24.50% - - 4.98% 17.91% 5.89% - - 37.19% - - 8.48% 29.16% 7.40% - - 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 10.76% - - 6.42% - 5.72% - - 13.21% - - 7.62% - 7.40% - - 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 39.83% 6.73% - 18.55% 22.04% 6.21% - - 52.05% 12.82% - 21.89% 34.95% 5.56% - - 
Worcester, MA 34.77% - 6.01% - 0.64% 29.78% - - 31.61% - 2.08% - 1.60% 28.47% - - 
Bakersfield, CA 12.79% - - - - 12.79% - - - - - - - - - - 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 10.65% - 2.41% - - 8.25% - - 7.40% - 1.96% - - 5.44% - - 
Baton Rouge, LA 16.72% - 15.05% - - 1.67% - - 24.51% - 20.49% - - 4.01% - - 
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El Paso, TX 33.36% 0.14% - 3.17% 15.71% 9.43% - 9.93% 42.05% 0.18% - 2.70% 16.71% 9.98% - 18.73% 
Columbia, SC 27.27% - 13.11% 0.09% 5.74% 8.33% - - 27.91% - 11.83% - 4.55% 11.53% - - 
Akron, OH 32.19% - 5.97% - 7.29% 22.91% - - 33.64% - 5.89% - 12.48% 19.56% - - 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 11.72% 0.43% 3.38% - 1.88% 6.51% - 0.69% 16.25% 1.32% 1.16% - 3.79% 10.97% - 1.78% 
Springfield, MA 34.33% - 1.16% 1.97% 3.18% 29.24% - - 33.36% - 2.23% 3.25% 1.50% 27.47% - - 
Greensboro-High Point, NC 5.25% - 4.57% - - 0.68% - - 3.66% - 2.54% - - 1.12% - - 
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 62.16% 54.07% - - - 30.39% - - 63.05% 55.04% - - - 38.98% - - 
Stockton, CA 6.79% - - - 5.55% 1.24% - - 3.70% - - - 2.80% 0.89% - - 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 20.17% - 11.29% 6.98% 4.33% 4.81% - - 18.85% - 7.22% 8.77% 5.69% 7.56% - - 
Knoxville, TN 15.73% - 13.97% 0.52% 13.97% 1.24% - - 6.61% - 3.88% 1.11% 3.88% 1.62% - - 
Toledo, OH 30.34% - 26.03% - - 10.84% - - 18.25% - 14.22% - - 6.74% - - 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, 20.08% - 9.91% 0.41% 7.10% 2.67% - - 15.90% - 4.93% 0.93% 5.67% 4.36% - - 
Syracuse, NY 21.34% - 10.48% 1.31% 0.80% 8.75% - - 25.28% - 13.26% 3.06% 0.88% 8.08% - - 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 44.91% 25.97% 3.92% - 8.09% 14.97% - - 43.42% 20.74% 4.69% - 6.87% 13.61% - - 
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC 2.08% - - 0.39% - 1.69% - - 2.19% - - 0.34% - 1.85% - - 
Colorado Springs, CO 47.09% - 1.62% 17.05% 36.47% 4.66% - - 47.66% - 2.15% 21.73% 34.59% 5.03% - - 
Wichita, KS 1.69% - - - 1.14% 0.54% - - 0.61% - - - - 0.61% - - 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH 9.78% - 4.65% - 3.38% 4.14% - - 16.39% - 7.79% - 6.65% 6.25% - - 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 57.42% 35.59% - - 1.35% 40.52% - - 52.37% 31.92% - - 3.11% 42.27% - - 
Boise City-Nampa, ID 23.75% - 2.72% 2.50% 7.23% 14.72% - - 35.74% - 5.05% 4.24% 11.90% 20.73% - - 
Lakeland, FL 19.72% - 7.49% - - 13.39% - - 21.68% - 4.69% - - 17.08% - - 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 21.87% - 3.94% 15.50% - 4.61% - - 23.72% - 3.05% 16.00% - 6.39% - - 
Madison, WI 24.50% - 19.84% - - 7.78% - - 13.81% - 10.18% - - 5.78% - - 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 71.13% 57.75% 4.24% - 8.00% 16.12% - - 61.26% 48.04% 3.79% - 7.13% 26.95% - - 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 16.79% - 0.56% - 2.48% 14.31% - - 13.45% - 0.78% - 2.32% 11.13% - - 
Jackson, MS 6.53% - 4.29% - - 2.24% - - 6.69% - 6.69% - - - - - 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 23.33% - 17.21% 6.86% 3.27% 4.74% - - 19.73% - 10.34% 5.08% 0.46% 7.46% - - 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA 12.99% - 2.07% - 5.93% 5.00% - - 14.45% - 2.88% - 7.85% 3.72% - - 
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 40.93% 21.13% 1.89% - 1.49% 27.09% - - 46.10% 31.07% 1.06% - 1.72% 27.49% - - 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 44.49% - 2.06% 28.31% 29.10% 11.07% - - 53.14% - 3.56% 41.23% 36.01% 9.98% - - 
Chattanooga, TN 48.47% - 22.11% 11.66% 32.97% 9.51% - - 37.66% - 8.37% 18.90% 20.18% 7.05% - - 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, 42.12% 27.60% 7.05% - 3.01% 14.94% - - 46.73% 27.57% 10.83% - 4.96% 18.44% - - 
Lancaster, PA 6.40% - 4.87% 0.29% - 1.36% - - 10.92% - 7.59% 0.86% - 2.74% - - 
Provo-Orem, UT 40.26% - 2.58% 28.56% 28.04% 9.01% - - 45.23% - 2.64% 33.71% 31.23% 10.21% - - 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 14.75% - - 9.21% - 8.79% - - 15.16% - - 8.80% - 6.97% - - 
Durham, NC 21.52% - 6.71% - 6.71% 14.81% - - 26.54% - 9.07% - 9.07% 17.47% - - 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 6.28% - 4.55% - - 1.73% - - 4.60% - 2.72% - - 1.88% - - 
Spokane, WA 16.49% - - 13.03% - 4.29% - - 21.00% - - 14.28% - 7.26% - - 
Flint, MI 3.63% - 1.98% - - 1.65% - - 5.08% - 1.50% - - 3.58% - - 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 59.83% 50.40% - - 19.82% 11.71% - - 62.66% 52.24% - - 21.93% 12.95% - - 
Lexington-Fayette, KY 5.48% - - - - 5.48% - - 6.56% - - - - 6.56% - - 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 2.87% - 2.34% - - 0.54% - - 4.20% - 3.88% - - 0.32% - - 
Visalia-Porterville, CA 2.97% - 0.55% 1.12% 0.55% 2.42% - - 3.81% - 0.79% 1.60% 0.79% 3.02% - - 
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York-Hanover, PA 9.68% - 9.15% 0.52% - - - - 9.42% - 9.15% 0.27% - - - - 
Corpus Christi, TX 44.24% 26.16% 15.02% - 5.99% 10.97% - - 40.44% 32.31% 7.86% - 5.53% 10.53% - - 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 42.23% 16.19% - 8.46% 5.54% 21.93% - - 43.07% 17.29% - 7.64% 7.40% 20.39% - - 
Salinas, CA 51.62% 9.88% - 16.10% 22.38% 10.76% - - 51.21% 16.65% - 15.06% 13.77% 17.54% - - 
Canton-Massillon, OH 17.43% - - - - 17.43% - - 13.58% - - - - 13.58% - - 
Fort Wayne, IN 13.28% - 8.42% - - 5.31% - - 8.63% - 4.55% - - 4.09% - - 
Springfield, MO 5.53% - - - - 5.53% - - 3.74% - - - - 3.74% - - 
Mobile, AL 16.53% 14.47% 0.67% - - 1.39% - - 17.80% 14.51% 0.96% - - 2.33% - - 
Manchester-Nashua, NH 27.57% - 2.46% 0.16% - 25.15% - - 31.83% - 2.89% - - 29.56% - - 
Reading, PA 11.11% - 0.76% 8.74% 0.26% 2.23% - - 9.37% - 1.29% 6.82% 0.32% 1.27% - - 
Reno-Sparks, NV 67.57% - - 11.80% 41.92% 25.50% - - 70.62% - - 10.03% 45.13% 25.49% - - 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 58.37% 16.55% - 15.96% 34.24% 10.78% - - 60.59% 22.44% - 14.92% 31.95% 11.21% - - 
Asheville, NC 36.68% - - 24.88% 11.18% 4.75% - - 39.98% - - 31.65% 10.22% 3.36% - - 
Port St. Lucie, FL 63.92% 43.92% - - 1.72% 40.64% - - 50.22% 31.34% - - 5.26% 38.22% - - 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 17.32% 2.85% - - 1.94% 12.14% - 3.03% 25.06% 5.32% - - 3.46% 17.59% - 3.90% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 20.01% - 10.20% - 9.33% 1.31% - - 14.21% - 7.75% - 6.58% 2.17% - - 
Salem, OR 15.77% - - 1.51% - 15.06% - - 10.99% - - 2.64% - 9.76% - - 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 20.31% - 2.76% - 3.67% 13.89% - - 28.24% - 5.05% - 3.18% 20.01% - - 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA 40.49% - 31.56% - 6.38% 30.96% - - 21.55% - 16.03% - 2.20% 17.94% - - 
Huntsville, AL 24.01% - - 7.43% 11.97% 6.51% - - 23.23% - - 6.43% 14.40% 4.31% - - 
Peoria, IL 14.79% - 7.45% - - 9.40% - - 14.59% - 7.50% - - 10.97% - - 
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 34.96% - - - - 34.96% - - 32.37% - - - - 32.37% - - 
Montgomery, AL 6.55% - - - 6.55% - - - 8.16% - - - 8.16% - - - 
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 14.25% - 12.54% 0.78% - 0.92% - - 10.87% - 6.92% 1.65% - 2.30% - - 
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 42.45% - 10.43% - 42.45% - - - 36.95% - 5.50% - 36.95% - - - 
Evansville, IN 19.04% - 16.07% - - 4.51% - - 19.50% - 17.62% - - 3.97% - - 
Rockford, IL 32.41% - - - - 32.41% - - 37.11% - - - - 37.11% - - 
Ann Arbor, MI 5.68% - 5.68% - - - - - 4.88% - 4.88% - - - - - 
Fayetteville, NC 30.24% - - - 20.24% 10.01% - - 33.31% - - - 21.04% 12.27% - - 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 25.76% - - 13.33% - 16.97% - - 26.55% - - 16.71% - 16.63% - - 
Tallahassee, FL 41.39% - 10.54% - 18.35% 19.73% - - 49.85% - 13.57% - 24.22% 21.52% - - 
Wilmington, NC 41.81% 37.99% - - 4.81% 12.19% - - 41.12% 36.96% - - 8.43% 14.01% - - 
Savannah, GA 36.62% 15.22% 0.83% - 10.74% 11.93% - - 33.49% 18.32% 1.95% - 9.33% 9.36% - - 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 12.81% - 7.59% - - 5.22% - - 18.39% - 7.87% - - 10.52% - - 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 1.37% - - - - 1.37% - - 2.28% - - - - 2.28% - - 
Ocala, FL 22.70% - - - - 22.70% - - 23.19% - - - - 23.19% - - 
Charleston, WV 48.73% - - 48.16% - 1.08% - - 50.72% - - 50.03% - 1.50% - - 
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN 12.19% - 3.30% 5.82% 3.48% 4.18% - - 9.59% - 2.64% 3.94% 3.13% 3.63% - - 
Green Bay, WI 15.19% - 10.84% - - 10.60% - - 18.34% - 12.86% - - 13.58% - - 
Utica-Rome, NY 2.18% - - 0.19% - 1.99% - - 3.08% - - 0.34% - 2.74% - - 
Roanoke, VA 46.53% - - 16.98% 11.15% 25.08% - - 49.97% - - 18.54% 11.45% 26.15% - - 
Columbus, GA 29.52% - - - 27.97% 1.55% - - 35.96% - - - 33.90% 2.06% - - 
Fort Smith, AR 26.80% - 22.01% - 6.26% 3.73% - - 24.65% - 16.83% - 10.30% 3.18% - - 
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Huntington-Ashland, WV 0.80% - - 0.46% 0.27% 0.07% - - 1.77% - - 1.12% 0.65% - - - 
Boulder, CO 12.50% - - 12.50% - - - - 17.50% - - 17.50% - - - - 
Erie, PA 23.91% - 23.91% - - 1.74% - - 34.07% - 34.07% - - 2.41% - - 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 22.60% - 16.64% 1.56% 1.97% 10.44% - - 21.10% - 15.79% 2.41% 3.10% 8.05% - - 
Duluth, MN 48.51% - 45.28% 1.52% - 2.27% - - 50.56% - 46.31% 2.65% - 2.80% - - 
Atlantic City, NJ 55.08% 29.16% - - 5.25% 31.31% - - 65.40% 42.62% - - 7.05% 31.12% - - 
Spartanburg, SC 2.06% - - - - 2.06% - - 3.64% - - - - 3.64% - - 
Norwich-New London, CT 22.98% 14.12% 1.32% - 2.69% 9.60% - - 33.73% 24.81% 2.40% - - 14.45% - - 
Lubbock, TX 6.56% - - - 2.96% 3.60% - - 9.89% - - - 5.05% 4.83% - - 
Holland-Grand Haven, MI 31.70% - 31.70% - - - - - 16.28% - 16.28% - - - - - 
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD 13.99% - - - 13.55% 0.44% - - 17.20% - - - 16.51% 0.69% - - 
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA 17.81% - - 11.99% - 7.37% - - 18.21% - - 12.70% - 6.94% - - 
Lafayette, LA 0.97% - - - - 0.97% - - 1.45% - - - - 1.45% - - 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 54.79% 9.67% - 30.29% - 29.10% - - 63.21% 15.98% - 33.71% - 32.96% - - 
Cedar Rapids, IA 4.46% - - - - 4.46% - - - - - - - - - - 
Binghamton, NY 28.23% - - 24.86% - 5.58% - - 37.53% - - 30.61% - 11.96% - - 
Merced, CA 4.74% - - - 4.74% - - - 6.38% - - - 6.38% - - - 
Gainesville, FL 26.12% - - - - 26.12% - - 30.36% - - - - 30.36% - - 
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA 66.26% - 56.70% 1.71% 14.64% 4.08% - - 57.14% - 45.46% 1.78% 15.80% 5.80% - - 
Clarksville, TN 15.75% - - - 8.62% 7.13% - - 18.49% - - - 12.75% 5.74% - - 
Lynchburg, VA 0.94% - - 0.94% - - - - 1.15% - - 1.15% - - - - 
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle 27.12% 20.15% - - - 9.55% - - 46.92% 36.03% - - - 16.29% - - 
Greeley, CO 4.91% - - - - 4.91% - - 6.05% - - - - 6.05% - - 
Olympia, WA 45.48% - 30.35% 1.78% 9.21% 10.21% - - 50.53% - 31.87% 2.21% 14.18% 11.73% - - 
Yakima, WA 16.24% - - 11.57% - 7.00% - - 13.00% - - 9.22% - 5.15% - - 
Laredo, TX 24.98% 15.30% 2.26% - - - - 7.42% 33.72% 21.84% 1.92% - - - - 9.96% 
Macon, GA 12.37% - 6.78% - 5.59% - - - 12.09% - 5.21% - 6.88% - - - 
Topeka, KS 12.03% - - - 12.03% - - - 15.83% - - - 15.83% - - - 
Gulfport-Biloxi, MS 44.99% 36.97% 1.26% - 4.15% 3.01% - - 52.81% 40.29% 2.15% - 7.28% 3.86% - - 
Waco, TX 14.07% - 14.07% - 14.07% - - - 10.61% - 10.61% - 10.61% - - - 
Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA 54.64% - 30.69% 4.95% 8.65% 23.33% - - 41.53% - 16.83% 7.17% 8.30% 14.71% - - 
Barnstable Town, MA 73.22% 32.54% 2.69% - 13.16% 44.51% - - 83.10% 62.25% 1.65% - 7.78% 46.14% - - 
Appleton, WI 19.13% - 17.06% - - 2.07% - - 21.52% - 17.84% - - 3.68% - - 
Chico, CA 9.33% - - - - 9.33% - - 6.09% - - - - 6.09% - - 
Prescott, AZ 52.67% - - 8.98% 37.33% 12.38% - - 59.17% - - 9.88% 41.99% 16.03% - - 
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 15.96% - 13.98% - 5.35% 1.08% - - 10.93% - 7.19% - 7.48% 1.06% - - 
Springfield, IL 34.62% - 30.21% - - 5.70% - - 21.18% - 16.73% - - 5.11% - - 
Burlington-South Burlington, VT 33.28% - 23.00% 0.61% 1.73% 13.67% - - 33.21% - 28.11% 1.09% - 12.55% - - 
Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA 99.54% - 99.54% - - 3.73% - - 99.04% - 99.04% - - 1.96% - - 
Tuscaloosa, AL 4.54% - 4.54% - - - - - 5.61% - 5.61% - - - - - 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 1.89% - 1.09% - - 0.80% - - 3.99% - 2.78% - - 1.21% - - 
Medford, OR 24.78% - - 16.92% 6.02% 12.05% - - 31.12% - - 23.33% 7.84% 14.41% - - 
Racine, WI 26.82% - 24.39% - - 4.07% - - 37.53% - 34.13% - - 5.69% - - 
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Tyler, TX 1.15% - 1.15% - - - - - 2.40% - 2.40% - - - - - 
Las Cruces, NM 34.66% - - - - 34.66% - - 38.53% - - - - 38.53% - - 
Lake Charles, LA 12.46% - 8.08% - - 4.38% - - 5.41% - - - - 5.41% - - 
Johnson City, TN 55.03% - 12.16% 7.87% 54.38% - - - 56.75% - 6.98% 6.10% 56.39% - - - 
Charlottesville, VA 7.25% - 7.25% - - - - - 7.94% - 7.94% - - - - - 
Yuma, AZ 54.70% - 10.62% - 13.51% 41.19% - - 49.01% - 7.39% - 12.32% 36.68% - - 
Bellingham, WA 59.22% - 43.73% 24.40% - 12.44% - - 65.24% - 46.13% 29.18% - 13.17% - - 
Lafayette, IN 4.42% - - - - 4.42% - - 3.71% - - - - 3.71% - - 
Athens-Clarke County, GA 10.35% - - - - 10.35% - - 7.38% - - - - 7.38% - - 
St. Cloud, MN 13.41% - 4.14% 1.18% - 8.10% - - 13.05% - 5.71% 2.09% - 5.25% - - 
Kingston, NY 21.91% - 15.80% 2.72% - 5.12% - - 28.52% - 20.96% 2.61% - 7.87% - - 
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL 96.18% 73.05% - - 58.73% 10.32% - - 97.75% 65.29% - - 69.71% 7.73% - - 
Redding, CA 20.56% - - 1.89% - 20.24% - - 23.08% - - 3.82% - 22.42% - - 
Rochester, MN 10.55% - - - - 10.55% - - 8.29% - - - - 8.29% - - 
Bloomington, IN 6.63% - 3.88% - - 5.94% - - 3.39% - 0.89% - - 2.50% - - 
Anderson, SC 14.46% - 14.46% - 9.40% - - - 14.66% - 14.66% - 10.78% - - - 
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI 44.01% - 35.21% - - 11.77% - - 43.17% - 31.86% - - 14.73% - - 
Gainesville, GA 66.05% - 61.82% - 61.82% 4.24% - - 50.35% - 48.59% - 48.59% 1.76% - - 
Monroe, LA 13.90% - 7.19% - 5.13% 2.56% - - 18.22% - 8.51% - 5.73% 4.76% - - 
Joplin, MO 5.47% - - - - 5.47% - - 6.95% - - - - 6.95% - - 
Terre Haute, IN 2.88% - - - - 2.88% - - 4.77% - - - - 4.77% - - 
Albany, GA 17.42% - 6.46% - 3.10% 7.85% - - 9.81% - 3.85% - 3.31% 2.65% - - 
Jackson, MI 9.13% - 9.13% - - - - - 8.96% - 8.96% - - - - - 
Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL 75.55% 69.62% 0.14% - 14.21% 6.60% - - 68.87% 60.01% 0.35% - 16.77% 9.26% - - 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 11.51% - - - - 11.51% - - 7.01% - - - - 7.01% - - 
Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV 20.78% - - - - 20.78% - - 18.97% - - - - 18.97% - - 
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 23.05% - 16.23% - - 13.09% - - 34.09% - 23.85% - - 19.30% - - 
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 31.65% - 26.11% - - 5.54% - - 33.25% - 30.67% - - 2.58% - - 
Abilene, TX 20.22% - - - 13.05% 7.17% - - 19.37% - - - 11.20% 8.17% - - 
Columbia, MO 2.84% - - - - 2.84% - - 3.54% - - - - 3.54% - - 
Eau Claire, WI 21.88% - 21.88% - - - - - 15.75% - 15.75% - - - - - 
Monroe, MI 25.54% - 8.81% - - 23.08% - - 28.25% - 15.58% - - 24.61% - - 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 17.83% - 4.69% - - 16.75% - - 17.37% - 1.86% - - 15.51% - - 
Pueblo, CO 14.55% - - - - 14.55% - - 17.55% - - - - 17.55% - - 
Pascagoula, MS 28.41% 25.62% - - - 5.11% - - 36.54% 32.79% - - - 6.87% - - 
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 8.94% - - 0.21% 8.72% - - - 10.53% - - 0.27% 10.25% - - - 
Jacksonville, NC 50.32% 25.04% - - 42.36% 7.96% - - 40.97% 19.85% - - 33.92% 7.04% - - 
Decatur, AL 31.79% - 22.27% - 29.81% 1.98% - - 35.86% - 27.80% - 34.16% 1.69% - - 
Bend, OR 40.63% - - 5.30% 23.91% 11.42% - - 48.41% - - 4.01% 30.65% 13.75% - - 
Billings, MT 34.31% - - 4.82% - 29.89% - - 35.20% - - 6.62% - 29.19% - - 
Dover, DE 39.08% - - - 4.54% 34.54% - - 38.91% - - - 4.29% 34.62% - - 
Wheeling, WV 51.65% - - 41.47% - 14.97% - - 41.57% - - 38.95% - 5.19% - - 
Bangor, ME 37.02% - - - - 37.02% - - 36.23% - - - - 36.23% - - 
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Johnstown, PA 37.47% - - 36.96% - 0.92% - - 27.52% - - 26.45% - 1.93% - - 
Wichita Falls, TX 29.81% - 15.35% - 12.00% 2.46% - - 29.86% - 13.40% - 13.27% 3.19% - - 
Jefferson City, MO 16.04% - 12.11% - - 6.34% - - 21.35% - 15.28% - - 9.01% - - 
Sioux City, IA 44.45% - 40.03% - - 7.81% - - 33.99% - 29.75% - - 4.24% - - 
Burlington, NC 1.52% - - - - 1.52% - - 0.69% - - - - 0.69% - - 
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL 26.49% - 26.49% - 26.49% - - - 27.19% - 27.19% - 27.19% - - - 
Santa Fe, NM 18.86% - - 1.63% 3.47% 15.39% - - 18.48% - - 0.29% 3.03% 15.45% - - 
Springfield, OH 12.45% - - - - 12.45% - - 15.00% - - - - 15.00% - - 
State College, PA 13.89% - - 2.74% - 12.88% - - 17.30% - - 3.18% - 16.48% - - 
Iowa City, IA 5.70% - 1.43% - 1.43% 4.27% - - 8.98% - 2.25% - 2.25% 6.72% - - 
Battle Creek, MI 2.29% - - - 2.29% - - - 3.90% - - - 3.90% - - - 
Hattiesburg, MS 5.81% - 5.81% - - - - - 4.70% - 4.70% - - - - - 
Dalton, GA 16.92% - - 3.66% 16.73% - - - 18.61% - - 1.12% 18.25% - - - 
Grand Junction, CO 50.86% - - 7.38% 8.87% 40.04% - - 65.73% - - 13.69% 11.89% 50.18% - - 
Napa, CA 1.63% - - 1.63% - - - - 2.04% - - 2.04% - - - - 
Morristown, TN 18.99% - 16.73% 1.44% 16.95% 0.60% - - 21.09% - 18.99% 1.15% 18.99% 0.95% - - 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 42.50% - 21.84% 21.10% 10.24% 6.60% - - 47.79% - 18.55% 21.66% 14.32% 7.33% - - 
Pittsfield, MA 44.05% - 8.99% 7.43% - 38.18% - - 40.88% - 5.66% 8.62% - 36.85% - - 
Wausau, WI 23.74% - 20.69% - - 3.06% - - 7.04% - 4.21% - - 2.83% - - 
Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL 65.00% 58.08% 0.05% - - 30.95% - - 67.31% 56.42% - - - 35.48% - - 
Glens Falls, NY 1.30% - - - - 1.30% - - 2.99% - - - - 2.99% - - 
La Crosse, WI 57.46% - 29.82% 12.08% 28.00% 16.08% - - 57.81% - 23.40% 14.94% 33.48% 9.13% - - 
Warner Robins, GA 17.46% - 6.30% - 9.02% 2.13% - - 24.32% - 8.05% - 13.28% 2.99% - - 
Mansfield, OH 1.52% - 1.52% - - - - - 1.37% - 1.37% - - - - - 
Lebanon, PA 1.09% - - - - 1.09% - - 1.61% - - - - 1.61% - - 
Altoona, PA 15.74% - - 12.87% 3.95% 0.74% - - 18.13% - - 15.08% 4.87% 0.88% - - 
Farmington, NM 54.21% - - 1.53% 5.84% 47.64% - - 54.44% - - 2.18% 3.89% 49.51% - - 
St. George, UT 37.43% - - 9.45% - 35.89% - - 45.94% - - 10.81% - 45.33% - - 
Valdosta, GA 9.48% - - - - 9.48% - - 9.78% - - - - 9.78% - - 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 1.42% - - - - 1.42% - - 1.22% - - - - 1.22% - - 
Weirton-Steubenville, WV 27.97% - - 26.53% - 3.46% - - 30.80% - - 29.95% - 4.07% - - 
Flagstaff, AZ 100.00% - - 5.47% 100.00% - - - 100.00% - - 7.56% 100.00% - - - 
St. Joseph, MO 24.41% - 24.09% - - 2.92% - - 18.10% - 17.68% - - 3.87% - - 
Rapid City, SD 4.22% - - 2.84% - 1.38% - - 3.75% - - 1.42% - 2.33% - - 
Salisbury, MD 6.84% - - - - 6.84% - - 12.35% - - - - 12.35% - - 
Williamsport, PA 19.99% - - 15.12% - 7.40% - - 25.85% - - 21.51% - 8.24% - - 
Idaho Falls, ID 5.57% - - - - 5.57% - - 8.13% - - - - 8.13% - - 
Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 12.66% - - 9.60% - 3.06% - - 11.22% - - 5.77% - 5.45% - - 
Morgantown, WV 34.28% - 14.16% 12.32% - 10.19% - - 32.74% - 9.42% 14.48% - 12.47% - - 
Sheboygan, WI 18.67% - 10.54% - - 8.90% - - 28.82% - 19.04% - - 11.19% - - 
Goldsboro, NC 2.05% - - - - 2.05% - - 3.86% - - - - 3.86% - - 
Anniston-Oxford, AL 25.33% - - 5.03% 16.62% 8.40% - - 21.24% - - 1.63% 19.77% 0.87% - - 
Owensboro, KY 16.13% - 14.35% - - 1.78% - - 19.12% - 16.81% - - 2.31% - - 
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Logan, UT 19.28% - 4.48% 11.92% 15.41% 2.90% - - 25.35% - 5.20% 17.52% 20.08% 4.13% - - 
Michigan City-La Porte, IN 26.69% - 14.75% - 9.13% 10.98% - - 33.58% - 20.81% - 12.12% 12.70% - - 
Decatur, IL 24.89% - 14.74% - - 11.37% - - 16.17% - 6.44% - - 11.22% - - 
Lawton, OK 34.95% - - - 34.95% - - - 44.90% - - - 44.90% - - - 
Kankakee-Bradley, IL 25.26% - - - - 25.26% - - 27.21% - - - - 27.21% - - 
Bay City, MI 52.55% - 46.50% - - 22.74% - - 48.62% - 40.80% - - 34.56% - - 
Lewiston-Auburn, ME 15.43% - 10.22% - - 5.21% - - 21.51% - 14.84% - - 6.66% - - 
Wenatchee, WA 66.26% - 36.91% 32.71% - 15.37% - - 65.51% - 30.26% 39.96% - 16.18% - - 
San Angelo, TX 46.76% - 40.22% - 11.72% 5.08% - - 40.70% - 33.87% - 17.29% 5.85% - - 
Sumter, SC 14.50% - - - 12.80% 1.70% - - 12.07% - - - 9.05% 3.02% - - 
Pine Bluff, AR 18.87% - 3.09% - 10.69% 5.08% - - 23.95% - 3.65% - 15.91% 4.38% - - 
Gadsden, AL 8.07% - 2.22% 5.86% - - - - 7.95% - 1.92% 6.03% - - - - 
Missoula, MT 40.55% - - 30.83% 12.13% 11.64% - - 53.18% - - 43.19% 18.39% 14.33% - - 
Bismarck, ND 19.59% - 19.59% - - - - - 12.55% - 12.55% - - - - - 
Kokomo, IN 3.16% - 3.16% - - - - - 3.48% - 3.48% - - - - - 
Brunswick, GA 50.39% 44.08% - - 2.18% 4.14% - - 45.70% 38.55% - - 3.30% 3.84% - - 
Ithaca, NY 31.91% - 13.12% 10.15% - 14.56% - - 32.21% - 9.85% 10.95% - 13.90% - - 
Longview, WA 40.69% 13.26% - 31.25% - 1.93% - - 54.34% 18.51% - 42.23% - 3.22% - - 
Fond du Lac, WI 15.00% - 15.00% - - - - - 14.44% - 14.44% - - - - - 
Ocean City, NJ 71.31% 38.91% - - 8.41% 44.83% - - 78.60% 53.45% - - 11.65% 39.15% - - 
Grand Forks, ND 6.56% - - - - 6.56% - - - - - - - - - - 
Rome, GA 15.42% - - - - 15.42% - - 17.42% - - - - 17.42% - - 
Hot Springs, AR 73.83% - 63.06% 4.37% 15.80% - - - 57.97% - 43.29% 5.56% 20.45% - - - 
Dubuque, IA 39.65% - 22.82% - 18.12% 21.00% - - 33.58% - 17.24% - 12.28% 20.45% - - 
Elmira, NY 31.18% - - 27.91% - 5.08% - - 30.28% - - 25.22% - 8.08% - - 
Pocatello, ID 42.86% - - 16.93% 6.05% 36.53% - - 51.14% - - 21.53% 8.11% 42.65% - - 
Cheyenne, WY 19.50% - - - 18.78% 0.72% - - 24.94% - - - 23.85% 1.09% - - 
Danville, IL 12.39% - 6.03% - - 11.24% - - 10.01% - 3.32% - - 8.53% - - 
Ames, IA 19.11% - - - - 19.11% - - 15.73% - - - - 15.73% - - 
Great Falls, MT 37.11% - - - 19.25% 17.86% - - 35.15% - - - 24.43% 10.72% - - 
Corvallis, OR 26.44% - - 16.96% - 10.78% - - 23.86% - - 14.85% - 9.01% - - 
Sandusky, OH 53.07% - 43.12% - - 23.74% - - 56.13% - 44.02% - - 22.24% - - 
Columbus, IN 5.59% - - - 5.59% - - - 6.60% - - - 6.60% - - - 
Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA 33.92% - - - 28.14% 5.77% - - 35.17% - - - 30.25% 4.92% - - 
Casper, WY 21.88% - - - 18.03% 3.84% - - 28.06% - - - 24.91% 3.15% - - 
Lewiston, ID 28.06% - - 22.34% - 7.03% - - 32.72% - - 25.16% - 9.28% - - 
Carson City, NV 76.08% - - 13.71% 29.80% 46.28% - - 76.84% - - 15.24% 30.85% 46.00% - - 
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Supplemental Regression Results 
Table 40: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Monthly Rent Payment – Inner and Outer Boundaries 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
monthly rent payment 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0297 1.52 0.0148 0.60 0.0495 2.58** 0.0310 1.66* 0.7859 0.63
Log of MSA Population -0.0230 -1.00 -0.0294 -1.14 0.0314 1.05 -0.0107 -0.32 -0.0272 -1.93* -0.0984 -0.22
African-American Pct -0.5535 -3.44**** -0.5058 -3.03*** -0.5833 -2.61*** -0.5334 -3.16*** -0.5589 -3.60**** -0.9038 -1.30
College Graduate Pct 0.0151 0.10 0.0330 0.20 0.3400 1.41 0.0329 0.21 0.0207 0.14 -0.3403 -1.07
Murder Rate 0.0026 0.60 0.0041 0.98 0.0041 0.68 0.0019 0.41 0.0028 0.68 0.0017 0.63
Mean Commute Time 0.0341 7.66**** 0.0341 6.44**** 0.0241 3.21*** 0.0338 6.03**** 0.0347 9.22**** -0.0102 -2.34**
Pct Coastal -0.1549 -0.73 -0.1566 -0.61 -0.2397 -1.18 0.1112 1.13 -0.1658 -0.82
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.3757 -1.62 -0.1844 -0.61 -0.5142 -2.68*** -0.0924 -0.90 -0.3883 -1.73*
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3862 2.01** 0.2871 0.99 -0.0212 -0.10 0.6018 4.15**** 0.3809 1.94*
Pct Federal Property 0.0012 0.01 0.0330 0.10 -0.1438 -0.69 0.2889 2.02** -0.0117 -0.05
Pct Protected Areas -0.0831 -0.34 0.0934 0.32 -0.2194 -0.97 0.2645 1.96* -0.1009 -0.43
Pct Canada 1.4091 2.07** 2.0333 2.48** -2.3964 -2.40** 1.7269 2.59*** 1.4295 2.29**
Pct Mexico -2.9321 -4.80**** -1.7290 -3.08*** -3.5382 -4.82**** -2.5468 -4.40**** -2.9327 -4.97****
PUMA         
African-American Pct -0.1403 -3.93**** -0.1329 -2.13** -0.0832 -1.74* -0.1414 -4.07**** -0.1406 -3.99**** -0.0802 -3.29****
College Graduate Pct 0.8012 20.55**** 0.8963 11.76**** 0.8134 12.89**** 0.8019 20.67**** 0.8006 20.77**** 0.8262 21.61****
Contains the CBD -0.0106 -0.92 -0.0397 -2.81*** 0.0286 1.19 -0.0098 -0.84 -0.0109 -0.96 -0.0033 -0.37
Log of Area -0.0469 -4.18**** -0.0639 -4.80**** -0.0338 -2.23** -0.0469 -3.75**** -0.0479 -5.65**** -0.0311 -5.68****
Log of Distance to CBD 0.0187 1.69* 0.0251 1.66* -0.0109 -0.72 0.0169 1.10 0.0200 2.55** 0.0101 1.62
Log of Elevation Change 0.0193 1.62 0.0491 4.07**** 0.0360 1.80* 0.0227 1.84* 0.0188 1.60 -0.0044 -0.67
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.1026 3.61**** 0.1488 4.63**** 0.1015 2.58** 0.1065 3.77**** 0.1013 3.62**** 0.0081 0.52
Abuts River -0.0169 -1.00 0.0172 0.93 -0.0354 -0.91 -0.0188 -1.15 -0.0166 -0.97 -0.0073 -0.62
Abuts Other Water Body -0.0433 -2.49** -0.0221 -0.97 -0.0418 -1.79* -0.0343 -1.83* -0.0438 -2.55** -0.0382 -2.38**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0197 -1.23 -0.0057 -0.25 0.0021 0.08 -0.0194 -1.24 -0.0199 -1.24 0.0100 1.17
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  -0.0926 - -0.0955 -13.05**** -0.0959 -7.14**** -0.0935 -14.24**** -0.0925 -13.99**** -0.0914 -15.88****
Number of Bedrooms 0.0849 18.38**** 0.0831 14.84**** 0.0850 11.58**** 0.0854 18.09**** 0.0848 18.23**** 0.0800 16.94****
Kitchen Facilities 0.0807 3.13*** 0.1277 3.05*** 0.0774 1.35 0.0814 3.20*** 0.0805 3.12*** 0.0847 3.44****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0275 1.05 0.0318 0.67 0.0565 1.13 0.0267 1.03 0.0276 1.06 0.0199 0.77
Number of Rooms 0.0539 18.77**** 0.0622 21.03**** 0.0532 12.74**** 0.0540 18.57**** 0.0539 18.72**** 0.0600 24.05****
Number of Cars 0.0707 23.42**** 0.0612 18.96**** 0.0777 19.85**** 0.0702 22.00**** 0.0707 23.14**** 0.0628 27.99****
Year Built -0.0336 - -0.0396 -16.71**** -0.0338 -10.42**** -0.0333 -12.56**** -0.0336 -13.16**** -0.0330 -15.49****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1032 -9.60**** -0.0743 -5.78**** -0.1342 -8.23**** -0.1040 -9.67**** -0.1032 -9.66**** -0.1074 -10.75****
Years of Schooling 0.0366 19.11**** 0.0404 32.04**** 0.0375 20.48**** 0.0368 19.21**** 0.0365 19.13**** 0.0366 19.53****
Age -0.0022 -8.71**** -0.0014 -6.67**** -0.0022 -7.14**** -0.0021 -8.69**** -0.0022 -8.70**** -0.0024 -10.00****
Female -0.0365 -9.49**** -0.0332 -7.11**** -0.0421 -5.30**** -0.0366 -9.51**** -0.0365 -9.52**** -0.0361 -10.08****
Married 0.0714 15.20**** 0.0734 12.88**** 0.0758 9.79**** 0.0715 15.24**** 0.0714 15.25**** 0.0668 17.86****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0065 -1.13 -0.0075 -1.13 -0.0080 -0.94 -0.0068 -1.20 -0.0065 -1.15 0.0001 0.02
Intercept 4.8786 19.20**** 4.5891 15.85**** 4.0676 12.53**** 4.6973 12.76**** 4.9234 29.78**** 3.8021 0.81
Number of observations 114,678  41,865 31,881 114,678  114,678 114,678
R2  0.4075 0.3836 0.4280 0.4067  0.4075 0.4448
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**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 41: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Monthly Rent Payment – Outer Boundaries Only 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
monthly rent payment 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0224 2.59*** 0.0209 2.07** 0.0309 2.70*** 0.0228 2.68*** 1.3179 1.13
Log of MSA Population -0.0309 -1.25 -0.0297 -1.14 0.0205 0.73 -0.0107 -0.32 -0.0320 -2.26** -0.2444 -0.57
African-American Pct -0.5815 -3.57**** -0.5315 -3.14*** -0.6208 -2.65*** -0.5334 -3.16*** -0.5834 -3.76**** -0.8010 -1.18
College Graduate Pct 0.1337 0.86 0.0791 0.48 0.5104 2.24** 0.0329 0.21 0.1371 0.94 -0.3799 -1.20
Murder Rate 0.0044 0.98 0.0043 1.02 0.0071 1.13 0.0019 0.41 0.0045 1.07 0.0015 0.57
Mean Commute Time 0.0348 7.85**** 0.0338 6.29**** 0.0257 3.77**** 0.0338 6.03**** 0.0349 9.66**** -0.0104 -2.35**
Pct Coastal -0.0837 -0.73 -0.2016 -1.78* -0.0723 -0.55 0.1112 1.13 -0.0876 -0.76
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.2979 -2.32** -0.2299 -1.55 -0.3421 -2.47** -0.0924 -0.90 -0.3022 -2.33**
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.4104 2.59*** 0.1677 0.67 0.1200 0.61 0.6018 4.15**** 0.4073 2.49**
Pct Federal Property 0.0721 0.50 -0.0044 -0.02 0.0378 0.25 0.2889 2.02** 0.0675 0.46
Pct Protected Areas -0.0175 -0.11 0.0053 0.03 -0.0212 -0.11 0.2645 1.96* -0.0239 -0.16
Pct Canada 0.9044 1.36 1.3170 1.55 -2.7997 -2.97*** 1.7269 2.59*** 0.8939 1.40
Pct Mexico -3.0058 -5.88**** -2.0467 -3.80**** -3.3326 -4.95**** -2.5468 -4.40**** -3.0122 -5.96****
PUMA         
African-American Pct -0.1395 -3.95**** -0.1316 -2.14** -0.0943 -2.07** -0.1414 -4.07**** -0.1395 -3.99**** -0.0802 -3.29****
College Graduate Pct 0.8021 20.97**** 0.8941 12.11**** 0.8241 12.90**** 0.8019 20.67**** 0.8020 21.12**** 0.8262 21.60****
Contains the CBD -0.0114 -1.00 -0.0385 -2.73*** 0.0303 1.24 -0.0098 -0.84 -0.0115 -1.02 -0.0033 -0.37
Log of Area -0.0474 -4.42**** -0.0623 -4.95**** -0.0342 -2.25** -0.0469 -3.75**** -0.0476 -5.61**** -0.0311 -5.68****
Log of Distance to CBD 0.0193 1.75* 0.0221 1.51 -0.0091 -0.64 0.0169 1.10 0.0196 2.51** 0.0101 1.62
Log of Elevation Change 0.0192 1.58 0.0480 4.01**** 0.0330 1.59 0.0227 1.84* 0.0190 1.61 -0.0044 -0.67
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0969 3.40**** 0.1468 4.49**** 0.0943 2.30** 0.1065 3.77**** 0.0965 3.47**** 0.0081 0.52
Abuts River -0.0181 -1.10 0.0198 1.16 -0.0333 -0.85 -0.0188 -1.15 -0.0180 -1.08 -0.0073 -0.62
Abuts Other Water Body -0.0328 -1.91* -0.0163 -0.72 -0.0191 -0.77 -0.0343 -1.83* -0.0328 -1.92* -0.0382 -2.38**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0195 -1.22 -0.0071 -0.30 0.0048 0.19 -0.0194 -1.24 -0.0196 -1.22 0.0100 1.17
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  -0.0923 - -0.0947 -12.94**** -0.0969 -7.14**** -0.0935 -14.24**** -0.0923 -14.04**** -0.0914 -15.88****
Number of Bedrooms 0.0844 18.36**** 0.0828 14.63**** 0.0845 11.76**** 0.0854 18.09**** 0.0844 18.17**** 0.0801 16.95****
Kitchen Facilities 0.0813 3.17*** 0.1285 3.05*** 0.0775 1.36 0.0814 3.20*** 0.0813 3.18*** 0.0848 3.44****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0279 1.08 0.0315 0.67 0.0551 1.11 0.0267 1.03 0.0279 1.08 0.0198 0.77
Number of Rooms 0.0545 19.16**** 0.0625 20.44**** 0.0540 12.60**** 0.0540 18.57**** 0.0545 19.05**** 0.0599 24.05****
Number of Cars 0.0706 23.75**** 0.0613 18.82**** 0.0771 19.43**** 0.0702 22.00**** 0.0706 23.62**** 0.0627 27.98****
Year Built -0.0336 - -0.0397 -17.46**** -0.0337 -10.35**** -0.0333 -12.56**** -0.0336 -13.44**** -0.0330 -15.50****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1027 -9.64**** -0.0735 -5.73**** -0.1340 -8.27**** -0.1040 -9.67**** -0.1027 -9.67**** -0.1074 -10.75****
Years of Schooling 0.0365 19.22**** 0.0402 32.00**** 0.0376 20.78**** 0.0368 19.21**** 0.0365 19.21**** 0.0366 19.53****
Age -0.0022 -8.72**** -0.0014 -6.70**** -0.0022 -7.12**** -0.0021 -8.69**** -0.0022 -8.71**** -0.0024 -9.99****
Female -0.0366 -9.52**** -0.0330 -7.06**** -0.0423 -5.32**** -0.0366 -9.51**** -0.0366 -9.56**** -0.0361 -10.07****
Married 0.0711 15.14**** 0.0729 12.90**** 0.0759 9.73**** 0.0715 15.24**** 0.0711 15.16**** 0.0668 17.85****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0067 -1.16 -0.0075 -1.11 -0.0076 -0.89 -0.0068 -1.20 -0.0067 -1.16 -0.0004 -0.05
Intercept 4.9337 18.06**** 4.5889 15.96**** 4.1322 12.84**** 4.6973 12.76**** 4.9459 30.98**** 3.1298 0.66
Number of observations 114,678  41,865 31,881 114,678  114,678 114,678
R2  0.4082 0.3844 0.4290 0.4067  0.4082 0.4448
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 42: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Monthly Rent Payment – Undevelopable Region 
Percentage – Area-UA 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
monthly rent payment 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0209 2.36** 0.0210 1.82* 0.0092 0.84 0.0196 2.23** 2.3475 1.50
Log of MSA Population -0.0061 -0.25 -0.0111 -0.40 0.0763 2.20** -0.0107 -0.32 -0.0229 -1.61 -0.0862 -0.25
African-American Pct -0.5599 -3.49**** -0.5092 -3.07*** -0.5384 -2.34** -0.5334 -3.16*** -0.5780 -3.79**** -0.7990 -1.19
College Graduate Pct 0.0315 0.19 -0.0022 -0.01 0.4500 1.90* 0.0329 0.21 0.0599 0.35 -0.3671 -1.14
Murder Rate 0.0030 0.66 0.0037 0.88 0.0028 0.42 0.0019 0.41 0.0040 0.89 0.0018 0.69
Mean Commute Time 0.0330 7.27**** 0.0321 5.82**** 0.0192 2.35** 0.0338 6.03**** 0.0358 9.66**** -0.0101 -2.33**
Pct Coastal -0.0568 -0.53 -0.1761 -1.40 0.0958 0.75 0.1112 1.13 -0.0412 -0.39
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.2192 -1.94* -0.1518 -1.10 -0.0997 -0.73 -0.0924 -0.90 -0.2101 -1.85*
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3732 2.10** 0.0755 0.27 0.2091 1.04 0.6018 4.15**** 0.4075 2.29**
Pct Federal Property 0.2108 1.49 0.1060 0.57 0.2656 2.01** 0.2889 2.02** 0.2162 1.52
Pct Protected Areas 0.1967 1.41 0.2213 1.68* 0.2770 1.79* 0.2645 1.96* 0.1920 1.37
Pct Canada -0.3447 -0.36 -0.1497 -0.11 -3.4270 -2.75*** 1.7269 2.59*** -0.0610 -0.07
Pct Mexico -3.7885 -6.08**** -2.8716 -3.49**** -3.4998 -3.91**** -2.5468 -4.40**** -3.6366 -6.08****
PUMA         
African-American Pct -0.1411 -4.09**** -0.1256 -2.04** -0.0930 -1.95* -0.1414 -4.07**** -0.1426 -4.17**** -0.0802 -3.29****
College Graduate Pct 0.8135 21.93**** 0.9063 12.10**** 0.8289 13.01**** 0.8019 20.67**** 0.8106 21.36**** 0.8262 21.61****
Contains the CBD -0.0110 -0.96 -0.0378 -2.69*** 0.0346 1.32 -0.0098 -0.84 -0.0121 -1.07 -0.0033 -0.37
Log of Area -0.0405 -3.98**** -0.0578 -4.45**** -0.0192 -1.06 -0.0469 -3.75**** -0.0452 -6.10**** -0.0311 -5.68****
Log of Distance to CBD 0.0120 1.00 0.0172 1.02 -0.0227 -1.30 0.0169 1.10 0.0181 2.43** 0.0101 1.62
Log of Elevation Change 0.0165 1.53 0.0496 4.21**** 0.0373 1.78* 0.0227 1.84* 0.0152 1.47 -0.0044 -0.67
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0882 3.44**** 0.1440 4.72**** 0.1068 2.65*** 0.1065 3.77**** 0.0843 3.34**** 0.0081 0.52
Abuts River -0.0232 -1.40 0.0114 0.67 -0.0536 -1.35 -0.0188 -1.15 -0.0219 -1.30 -0.0073 -0.62
Abuts Other Water Body -0.0209 -1.15 -0.0122 -0.53 -0.0169 -0.64 -0.0343 -1.83* -0.0225 -1.27 -0.0382 -2.38**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0183 -1.31 -0.0118 -0.54 0.0005 0.02 -0.0194 -1.24 -0.0192 -1.35 0.0100 1.17
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  -0.0933 - -0.0960 -13.05**** -0.0994 -7.16**** -0.0935 -14.24**** -0.0932 -14.22**** -0.0914 -15.88****
Number of Bedrooms 0.0843 18.00**** 0.0825 14.59**** 0.0861 11.11**** 0.0854 18.09**** 0.0841 18.02**** 0.0800 16.95****
Kitchen Facilities 0.0837 3.26**** 0.1312 3.09*** 0.0799 1.40 0.0814 3.20*** 0.0826 3.21*** 0.0847 3.44****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0280 1.08 0.0333 0.70 0.0566 1.12 0.0267 1.03 0.0285 1.10 0.0198 0.77
Number of Rooms 0.0551 19.05**** 0.0629 20.88**** 0.0529 11.84**** 0.0540 18.57**** 0.0551 19.17**** 0.0600 24.05****
Number of Cars 0.0700 22.97**** 0.0611 18.68**** 0.0779 19.43**** 0.0702 22.00**** 0.0698 22.95**** 0.0628 27.97****
Year Built -0.0340 - -0.0397 -17.19**** -0.0350 -9.65**** -0.0333 -12.56**** -0.0338 -12.64**** -0.0330 -15.49****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1027 -9.60**** -0.0724 -5.67**** -0.1339 -8.28**** -0.1040 -9.67**** -0.1031 -9.68**** -0.1074 -10.75****
Years of Schooling 0.0366 19.35**** 0.0404 32.32**** 0.0379 20.74**** 0.0368 19.21**** 0.0366 19.37**** 0.0366 19.53****
Age -0.0022 -8.72**** -0.0015 -6.78**** -0.0022 -6.97**** -0.0021 -8.69**** -0.0022 -8.72**** -0.0024 -10.00****
Female -0.0368 -9.56**** -0.0333 -7.09**** -0.0431 -5.36**** -0.0366 -9.51**** -0.0367 -9.57**** -0.0361 -10.08****
Married 0.0704 15.58**** 0.0726 12.76**** 0.0754 9.52**** 0.0715 15.24**** 0.0706 15.53**** 0.0668 17.85****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0052 -0.91 -0.0057 -0.87 -0.0080 -0.93 -0.0068 -1.20 -0.0056 -0.96 0.0004 0.05
Intercept 4.6920 17.26**** 4.3974 14.51**** 3.6026 9.26**** 4.6973 12.76**** 4.8554 31.44**** 1.0960 0.23
Number of observations 114,678  41,865 31,881 114,678  114,678 114,678
R2  0.4081 0.3840 0.4245 0.4067  0.4083 0.4448
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Table 43: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Monthly Rent Payment – Undevelopable Region 
Percentage – Area-25 
Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
monthly rent payment 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0217 2.99*** 0.0193 1.76* 0.0240 2.72*** 0.0167 2.60*** 0.8615 0.80
Log of MSA Population 0.0273 0.96 0.0059 0.18 0.0983 2.41** -0.0107 -0.32 -0.0042 -0.30 -0.0079 -0.02
African-American Pct -0.5337 -3.32**** -0.4876 -2.84*** -0.6069 -2.52** -0.5334 -3.16*** -0.5609 -3.62**** -0.9039 -1.33
College Graduate Pct -0.1016 -0.60 -0.0897 -0.49 0.2254 0.83 0.0329 0.21 -0.0316 -0.20 -0.3392 -1.06
Murder Rate 0.0029 0.67 0.0036 0.87 0.0051 0.73 0.0019 0.41 0.0041 0.92 0.0019 0.72
Mean Commute Time 0.0309 6.29**** 0.0321 5.62**** 0.0198 2.39** 0.0338 6.03**** 0.0353 9.58**** -0.0102 -2.36**
Pct Coastal -0.0154 -0.15 -0.1345 -1.09 0.0036 0.03 0.1112 1.13 0.0210 0.22
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.2362 -2.06** -0.1407 -0.97 -0.1960 -1.63 -0.0924 -0.90 -0.2014 -1.81*
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.4663 2.84*** 0.1770 0.60 0.1667 0.84 0.6018 4.15**** 0.5253 3.15***
Pct Federal Property 0.2245 1.71* 0.0777 0.39 0.2634 2.43** 0.2889 2.02** 0.2401 1.81*
Pct Protected Areas 0.1218 0.95 0.1595 1.20 0.1662 1.11 0.2645 1.96* 0.1424 1.08
Pct Canada -0.6454 -0.66 -0.1290 -0.09 -4.8116 -3.45**** 1.7269 2.59*** 0.1160 0.14
Pct Mexico -3.9216 -5.89**** -2.7617 -3.40**** -4.2006 -5.04**** -2.5468 -4.40**** -3.5012 -5.99****
PUMA         
African-American Pct -0.1412 -4.08**** -0.1281 -2.06** -0.0874 -1.89* -0.1414 -4.07**** -0.1432 -4.17**** -0.0802 -3.29****
College Graduate Pct 0.8207 22.03**** 0.9327 11.98**** 0.8572 12.26**** 0.8019 20.67**** 0.8134 21.25**** 0.8262 21.61****
Contains the CBD -0.0104 -0.91 -0.0383 -2.79*** 0.0272 1.07 -0.0098 -0.84 -0.0119 -1.07 -0.0033 -0.37
Log of Area -0.0343 -3.02*** -0.0543 -3.87**** -0.0155 -0.84 -0.0469 -3.75**** -0.0431 -5.67**** -0.0311 -5.68****
Log of Distance to CBD 0.0056 0.43 0.0134 0.73 -0.0193 -1.06 0.0169 1.10 0.0162 2.16** 0.0101 1.62
Log of Elevation Change 0.0098 0.94 0.0443 3.80**** 0.0195 1.02 0.0227 1.84* 0.0105 1.02 -0.0044 -0.67
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0800 3.26**** 0.1378 4.59**** 0.0882 2.42** 0.1065 3.77**** 0.0792 3.21*** 0.0080 0.52
Abuts River -0.0210 -1.23 0.0130 0.75 -0.0456 -1.13 -0.0188 -1.15 -0.0191 -1.10 -0.0073 -0.62
Abuts Other Water Body -0.0247 -1.32 -0.0184 -0.79 -0.0087 -0.32 -0.0343 -1.83* -0.0280 -1.58 -0.0382 -2.38**
Abuts Protected Area -0.0135 -1.03 -0.0100 -0.43 0.0034 0.14 -0.0194 -1.24 -0.0160 -1.17 0.0100 1.17
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  -0.0910 - -0.0945 -12.75**** -0.0963 -7.03**** -0.0935 -14.24**** -0.0915 -14.01**** -0.0914 -15.88****
Number of Bedrooms 0.0832 17.51**** 0.0825 14.58**** 0.0838 11.44**** 0.0854 18.09**** 0.0834 17.64**** 0.0800 16.95****
Kitchen Facilities 0.0843 3.29**** 0.1318 3.08*** 0.0774 1.35 0.0814 3.20*** 0.0823 3.19*** 0.0847 3.44****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0292 1.12 0.0307 0.65 0.0598 1.20 0.0267 1.03 0.0294 1.13 0.0199 0.77
Number of Rooms 0.0552 19.02**** 0.0631 20.72**** 0.0540 12.21**** 0.0540 18.57**** 0.0550 18.95**** 0.0600 24.05****
Number of Cars 0.0701 22.78**** 0.0612 18.54**** 0.0768 19.81**** 0.0702 22.00**** 0.0698 22.71**** 0.0627 27.99****
Year Built -0.0330 - -0.0392 -16.91**** -0.0338 -9.50**** -0.0333 -12.56**** -0.0329 -12.57**** -0.0330 -15.49****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1020 -9.47**** -0.0727 -5.66**** -0.1321 -8.09**** -0.1040 -9.67**** -0.1029 -9.68**** -0.1074 -10.75****
Years of Schooling 0.0365 19.36**** 0.0403 31.85**** 0.0376 20.53**** 0.0368 19.21**** 0.0365 19.45**** 0.0366 19.53****
Age -0.0022 -8.79**** -0.0015 -6.76**** -0.0022 -7.16**** -0.0021 -8.69**** -0.0022 -8.76**** -0.0024 -10.00****
Female -0.0366 -9.45**** -0.0333 -7.06**** -0.0427 -5.26**** -0.0366 -9.51**** -0.0365 -9.47**** -0.0361 -10.08****
Married 0.0699 15.83**** 0.0724 12.71**** 0.0755 9.78**** 0.0715 15.24**** 0.0705 15.64**** 0.0668 17.85****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 -0.0039 -0.66 -0.0051 -0.77 -0.0041 -0.45 -0.0068 -1.20 -0.0049 -0.84 0.0002 0.03
Intercept 4.3309 14.40**** 4.2023 11.82**** 3.4035 8.12**** 4.6973 12.76**** 4.6403 31.54**** 3.9468 0.88
Number of observations 114,678  41,865 31,881 114,678  114,678 114,678
R2  0.4078 0.3834 0.4257 0.4067  0.4084 0.4448
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
mean household wage 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0193 2.38** 0.0130 1.08 0.0262 2.92*** 0.0155 1.86* 1.2234 1.86*
Log of MSA Population 0.0043 0.35 0.0134 0.90 0.0044 0.26 0.0254 1.42 -0.0058 -0.80 -0.0196 -0.08
African-American Pct -0.1454 -1.68* -0.0030 -0.03 -0.2120 -1.41 -0.1247 -1.27 -0.1609 -1.90* -0.6356 -1.26
College Graduate Pct -0.2257 -2.56** -0.1610 -1.53 -0.1541 -1.13 -0.2267 -2.37** -0.2058 -2.32** -0.4617 -1.78*
Murder Rate 0.0045 2.20** 0.0008 0.36 0.0037 1.31 0.0032 1.41 0.0051 2.44** -0.0010 -0.66
Mean Commute Time 0.0118 4.53**** 0.0084 2.80*** 0.0120 2.86*** 0.0099 2.96*** 0.0138 6.92**** 0.0007 0.22
Pct Coastal -0.2744 -3.13*** -0.2333 -1.88* -0.2826 -3.14*** -0.0958 -2.12** -0.2367 -2.86***
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.1636 -1.78* -0.1657 -1.23 -0.2254 -2.36** 0.0248 0.36 -0.1253 -1.39
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3062 2.97*** 0.2136 1.55 0.2839 2.32** 0.4335 3.77**** 0.3458 3.32****
Pct Federal Property -0.2139 -1.84* -0.1429 -0.86 -0.2785 -2.56** -0.0314 -0.46 -0.1800 -1.55
Pct Protected Areas -0.1796 -1.82* -0.1239 -0.86 -0.2840 -2.71*** 0.0497 0.89 -0.1411 -1.39
Pct Canada 2.1899 7.36**** 2.7456 6.55**** 2.5966 5.20**** 2.2996 7.54**** 2.3287 7.63****
Pct Mexico -1.2410 -4.87**** -1.7002 -6.76**** -0.9304 -2.39** -1.0135 -3.72**** -1.1403 -4.56****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0164 0.88 0.0073 0.27 0.0190 0.54 0.0172 0.92 0.0155 0.83 0.0373 2.73***
College Graduate Pct 0.7397 17.64**** 0.6031 14.42**** 0.8173 11.01**** 0.7400 18.20**** 0.7405 17.30**** 0.7393 17.41****
Contains the CBD -0.0084 -1.24 -0.0095 -1.21 -0.0157 -1.22 -0.0066 -1.00 -0.0092 -1.37 -0.0080 -1.59
Log of Area 0.0082 1.55 -0.0028 -0.40 0.0064 0.99 0.0120 1.66* 0.0054 1.14 0.0046 1.09
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0022 -0.36 0.0039 0.43 0.0006 0.07 -0.0088 -1.00 0.0021 0.46 0.0009 0.19
Log of Elevation Change 0.0182 2.86*** 0.0363 4.87**** 0.0135 1.36 0.0215 3.37**** 0.0173 2.78*** 0.0215 4.15****
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0798 6.82**** 0.0709 5.02**** 0.0794 4.29**** 0.0851 7.09**** 0.0776 6.62**** 0.0750 5.79****
Abuts River -0.0035 -0.47 -0.0093 -0.98 -0.0010 -0.05 -0.0057 -0.77 -0.0029 -0.39 -0.0081 -1.37
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0004 0.05 0.0158 1.66* -0.0086 -0.55 0.0064 0.69 0.0006 0.07 -0.0011 -0.10
Abuts Protected Area -0.0045 -0.55 -0.0133 -0.98 0.0005 0.03 -0.0034 -0.45 -0.0051 -0.60 -0.0014 -0.26
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0680 11.72**** 0.0610 9.66**** 0.0881 5.67**** 0.0676 11.61**** 0.0680 11.69**** 0.0701 13.08****
Number of Bedrooms -0.0134 -3.94**** -0.0077 -2.05** -0.0154 -3.08*** -0.0132 -3.90**** -0.0134 -3.93**** -0.0144 -4.37****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1005 4.44**** 0.0724 1.90* 0.1190 3.03*** 0.0997 4.41**** 0.1004 4.44**** 0.1018 4.50****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0289 1.30 0.0408 1.20 0.0380 1.31 0.0278 1.25 0.0290 1.31 0.0261 1.18
Number of Rooms 0.0734 23.70**** 0.0673 24.34**** 0.0781 21.22**** 0.0735 23.49**** 0.0736 23.79**** 0.0760 26.40****
Number of Cars -0.2257 - -0.2156 -57.38**** -0.2386 -35.41**** -0.2256 -65.40**** -0.2258 -64.96**** -0.2281 -69.86****
Year Built -0.0256 - -0.0302 -25.41**** -0.0273 -13.74**** -0.0253 -19.30**** -0.0254 -20.50**** -0.0265 -21.83****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1417 - -0.1439 -13.73**** -0.1640 -7.30**** -0.1420 -11.10**** -0.1420 -11.03**** -0.1460 -11.49****
Years of Schooling 0.0838 82.42**** 0.0792 70.68**** 0.0873 55.49**** 0.0839 81.88**** 0.0838 82.03**** 0.0834 79.30****
Age 0.0228 59.10**** 0.0237 67.26**** 0.0231 47.61**** 0.0228 59.34**** 0.0228 59.19**** 0.0227 59.44****
Female -0.0923 - -0.0927 -27.01**** -0.0978 -19.16**** -0.0921 -33.72**** -0.0923 -33.59**** -0.0930 -35.03****
Married -0.0917 - -0.0991 -22.63**** -0.0689 -9.05**** -0.0916 -23.06**** -0.0915 -23.30**** -0.0923 -23.78****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 0.0186 7.81**** 0.0184 4.82**** 0.0185 3.69**** 0.0185 7.86**** 0.0182 7.71**** 0.0242 5.26****
Intercept 0.1892 1.37 0.1299 0.74 0.0648 0.39 -0.0685 -0.37 0.2819 2.97*** -4.7305 -1.84*
Number of observations 865,867  353,554 235,637 865,867  865,867 865,867
R2  0.2352 0.2206 0.2428 0.2350  0.2353 0.2389
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 44: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Hourly Wage – Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
Table 45: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Hourly Wage – Inner and Outer 
Boundaries 
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
mean household wage 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0056 1.45 0.0061 1.13 0.0088 1.75* 0.0055 1.34 1.4216 2.67***
Log of MSA Population 0.0062 0.48 0.0159 1.10 0.0057 0.33 0.0254 1.42 -0.0050 -0.70 -0.0796 -0.36
African-American Pct -0.1533 -1.69* -0.0074 -0.07 -0.2064 -1.31 -0.1247 -1.27 -0.1685 -1.91* -0.5866 -1.14
College Graduate Pct -0.1791 -1.96* -0.1384 -1.32 -0.0636 -0.49 -0.2267 -2.37** -0.1637 -1.86* -0.4976 -1.92*
Murder Rate 0.0047 2.24** 0.0008 0.34 0.0044 1.44 0.0032 1.41 0.0054 2.51** -0.0010 -0.68
Mean Commute Time 0.0122 4.67**** 0.0083 2.76*** 0.0129 3.17*** 0.0099 2.96*** 0.0141 6.93**** 0.0007 0.21
Pct Coastal -0.1479 -3.07*** -0.1657 -2.77*** -0.1339 -2.39** -0.0958 -2.12** -0.1450 -3.19***
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.0278 -0.45 -0.0891 -1.05 -0.0662 -1.04 0.0248 0.36 -0.0260 -0.40
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3972 3.48**** 0.2476 1.72* 0.4045 3.28**** 0.4335 3.77**** 0.4095 3.63****
Pct Federal Property -0.0809 -1.10 -0.0652 -0.68 -0.1197 -1.46 -0.0314 -0.46 -0.0817 -1.10
Pct Protected Areas -0.0247 -0.36 -0.0466 -0.51 -0.1021 -1.41 0.0497 0.89 -0.0288 -0.42
Pct Canada 2.2112 6.55**** 2.6381 5.84**** 2.4634 4.34**** 2.2996 7.54**** 2.3071 6.76****
Pct Mexico -1.0822 -4.10**** -1.6854 -6.31**** -0.6827 -1.75* -1.0135 -3.72**** -1.0360 -3.90****
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0166 0.89 0.0085 0.32 0.0158 0.45 0.0172 0.92 0.0158 0.85 0.0373 2.73***
College Graduate Pct 0.7407 17.62**** 0.6017 14.64**** 0.8177 11.09**** 0.7400 18.20**** 0.7413 17.26**** 0.7393 17.41****
Contains the CBD -0.0083 -1.25 -0.0092 -1.16 -0.0144 -1.13 -0.0066 -1.00 -0.0093 -1.39 -0.0080 -1.59
Log of Area 0.0083 1.47 -0.0022 -0.32 0.0075 1.11 0.0120 1.66* 0.0054 1.13 0.0046 1.09
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0026 -0.40 0.0028 0.30 0.0004 0.05 -0.0088 -1.00 0.0019 0.40 0.0009 0.19
Log of Elevation Change 0.0190 3.00*** 0.0365 5.09**** 0.0141 1.47 0.0215 3.37**** 0.0178 2.87*** 0.0215 4.15****
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0795 6.63**** 0.0700 4.89**** 0.0805 4.24**** 0.0851 7.09**** 0.0769 6.41**** 0.0750 5.79****
Abuts River -0.0044 -0.60 -0.0102 -1.08 -0.0033 -0.14 -0.0057 -0.77 -0.0035 -0.49 -0.0081 -1.37
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0062 0.70 0.0194 1.98** 0.0006 0.04 0.0064 0.69 0.0054 0.62 -0.0011 -0.10
Abuts Protected Area -0.0045 -0.55 -0.0133 -1.00 -0.0011 -0.07 -0.0034 -0.45 -0.0051 -0.60 -0.0014 -0.26
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0679 11.64**** 0.0611 9.69**** 0.0875 5.60**** 0.0676 11.61**** 0.0680 11.62**** 0.0701 13.08****
Number of Bedrooms -0.0135 -3.97**** -0.0080 -2.11** -0.0154 -3.05*** -0.0132 -3.90**** -0.0136 -3.96**** -0.0143 -4.37****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1002 4.43**** 0.0727 1.91* 0.1181 3.03*** 0.0997 4.41**** 0.1003 4.43**** 0.1018 4.50****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0285 1.28 0.0405 1.19 0.0371 1.28 0.0278 1.25 0.0288 1.30 0.0261 1.18
Number of Rooms 0.0737 23.74**** 0.0675 24.32**** 0.0782 21.02**** 0.0735 23.49**** 0.0738 23.82**** 0.0760 26.40****
Number of Cars -0.2258 - -0.2156 -57.29**** -0.2387 -35.28**** -0.2256 -65.40**** -0.2259 -64.60**** -0.2281 -69.86****
Year Built -0.0253 - -0.0302 -25.41**** -0.0271 -13.91**** -0.0253 -19.30**** -0.0252 -20.42**** -0.0265 -21.83****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1420 - -0.1437 -13.76**** -0.1654 -7.26**** -0.1420 -11.10**** -0.1422 -11.04**** -0.1460 -11.49****
Years of Schooling 0.0838 82.18**** 0.0792 70.69**** 0.0873 55.27**** 0.0839 81.88**** 0.0838 81.93**** 0.0834 79.30****
Age 0.0228 59.01**** 0.0237 67.09**** 0.0231 47.56**** 0.0228 59.34**** 0.0227 59.07**** 0.0227 59.44****
Female -0.0923 - -0.0927 -27.06**** -0.0976 -19.02**** -0.0921 -33.72**** -0.0923 -33.63**** -0.0930 -35.03****
Married -0.0916 - -0.0992 -22.53**** -0.0688 -9.02**** -0.0916 -23.06**** -0.0914 -23.12**** -0.0923 -23.78****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 0.0182 7.79**** 0.0180 4.89**** 0.0182 3.66**** 0.0185 7.86**** 0.0179 7.60**** 0.0239 5.15****
Intercept 0.1377 0.97 0.0937 0.56 0.0080 0.05 -0.0685 -0.37 0.2497 2.79*** -5.0786 -1.99**
Number of observations 865,867  353,554 235,637 865,867  865,867 865,867
R2  0.2352 0.2206 0.2427 0.2350  0.2352 0.2389
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 46: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Hourly Wage – Outer Boundaries Only
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Dependent variable: 
Log of real (2006), value of 
mean household wage 
2SLS Model 
2SLS Model – 
Unbound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
Bound PUMAs 
2SLS Model – 
No HSE OLS Model 
MSA Effects OLS 
Model 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
MSA/URBAN AREA     
Housing Supply Effect 0.0043 0.96 0.0077 1.51 0.0048 1.03 0.0040 0.86 0.3242 0.35
Log of MSA Population 0.0135 0.95 0.0163 1.01 0.0234 1.01 0.0254 1.42 -0.0026 -0.38 0.2489 1.30
African-American Pct -0.1480 -1.56 -0.0123 -0.12 -0.1979 -1.22 -0.1247 -1.27 -0.1696 -1.86* -0.7958 -1.55
College Graduate Pct -0.2045 -2.27** -0.1452 -1.35 -0.0861 -0.66 -0.2267 -2.37** -0.1823 -2.09** -0.4303 -1.67*
Murder Rate 0.0042 1.95* 0.0010 0.44 0.0032 1.00 0.0032 1.41 0.0052 2.39** -0.0005 -0.31
Mean Commute Time 0.0118 4.17**** 0.0086 2.78*** 0.0110 2.15** 0.0099 2.96*** 0.0145 7.01**** 0.0013 0.44
Pct Coastal -0.1304 -3.16*** -0.1638 -3.06*** -0.0985 -1.75* -0.0958 -2.12** -0.1249 -3.04***
Pct Rivers & Lakes -0.0037 -0.05 -0.0780 -0.91 -0.0118 -0.18 0.0248 0.36 -0.0002 0.00
Pct Steep Hillsides 0.3964 2.81*** 0.2068 1.60 0.4067 2.84*** 0.4335 3.77**** 0.4165 3.00***
Pct Federal Property -0.0464 -0.69 -0.0409 -0.47 -0.0634 -0.92 -0.0314 -0.46 -0.0477 -0.71
Pct Protected Areas 0.0285 0.47 0.0045 0.06 -0.0272 -0.35 0.0497 0.89 0.0222 0.38
Pct Canada 1.9854 3.59**** 2.1180 3.08*** 2.0837 2.88*** 2.2996 7.54**** 2.1481 3.90****
Pct Mexico -1.2215 -3.30**** -1.9891 -5.67**** -0.8615 -1.85* -1.0135 -3.72**** -1.1396 -3.00***
PUMA         
African-American Pct 0.0158 0.85 0.0079 0.29 0.0174 0.48 0.0172 0.92 0.0146 0.78 0.0373 2.73***
College Graduate Pct 0.7415 17.71**** 0.6065 14.55**** 0.8179 11.16**** 0.7400 18.20**** 0.7422 17.16**** 0.7392 17.41****
Contains the CBD -0.0080 -1.23 -0.0093 -1.17 -0.0132 -1.03 -0.0066 -1.00 -0.0093 -1.42 -0.0080 -1.59
Log of Area 0.0100 1.59 -0.0021 -0.27 0.0129 1.54 0.0120 1.66* 0.0059 1.24 0.0046 1.09
Log of Distance to CBD -0.0049 -0.66 0.0032 0.32 -0.0052 -0.47 -0.0088 -1.00 0.0015 0.33 0.0009 0.19
Log of Elevation Change 0.0190 3.20*** 0.0363 5.21**** 0.0147 1.58 0.0215 3.37**** 0.0174 2.94*** 0.0215 4.15****
Abuts Ocean/Great Lake 0.0789 6.44**** 0.0659 4.54**** 0.0825 4.26**** 0.0851 7.09**** 0.0754 6.13**** 0.0750 5.79****
Abuts River -0.0054 -0.77 -0.0122 -1.28 -0.0096 -0.41 -0.0057 -0.77 -0.0042 -0.60 -0.0081 -1.37
Abuts Other Water Body 0.0081 0.98 0.0209 2.14** 0.0030 0.19 0.0064 0.69 0.0067 0.84 -0.0010 -0.10
Abuts Protected Area -0.0041 -0.50 -0.0154 -1.18 -0.0022 -0.13 -0.0034 -0.45 -0.0050 -0.58 -0.0015 -0.26
HOUSEHOLD          
Acres  0.0678 11.64**** 0.0609 9.65**** 0.0869 5.55**** 0.0676 11.61**** 0.0678 11.65**** 0.0701 13.08****
Number of Bedrooms -0.0135 -3.97**** -0.0081 -2.14** -0.0151 -2.99*** -0.0132 -3.90**** -0.0136 -3.96**** -0.0144 -4.37****
Kitchen Facilities 0.1003 4.44**** 0.0729 1.91* 0.1166 2.97*** 0.0997 4.41**** 0.1003 4.44**** 0.1017 4.49****
Plumbing Facilities 0.0283 1.28 0.0410 1.21 0.0370 1.29 0.0278 1.25 0.0287 1.30 0.0261 1.18
Number of Rooms 0.0738 23.63**** 0.0676 24.45**** 0.0780 20.53**** 0.0735 23.49**** 0.0739 23.77**** 0.0760 26.40****
Number of Cars -0.2258 - -0.2157 -57.40**** -0.2386 -35.23**** -0.2256 -65.40**** -0.2260 -64.78**** -0.2281 -69.85****
Year Built -0.0253 - -0.0302 -25.62**** -0.0274 -14.31**** -0.0253 -19.30**** -0.0251 -19.50**** -0.0265 -21.82****
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD          
African-American -0.1419 - -0.1431 -13.61**** -0.1655 -7.27**** -0.1420 -11.10**** -0.1421 -10.99**** -0.1460 -11.49****
Years of Schooling 0.0839 81.59**** 0.0792 70.71**** 0.0873 55.63**** 0.0839 81.88**** 0.0838 81.36**** 0.0834 79.30****
Age 0.0228 59.22**** 0.0237 67.22**** 0.0231 47.66**** 0.0228 59.34**** 0.0228 59.23**** 0.0227 59.44****
Female -0.0922 - -0.0926 -27.03**** -0.0975 -19.05**** -0.0921 -33.72**** -0.0923 -33.63**** -0.0931 -35.03****
Married -0.0916 - -0.0993 -22.52**** -0.0689 -8.95**** -0.0916 -23.06**** -0.0914 -22.76**** -0.0923 -23.78****
TIME         
Dummy variable for 2005 0.0185 7.78**** 0.0185 4.89**** 0.0184 3.50**** 0.0185 7.86**** 0.0181 7.52**** 0.0248 5.35****
Intercept 0.0581 0.39 0.0881 0.50 -0.1604 -0.79 -0.0685 -0.37 0.2197 2.51** -3.7170 -1.40
Number of observations 865,867  353,554 235,637 865,867  865,867 865,867
R2  0.2351 0.2206 0.2425 0.2350  0.2352 0.2389
**** Significant at 0.1% level *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
Table 47: Regression Results using American Community Survey PUMS Data on Household Hourly Wage – Undevelopable Region 
Percentage – Area-UA 
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